Marxists and the British

Labour Party

The New Turn - What Is the Alternative?

Minority Document

Party Building

111) It has been posed frequently in debates: "What kind of organisation do you want for the 1990s? What is your alternative to the 'Turn'?"

112) We want a strong, outward-looking organisation -with a healthy internal regime - built on firm foundations and sound roots in the Labour Movement and the youth.

113) If we are going to develop a more effective organisation in the coming period then we need an honest balance-sheet of our past strengths and weaknesses. What are the pluses and minuses? What are the lessons of the past period? How are we equipped to tackle or face the tasks ahead?

114) The building of the organisation is a very complex task. However, the first prerequisite must be a self-acting and critical minded rank and file who must be fully involved in the decision making of the organisation. Comrades must feel free to question and criticise any decisions or proposals that they are not convinced about, without any fear of being labelled a 'conservative', 'pessimist' or worse, 'disloyal. Comrades must feel free to express opposition views - or even to join established factions, which is their democratic right - without the fear of the full weight of the FT apparatus being used to discredit and isolate them. We must welcome a mil, free and democratic discussion on all issues, as it is only through the clarity of ideas that the organisation can go forward. Internal democracy is the vital oxygen of the revolutionary organisation, at every level. Only on this basis can we develop a strong and healthy organisation.

115) For too long, there has been a tendency to take decisions at the top and relay them to the ranks without any meaningful dialogue. There has been a fear of real 'controversy' in the ranks as this might divert attention away from the everyday tasks of FF, papers, etc. This has resulted in a certain frustration in the ranks which must be overcome by an honest discussion over the way things have been run in the past, and how to improve them in the future.

116) We have correctly characterised the present period as a very complex one. The lengthy 'boom' of the 1980s and the collapse of Stalinism in particular have had an effect on the working class. In Britain we are faced with an industrial lull and the mass of workers are now looking to the electoral plane and the prospect of a Labour government. But even within this picture there are certain cross currents, especially amongst the youth.

117) We have previously recognised that if a Labour Government comes to power the organisation will face a difficult period initially. Only with the development of cadres can we hope to build and develop the organisation. We therefore need to take stock of the situation, and prepare the organisation to deal with these real problems and equip ourselves politically and organisationally for the tasks that lie ahead.

118) The organisation has made tremendous progress over the past decade. We have succeeded in establishing ourselves as a component section of the labour movement. We have recorded great successes in the class struggle, especially in Liverpool and the epic poll tax battle. We have become the largest organisation on the left, completely eclipsing the Stalinists. Many other gains, including on the parliamentary front, could provide us with big possibilities for future growth.

119) These past gains have been achieved by our correct programme, perspectives, and flexible methods. It is also based upon the self sacrifice of our comrades in their pioneering work in the labour movement. Resting on this colossal capital built up over decades, we can be confident - provided we avoid the pitfalls of ultra-leftism and opportunism - of our future growth and development.

120) In drawing up a balance sheet, it is necessary to have an honest appraisal, not only of our strengths and successes, but also of our weaknesses and mistakes. Only by correcting these deficiencies in sufficient time can we successfully lay the solid foundations for our transformation into a decisive political force over the coming years.

121) The complex political situation has not only had its effects upon the working class and its organisations, but also upon our own organisation itself. Despite our consistent intervention in struggles and the labour movement, we have faced a period of retrenchment in terms of comrades, locals, DCs [District Committees], paper sales, etc. In these terms we are far weaker than we were 5 years ago. Unfortunately the weakness of our cadre and our one-sided approach to party building have served to compound these problems.

122) In the past, the organisation has correctly pursued a bold recruitment policy. The need to draw workers and youth rapidly into our ranks was crucial if we were to capitalise on the potential that existed. This approach largely resulted in a sizable increase in the tendency up until 1987.

123) We recognised that such bold recruitment would mean a certain turnover in the ranks. This was regarded as acceptable as long as it remained at a relatively low level. However, turnover in the last 5 years has reached alarming proportions. The figures given at the last national event in January indicted a 50 per cent turnover on those given for the previous event. We have the development of a 'revolving door' syndrome. Even now, the majority of the ranks is composed of paper members -something in the past we were highly critical of the Communist Party for being. This has resulted not from more rapid recruitment, but grave deficiencies in consolidation and training and the complex objective situation. This high turnover has even affected the Full Time staff. We ought to have taken urgent action earlier to reverse this trend, and strengthen the cadre basis of the organisation. If this is not done, then the burden of work will tend to fall on fewer and tower shoulders. It will become like an inverted pyramid.

124) Consolidation is not an optional question that we can take or leave. The development of a cadre is a political task. The training of them is a prime responsibility of the organisation. How many times did we condemn the SLL/WRP for its method of pure activism, which destroyed countless workers and youth?

125) To tackle this serious problem is not to turn the tendency into a discussion circle. Activity and intervention in the class struggle is a vital ingredient in the training of cadres. To counter-pose one to the other is false from beginning to end. However, without the necessary balance and political training then we will be in danger of building on sand. That has been the salutary lesson of the past five years.

126) Of course, over the last two years in England and Wales (and in Scotland three), we have been heavily involved in the poll tax work. There appeared little time to consolidate the new recruits. But in that case it is even more important to be more conscious about education and training and to take special measures to redress the balance. This is vital given the very complex nature of the period.

127) The analogy with 1917 and the growth of the Bolshevik party from 8,000 to 240,000 with very limited cadres is false. The Bolshevik party was able to become a mass party due to the correct policy and tactics of Lenin, and the tumultuous events of that year. The revolutionary tasks were posed within a space of nine months. We are still at the very early stages of the revolutionary movement of the British working class. The development of the British revolution will be of a far more protracted character. The development of cadres if paramount in the building of the organisation in the next period. Without the necessary training of cadres, especially in this period, how is it possible to grow in the future to 10,000, 20,000, and so on?

128) Although this weakness has been recognised formally in ample resolutions to numerous conferences, etc, little has been done in practise nationally to correct the situation. We must ensure that past decisions are translated into reality.

129) We therefore propose the immediate establishment of a department responsible for the systematic education and training of the organisation. That a special session be given at a NEB to consider the work and plans of such a department so that it can be integrated into all aspects of the work.

130) This far more balanced approach to party building and the training of our comrades, including the FT staff, will assist in regenerating the structures of the tendency, especially the locals. This is vital as healthy locals will moan a more healthy organisation overall.

131) In previous resolutions we have stressed the need for the locals to work out a strategy to penetrate the labour movement locally. It must be responsible for the organisational tasks in each field, and work out how they can be applied to local conditions. However, we must also re-establish the local as the key political unit of the organisation.

132) Unfortunately a whole layer of comrades, particularly industrial comrades, have tended to turn their back on the locals as they get very little from them, politically or organisationally. As one NEB member wrote to the EB there: "has been a drop in the political level and the loss of a layer of trained comrades. This has load to weaknesses in the branches." We have to rectify this by making them more relevant and attractive.

133) We must raise the level of the branches by assisting the education of newer comrades by the systematic organisation of special training schools, meetings, as well as other initiatives.

134) In relation to party building the organisation must reappraise the way targets are arrived at and implemented. There exists a widespread feeling that targets are decided upon from on high and simply handed down to the ranks without any consultation or full appreciation of the subjective weaknesses of the organisation. We must ensure a dialogue is carried out before all targets are agreed in future. For example, the target we set in January was 5,000 new comrades by the end of this year. We have no hope of achieving it, but instead of amending it, it was simply retained. Why didn't we face reality and do so? Over Walton, as explained, the target was for doubling and trebling the ranks - how many comrades actually believed or knew about the target? Such pie-in-the-sky targets, which were never even challenged by the NEB comrades, just serve to undermine the confidence of comrades in the targets proposed nationally. There is a feeling that the leadership is out of touch. We must have an attentive ear to those who raise doubts or opposition to proposed targets. It is far too easy to write off these genuine doubts as 'conservative', instead of patiently discussing with and hopefully convincing the comrades of their correctness, or they the leadership with their unrealistic proposals.

135) What this feeling reflects is a lack of genuine involvement of the ranks in the decision making of the organisation. From this flows the need to ensure the widest internal democracy and fullest participation in the collective work of the tendency. It requires greater control and accountability over the leading bodies. Unfortunately, over the past few years it appears the opposite process has occurred.

136) The change from a lay leadership to a FT NEB in 1980-81 was taken to professionalise the leadership of the tendency. It was to allow greater flexibility, to meet rapidly, to deal with abrupt changes in the situation. However in recent years we have ended up with fewer meetings of the elected bodies, resulting in an undermining of accountability by the ranks. Although we face the pressure of events, we must remember that the Bolsheviks held their congresses every year, including the international, even despite the difficulties of the civil war period.

137) On the other side, the dangers of a FT NEB becoming 'out of touch' were recognised at the time. As a result, guarantees of greater control over the NEB were undertaken. There were to be regular full annual national events, a regular National Industrial Bureau to maintain the links with the industrial workers, two National Councils each year, as well as regular NEBs to ensure greater accountability over the FT leadership.

138) Unfortunately those guarantees have fallen largely by the wayside. We therefore call for them to be reinstated forthwith. These will then provide the necessary forums for the ranks to collectively develop our perspectives, strategy and tactics at each stage.

139) It is alarming that discussions over the tactic of standing independent candidates in Liverpool last May had taken place in for some time in Liverpool but nowhere else. This constituted a fundamental change in tactics yet even the NEB did not discuss it until the decision had been taken and it was too late to change. Even the EB only discussed it once to approve the recommendation from Liverpool. As another NEB comrade wrote criticising the EB, "I think it is ridiculous that comrades get to hear about what is going on first in the pages of the bourgeois press."

140) The vital issue of standing more independent candidates in the general election should be thoroughly discussed out, weighing up all the implications, including the possibility of splitting the Labour vote and allowing a Tory or Liberal in, instead of being pre-empted with announcements in the capitalist press. Such actions can only demonstrate a contempt for the ranks who should be fully involved in deciding these issues.

141) This greater involvement of the membership in the decision making of the organisation will serve to raise the political level as well as the collective consciousness concerning the tasks that face us. It will allow us to conduct a real dialogue with the comrades on all aspects of the work and serve to transform the outlook of the organisation as a whole.

142) These measures will also serve to cut across the tendency towards 'commandism' that have arisen from the organisational pressures of the Centre.

143) Likewise they will assist in overcoming the sickness of substitutionism, especially by the FT staff. The continual pressure from the Centre to 'deliver the goods', which bears down on the FTs especially, force them to take shortcuts. Instead of being able to train up organisers in the various fields, they appear to be on a treadmill dealing with one organisational crisis after another. The FTs are forced to step in more and more to fill the gaps in the apparatus. It has been reported recently that the decline in the number of finance organisers has resulted in FTs taking responsibility for this even at branch level.

144) A recent letter from an NEB explains: "At present the FTs spend a lot of their effort in covering the organisational gaps in the work. This can lead to the position where the FTs come under pressure to substitute themselves for the organisation and not do their main job which is giving political leadership.

"This pressure is particularly sharp on the question of finance especially the regular income. We have achieved miracles on the regular income. However is there not a trend which could become a problem that the FTs become like Labour Party Agents spending their time raising the money to pay their keep?"

145) We must undertake a thorough review of the organisation at all levels, and take urgent measures to increase the active base of the organisation. Unless we do this then we will not have the necessary forces to face up to the increased tasks of the future. This will not be accomplished by brow-beating, but by real inspiration and a patient approach. Above all it will mean an improved life of the local, with political training as a key component. This will give rise to more effective work, enabling us to penetrate the local labour movement and establish a sound basis for the ideas of Marxism.

146) This is a timely period to undertake such a review and reorganisation of our work. We have gone through the mighty battle of the poll tax - although this is still not at a complete end - and it is essential to take stock of the situation. This, of course, is not a recipe for "passivity". After all, wasn't it Trotsky who stated that the nerves of comrades must not be strained indefinitely. After hard efforts one needs to catch one's breath, get one's bearings and restore one's energies. This is essential to prepare the organisation for the next stage in its development.

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