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Marxists and the British

Labour Party

The New Turn - What Is the Alternative?

Minority Document

76) We are accused of failing "to answer the case made out in Scotland: Perspectives and Tasks 1991." (For the Scottish Turn 197). The whole of our original document was an answer to the proposed 'turn'. But in addition we are accused of not dealing sufficiently with the problem of Scottish nationalism.

77) To begin with, we stand by the position put in the British Perspectives 1991 document which dealt in outline with Scottish nationalism and the likely perspectives that flowed from it.

78) The crisis of capitalism has led to a revival of the national question in Scotland and Wales. The incapacity of reformism to solve the problems of the working class and middle class provides fertile ground for the nationalists. The de-industrialisation of Wales and Scotland, with the destruction of much of the basic industries, has resulted in an exodus to the South-East in search of work. This in turn has reinforced the genuine aspirations of the Scottish and Welsh people for greater control over their lives. This has been reflected in opinion polls and the support for elected assemblies.

In the coming general election, Labour will win the overwhelming majority of the working class vote. However, added to this is Labour's promise to establish a Scottish Assembly.

80) Despite the actions of the reformist leaders, there still remains an overwhelming loyalty of the Scottish working class to its traditional organisations. This was reflected when Dick Douglas, who resigned as a Labour MP and stood in the regional elections as Independent Labour against a right wing pro-poll tax Labour candidate and was defeated. This was despite his reputation as an MP, and his support for mass non-payment, etc.

81) The shift of layers of youth towards the nationalists is of course a potential danger. The fact that they have not turned towards the YRC and its revolutionary banner, despite the efforts of the comrades, means that they do not at this stage see it as a real alternative. The same would be also be true of a small revolutionary organisation/party.

82) In the event of a Tory victory, with the disillusionment and despair, there could be a move in the direction of nationalism. This however is not automatic. Much will depend upon the national and international situation and the events in the industrial field. As the original Scottish document stated, "In this complex period, perspectives are of necessity conditional. For instance, nationalism could be held in check if a huge wave of industrial conflict were to engulf Britain. In the miners' strike of 1984-85 nationalist sentiment was completely eclipsed by class loyalty and the Scottish National Party was driven into the political wilder-ness."(Scotland, Perspectives and Tasks 93). Despite the Scottish National Party's left face. the future movement of the working class in Scotland and nationally will certainly serve to cut the ground from under their feet. In this context, the article in the paper in September covering perspectives for Scottish nationalism, was inadequate as it did not deal with the possibility of trade union struggle checking a movement towards nationalism.

83) If Labour wins, after 12 years of Toryism, there will be enormous credit given, temporarily, to the Kinnock government, especially if it promises to create a Scottish Assembly. This very act would serve to temporarily cut across nationalism. There will be a honeymoon period.

When they move on to counter-reforms, a reaction and disillusionment will develop. Under these conditions there could be a renewed move towards nationalism in Scotland and Wales.

84) As we explained in the British Perspectives 1991, "The development of industrial struggles in England, Wales and Scotland would tend to unify the workers and lead to a decline of nationalism and nationalist parties. Similarly, the development of a mass, left opposition within the Labour Party and trade unions, with the forces of Marxism playing a prominent role, would provide a powerful counter-attraction to those sections of the working class and youth currently looking towards the Scottish National Party." (British Perspectives 1991 203). Unfortunately, the turn will serve to undermine this position as all our forces will be outside of the Party.

85) We never attempted to over exaggerate the dangers of nationalism. This is being done now to panic the comrades into accepting the new 'turn'. Suddenly Scottish nationalism becomes the major threat. According to a leading Scottish comrade, "I predict that the campaign around a Scottish Assembly will assume even greater political proportions than the campaign against the poll tax - in other words, mass civil disobedience to force a Tory government to grant an assembly or a Labour government to allow it to work."(our emphasis). We believe this is a complete exaggeration of the situation. Although we do not discount a movement over this issue, to equate with the mass movement against the poll tax is to completely mislead the comrades. If nationalism was such a danger why the extremely scant coverage in the paper over the last 12 months? This year there has only been one article on Scottish nationalism, and that was the centre page article last month.

86) The question of Scottish nationalism has been exaggerated and drawn in to back up arguments for the turn. If it was so vital, why did the lead-off and summing-up by FT [Full time worker for the Militant] at the April NEB discussion on the turn hardly mention a single word about Scottish nationalism? Because in April it was not the issue at all. The argument was that the poll tax is coming to an end, there is a periphery around us in Scotland and we need an open banner to recruit them. The only fleeting reference to Scottish nationalism was PT arguing to put up candidates to the Scottish Assembly (when it comes about) so as not to give the Scottish National Party a free run. That was all that was said about nationalism.

87) Nevertheless, our main argument remains. If there was a movement of youth towards the Scottish National Party, to imagine a small organisation like ours could head this off is deluding ourselves. They would not be attracted to a small open revolutionary organisation / party.

88) 'But didn't we lead 2 million in Scotland over the poll tax?' we are asked. But that was entirely different. Millions were being faced with staggering bills they were unable to pay. There was no leadership from the labour movement. A huge ground swell built up against the poll tax. We were able to step in and articulate this mood, and give it an organised expression. Workers looked to us when we said "Don't panic. Don't pay. We will defend you. Stick together as they can't deal with us all." etc. Whole layers looked to us for advice and a lead. This was a classic instance where a tiny force can become a leadership of millions.

89) The Poll Tax campaign has been a tremendous achievement for our organisation. We can be truly proud of our successes. However, we also need to have a sense of proportion That is not to be, as the EB majority say' the role of sceptics, raising doubts and difficulties (For the Scottish Turn 199) We have to be honest with ourselves and not bury our heads in the sand.

90) To quote the comrades "Even if we accept this figure (of 300 active comrades in Scotland), has not our organisation been able to act as a lever on millions of workers? Do we not have an enormous periphery with tremendous authority amongst wide layers of workers?" (For the Scottish Turn 217)

91) On the poll tax, by and large, we were swimming with the stream. We articulated the mood of workers. They supported us over that particular issue. We built up respect for our work and achievements. To believe that we can translate our success on the poll tax into fighting nationalism is to completely misread the situation.

92) Let us be clear, our entrist tactic has not impeded any of our independent work over the last period. To blame our lack of recruitment from the poll tax on our entrist image' is to make a fundamental error. "While the image of the tendency among some of the most advanced layers could be that of only a loose pressure group inside the Labour Party we are forced to fight with one hand tied behind our back. Only with an open, public organisation can we attract towards us the best fighting elements.." (Scotland, Perspectives and Tasks 107) The new 'turn' is clearly borne out of this frustration. It is an attempted organisational solution to a political problem.

93) The whole 'turn' is posed as a gamble. According to the comrades if the gamble doesn't succeed then we would have lost nothing in trying. PT at the April NEB asked: "what is to be lost for us testing out the water in Scotland on this initiative... we may end up without any results or we may get 2,000. It won't make a fundamental difference to the tendency if we take this initiative." Again later on: "There are no guarantees, it may or may not work out." (Transcript of tape recording of NEB meeting, 10 April 1991)

94) So confident were the EB majority that they were not sure if we would get bold results from this gamble - one that threatens 40 years work, and the emptying of all our forces out of the Labour Party.

The April NEB

95) A myth has been fostered about the NEB meeting in April. The comrades state in the Majority document that when the proposals for new tactics were put forward in April, not one leading comrade opposed them. (For the Scottish Turn 9) This is being somewhat economical with the truth.

96) After a 20 minute emergency EB meeting on the last morning of the NEB, the proposal of the Scottish Turn was taken to a surprised NEB. Nobody knew of this proposal beforehand which was squeezed into the session on standing independent candidates in Liverpool.

97) Incidentally, there was no mention at the EB about Scottish nationalism. In fact the proposal to establish some open organisation was still quite vague. The complete minutes of the EB meeting 10 April read as follows:

"1. Present: 10 comrades

2. NEB agenda PT reported that in the discussion with the Scottish comrades, it had been agreed that there would be a big advantage in us establishing some open organisation which could appeal to the thousands who had been pulled around us during the campaign against the poll tax. After some discussion, it was agreed that this be put to the NEB meeting in view of the urgency and the changes taking place in the poll tax campaign at the moment. The name and launching details would have to be worked out with them, but generally, we should first get the approval of the NEB. End"

98) At the full NEB, PT explained the position. "Very tentatively and very hesitantly we have arrived at these conclusions. It is not true to say that we have arrived at them in the last week. We have been pondering this for quite a while. But it came to a point in a commission meeting and I think it is correct to bring it before the NEB. Even if it is aired in order to get clarity if possible on the issue. ' (transcript)

99) It is amazing that the most serious turn in our history was being pondered 'for quite a while", when the elected leadership knew nothing about it until the day it was announced

100) At the NEB many comrades were taken aback Clearly many supported the proposal, but others were against or had serious doubts.

101) PT was forced to acknowledge this opposition when he replied. "If we had produced a document and come back to the next NEB, I do not exclude that we would have more agreement perhaps than what appears at this particular time, but we would have missed a golden opportunity' (our emphasis.)

102) The attempt to re-write history by the EB majority goes a little further. Their document now claims that "Plans were made for a thorough discussion throughout the tendency before any firm decision would be taken. There was no lack of democracy" (For the Scottish Turn 9.)

103) The fact of the matter is there was no plan, beyond the normal NEB report backs, for a discussion in the ranks or for a special conference. The Scottish Turn was to be immediately implemented from that April NEB and reviewed at the following NEB in June. This was only changed when opposition to the turn emerged in the ranks after the NEB report backs. This was particularly the case in Scotland, where more time was now needed to convince the comrades of this drastic change. It was an aggregate in Manchester/Lancs which passed a motion, moved by a comrade who now supports the Opposition, overwhelmingly demanding a National Council to discuss the issue that finally changed the EB's mind.

104) But even after the April NEB there was confusion of what was being proposed and decided. For example, within a week DC (W Mids) wrote to the EB (15 April, 1991) saying the proposals were: "tentative steps indicated in Scotland (our emphasis) ... the obvious danger in some NEB members minds is ultra-leftism, a looking away from the mass organisations - this may not be too great a problem with existing comrades but will be a greater problem with new, and future comrades joining under a more open policy" (emphasis in original.)

105) PT had stressed at the NEB the need to immediately implement the proposal: "We must begin now to take the initiative. It's not an attempt to bounce the meeting. Let's give it a go in relation to Scotland, then at a future CC we can re-appraise the position."

106) The whole weight of the leadership was used to push the proposal through. In the words of PT, "I don't know whether we can arrive at definite conclusions today, but I think it will be a grave mistake for the meeting not to agree...

"In Scotland we are proposing to establish an organisation called M[ilitant] Labour Federation, aiming at a big conference of 1,000 to join the organisation. It is not a parallel organisation, it is our organisation, where we could bring in 100s and 1,000s of workers who will start maybe at £1 a week subs - of course it will be different for the cadres."

"It is not the green light for us to proclaim a national independent party. It is an important point of departure in Scotland ... I must say at face value there is a case for it in Wales as well, of testing the water.

"But we are not proposing it. Don't comrades, because some areas believe it applies to them,... say let's postpone it until we can discuss the national implications ...

"If we agree on this particular initiative, then the worse thing we can do is to prevaricate, hesitate, 'will we, won't we', 'what are the dangers, difficulties'. When we arrive at something we take it to the rank and file, the best workers, we jump in the water and take (the) initiative as far as we can. There are no guarantees; it may or may not work out, but it would be criminal for us not to take what the comrades say - there is that periphery. If we get an audience of 1,000, let's get them..."

107) In relation to the proposal being solely for Scotland, everything was qualified. At this stage it was for Scotland. PT went on "In the West of Scotland we have the strength to take this initiative. There are all kinds of implications for the rest of the country. To put it forward in Hampshire would be ludicrous, to put it forward in other areas would be a nonsense at this particular stage. The organisational nationally has not arrived at that position. We may be there in 6 or 12 months time."(our emphasis).

108) The consequences of adopting the new 'turn' were never really brought out. In fact the idea was stressed that it wouldn't make any fundamental difference. The question of Scottish nationalism was only referred to by PT in one sentence. At that time it was not the issue at all. Subsequently it has become a central issue! The key issue in April was the large periphery that was around us in Scotland and the best means to win them.

109) The new 'Turn' was born out of this frustration at the lack of growth from the poll tax battle. In fact, in terms of comrades, locals, districts, etc we are weaker now in Scotland than we were two years ago. This is not to denigrate the sterling efforts of the Scottish comrades and the undoubted standing and respect which many comrades have on the housing schemes, etc, but merely to face up to the real situation, and to understand the reasons for it.

110) Although we have a periphery around us from our work on the poll tax, it has been very difficult to recruit them. They have great respect for our work in the campaign, but joining a revolutionary organisation is a different matter entirely. To think we can overcome this political problem (which we face nationally) by an organisational measure is to fool ourselves. It is not our "image" that repels them, no matter how high our banner, but the seemingly difficult prospects of building a revolutionary organisation in the coming period.

The real reason for our lack of growth is not the potential for building, but the lack of cadres that could politically convince the periphery of the need to join us. Unlike in the early 1980s or the miners' strike, it is more difficult at the present time to recruit. Because of the complexity of the situation far more patient discussion is needed to convince and consolidate contacts. The whole argument of the turn is false from beginning to end. If alt that is needed is an open revolutionary banner, why have not big layers of the youth in Scotland turned to the YRC?

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