The Struggle for Socialism
Today
A reply to the politics of the
Socialist Workers Party
Northern Ireland
1. The "Armed Struggle"
On the issue of the "armed
struggle," the differences between us have been as night and day.
At the outset we explained the reasons for the emergence of the
Provisional IRA in the early 1970s. The factors which gave the
Provisionals a mass base of support among the Catholic working class
youth were the apparent failure of mass action, in the form of the civil
rights movement, to deliver real change; brutal repression by the army
and police, especially internment and Bloody Sunday; the poverty endemic
in Catholic areas; and finally the failure of the labour movement to
offer any alternative means of fighting back.
We understood the reasons for
the IRA campaign and we did not see the IRA, as is implied in your
letter, as the root cause of the violence. But we stood against the
illusions which were widespread among the most combative of the Catholic
youth that the Provisionals’ methods offered any way forward. The
first issue of Irish Militant, produced at the beginning of 1972,
carried an article on the Provisionals. Its headline summed up our
attitude: "Provisional IRA strategy will not defeat
Imperialism." In this, and in other material we produced at that
time and since, we opposed the tactic of individual terrorism.
We explained the difference
between guerrillaism — which can have a certain legitimacy in
underdeveloped countries as the method of struggle of the peasantry —
and individual terrorism, which has none. We argued that the efforts and
sacrifice of those radical Catholic youth who joined the IRA would be
wasted. Far from weakening the state, individual terrorism tends to
strengthen it by giving the excuse for a whole raft of repressive
measures which otherwise might not have reached the statute books.
Inevitably, it would be the people in the working class areas in whose
name the campaign was being fought who would feel the full severity of
this repression. Against these false methods we counter-posed mass action
by the working class as the only way to change society.
We went further. The
Provisionals’ campaign was not only futile, it was totally
counterproductive. It was based on only one section of the working class
and had the effect of infuriating the other. It helped deepen the
sectarian divide and, in so doing, weakened the working class, the only
force capable of showing a way forward.
We took seriously our
responsibility to warn the Catholic youth of the blind alley into which
they were facing. We did so when the tide of history was against us,
when it was not popular; not "revolutionary" to resist the
turn to the gun, and not after the event when history had already proved
the point. Not so the SWP — or for that matter the rest of the
"revolutionary" left — who capitulated to the pressures in
the Catholic areas and acted as left apologists for the Provisionals.
Did the SWP, as you claim,
stand against the stream and oppose the military tactics of the IRA
during the early 1970s when thousands of the best of Catholic youth were
moving to embrace these methods? Here is what you actually said — and
it is a long way from your current claim to "have consistently
attacked the armed struggle as counterproductive."
"The only way to minimise
loyalist threats and at the same time keep up the anti imperialist
struggle is to ensure that the military campaign is subordinate to the
political interests of the working class," (The Worker, June 1972.)
What precisely does this mean? The following makes it quite clear:
"Attempts to link the various aspects of the anti-imperialist
offensive, North and South, must be made by socialist republicans within
their organisations and in the resistance movement. Only when the
military campaign is directed by such political ends will Whitelaw’s
attempts at splitting the anti imperialist side be overcome and the
possibility of making an impression on Protestant workers become a
reality."
This was the general position
which the SWP adopted, basically that the problem with the military
campaigns was that it did not have socialist republicans — like the
SWP — leading it and giving it political direction. At times, the
unconditional support for the Provisionals was hedged with criticisms of
aspects of the campaign. Whether the emphasis was on acting as
cheerleaders for the IRA, or on criticisms which would distance the SWP
from IRA actions, depended opportunistically upon the mood at the time.
The allies, such as the SWP, which the IRA won for itself on the
"revolutionary left" would turn out to be fair-weather
friends.
Here is just one example. In
October 1974 the British Socialist Worker (19 October) had this way to
say on the subject of the troops and IRA activity in Britain:
"It’s up to us to fight to get them (troops editor) out, by
making their dirty war so unpopular with British workers that the
Government cannot continue with it. That means we support all those in
Ireland who want to get rid of British troops, including the IRA. When
people get hysterical, about IRA bombs in Britain tell them that 20,000
troops in Ireland is like 660,000 foreign troops occupying our towns and
cities."
A few weeks later on 21
November the IRA planted bombs in the centre of Birmingham which killed
19 people and injured hundreds. There was an immediate wave of revulsion
and an angry anti-IRA and anti-Irish mood swept Britain. On November 30th
the Socialist Worker ran with a headline "Stop the bombings."
The SWP got over the difficulty of supporting the IRA campaign in
Ireland where it remained popular among the most combative of the
Catholic youth, and opposing it in Britain by drawing the following
distinction:
"For we recognise that the
Provisional IRA does not operate only, or even mainly, as an
organisation carrying out terrorist attacks in Britain. Most of its
energies are directed to a quite different task — that of defending
the Catholic part of the population of Northern Ireland against
murderous attacks, whether they come from the British army or from
loyalist thugs. We have to continue to support it in this defence role
— at the same time as completely dissociating ourselves from action
which kills or maims workers." (Socialist Worker, 30 November
1974).
Of the IRA bombing campaigns
which had been blitzing towns across Northern Ireland since 1971, not a
mention. Of the sectarian nature of some of these attacks, including on
occasions the blowing up of pubs in Protestant areas, not a word. In
England, condemnation of unpopular actions and a call to halt — in
Ireland a prettification of the IRA campaign and full support for it to
continue.
By the 1980s the IRA campaign
was faltering and losing support. The SWP accordingly altered the
balance of support and criticism a little in the direction of the later.
There was greater emphasis on pointing out that the IRA’s methods
would not succeed. But there was no call on them to stop. Rather as the
January 1986 issue of Socialist Worker put it: "We give
unconditional support to the IRA in their fight against the Northern
State. And we defend their right to take up arms against British
imperialism."
More recently this position has
been dropped. With the IRA cease-fire in place and deep opposition among
the working class to any resumption, the SWP have accepted the
accomplished fact, forgotten about the "right to take up
arms," and come out against a return to war. Recent SWP material
has carried similar theoretical arguments against individual terrorism
as those put forward by the Militant/Socialist Party since the early
1970s, arguments which the SWP, for more than 20 years, categorically
rejected.
The Socialist Party and before
it, Militant, have always stood for the unity of the working class,
Catholic and Protestant, as the only basis for a solution. We have
explained that this unity can only be built around the common interests
of workers, not around the ideas either of Nationalism or of Unionism.
Contrary to what you imply this does not mean ignoring issues such as
repression, the role of the state, parades, or the national question. It
means taking these up in a class manner which can unite workers, not in
the sectarian manner they have most often been raised.
Recently the SWP has begun to
pay lip service to the idea of class unity. Your letter even claims that
you played a role in initiating labour movement demonstrations against
sectarianism, a claim which will be greeted with incredulity by those
who were actually involved and who knows that the SWP played no role
whatsoever in these movements.
In the early 1970s the
sectarian reaction seemed unstoppable and the idea of class unity was,
to most people, a dim and distant prospect. While the Socialist
Party/Militant defended workers unity as the only way forward, the SWP
were swept along by the tide. The tiny forces of the SWP were presenting
themselves as a radical wing of the "resistance" movement
which had sprung from Catholic areas and whose cutting edge was the
Provisionals. The "problem" of the Protestant working class
was dismissed as something to be dealt with in the future, when
immediate issues such as the presence of the troops was resolved.
The arguments set out in SWP
publications of the time come close to the Stalinist "theory of
stages," first unity with other non-socialist forces to
"solve" the national question, then, and only then, can the
class issue come onto the agenda. Eamonn McCann writing in Socialist
Worker (25 May 1974) argued: "If the troops get out, it will at
least create the conditions for the Irish people, North and South, to
work out their own future, free from outside interference. Which, of
course, they have every right to do. In that situation it is likely that
Protestant sectarianism would fragment if Protestants lost the British
backing which they’ve come to except as their right. The basic point
is that the development of working class politics in Ireland is
desperately difficult while the National Question is still
unresolved."
Four years later Eamonn McCann,
writing in the SWP journal, Socialist Review (No. 6, October 1978),
doesn’t bother to camouflage his nationalist conclusions with even the
scantiest socialist dressing: "And we are no longer marching for
more ‘civil rights,’ but against the root cause of all our political
ills: British domination. Because the main lesson to be learned from the
last decade is that the real problem never was the way Britain ran the
North. It was the fact that Britain ran the North. And until Britain
leaves, there’ll be no end of trouble."
2. The Role of Protestant Workers
The idea of Protestant and
Catholic workers uniting and fighting for a socialist solution is at no
time part of the thinking of the SWP, other than as the music of some
distant future. How could any prospect of achieving class unity be
seriously considered when the party held the following opinion of the
Protestant working class: "Orange bigotry is based on Protestant
privilege today as surely as it was when the Orange Order as founded in
1795. Then, the privilege was to do with access to the best land on the
most favourable terms. Today, it has to do with jobs, houses, social
prestige and access to political influence. The fact that, from the
Protestant worker’s point of view, the privilege is pretty small,
matters not at all. When tuppence half-penny is looking down on tuppence,
the half-penny difference can assume an importance out of all proportion
to its actual size. The same is true for the ‘poor whites’ of the
southern states of the US or the skin head racists of the National Front
in Britain." (Socialist Worker, No. 25, April 1986.)
Or, the same sentiment put
rather more succinctly and to the point: "In this sense Protestant
workers can be compared to the poor whites of the Southern states of the
USA. Their cheap labour goes hand in hand with their racism."
(Socialist Worker, No. 21, December 1985).
Even were the
"privileges" enjoyed by the Protestants to come under attack
you held out no real hope that the "ignorant" Protestant
workers could be won away from loyalism: "Despite the wave of
redundancies that have hit the Protestant industrial heartlands, the
perspective of most Protestant workers has been to even more firmly hold
on to their privileges and their state," ("Why we need a
revolution in Ireland. An introduction to the politics of the Socialist
Workers Movement," Socialist Worker Pamphlet, p. 27.)
You go on: "This is not to
say that all Protestant workers are inevitably bound to loyalism. Their
privileges are marginal. They have no objective interest in upholding
those privileges above and beyond what could be achieved by uniting
working class action. But given the grip of loyalism in the Protestant
communities any real lead in this direction will have to come from
outside." (ibid, our emphasis.)
And even then the best hope is
only that some Protestant workers will be won over: "It is
therefore only in the high point of a challenge against both Irish
states that sections of Protestant workers will be broken from loyalism."
(ibid)
Given this attitude it is not
surprising that the SWP held out no real prospect of building class
unity. The breaking of Protestants from loyalism would have come from
the "outside." The fact that there were powerful trade unions
and a rich labour tradition, especially in Protestant working class
areas, is dismissed as "economic unity" which cannot last. Of
the fact that workers involved in industrial struggles are capable of
drawing far reaching political conclusions there is nothing. Unity
between Catholic and Protestant workers is therefore and objective, but
not immediate task. The road to this unity is through the
"nationalist" community. When Catholic workers link arms to
struggle for socialism they will show a way to their more
"ignorant" Protestant brethren and break them from their
"racism."
Here is how this strategy is
explained in Socialist Worker, (January 1986). "Our alternative to
the present armed struggle is for Catholic workers in the North to
organise as a class against imperialism to put their case to Southern
workers. If a mass movement developed out of this, Protestant workers in
the Six Counties could be broken from loyalism and workers revolution
would be on the agenda."
Today the emphasis of the SWP
— on most occasions — is on class unity. But as with the about face
on the IRA campaign the calls for Protestant and Catholics to unite are
now made in complete denial that your party ever had any other position.
You have never clarified whether the condescending and sectarian — in
the Northern Ireland sense — attitude you have had to the Protestant
working class has been rejected or whether, although deep down and
hidden for the moment, it remains your view.
Which brings us to your claim
to have helped initiate the labour movement campaigns against
sectarianism. Every activist in the North knows that this is not true.
Socialist Party members have been involved in organising working class
action against sectarianism since the mid 1970s when we participated in
the 1976 Trade Union Better Life For All Campaign. During the 1980s our
members were the head of the DHSS workers who established a tradition of
striking against sectarian threats, whether from Republicans or from
loyalists. In 1992, we organised a general strike in Mid-Ulster against
the IRA atrocity at Teebane and against the sectarian attacks on
Catholics being carried out mainly by Billy Wright’s Mid-Ulster UVF.
Our members who took this courageous initiative well recall being
chastised by SWP members for organising a "loyalist" strike.
How could the SWP have been
part of labour movement campaigns which were demanding a halt to all
paramilitary campaigns when you were giving "critical" support
to one of the organisations which these movements were directed against?
We argued that the broad labour movement was the vehicle which could
mobilise workers to defeat sectarianism. You took a different view. You
looked, not to the labour movement, but to republicanism, to achieve
this. "While never flinching from our profound differences with the
Provos, we recognise that they are presently leading the fight against
sectarianism and bigotry." (Socialist Worker, No. 21, December
1985).
3. Troops and Repression
Your references to the position
of the Socialist Party on repression and on the sectarian nature of the
state, are wide of the mark. When the Civil Rights campaign developed
we, with the very small forces we had at the time, gave full support to
the struggle to end discrimination. We did not leave it at this but
pointed out that Protestant working class people also suffered
discrimination and poverty. We called for the civil rights demands to be
broadened to class issues so that they could appeal to the Protestant
working class.
This was not done and the civil
rights movement could only draw its mass support from the Catholic
community. In August 1969 the pogroms in Belfast and the threat of even
worse pogroms in Derry at the hands of the RUC and B Specials, raised
the prospect of a sectarian bloodbath. When the troops were sent in the
general feeling in Catholic areas of Belfast and Derry was of relief, of
a siege having been lifted. There were some underlying suspicions but it
is a fact that the majority of Catholics welcomed the sight of British
army uniforms.
The Socialist Party — then
Militant — warned against illusions that the troops were sent to
protect lives or that this would be their ongoing role. We predicted
that: "The call made for the entry of British troops will turn to
vinegar in the mouths of some of the civil rights leaders. The troops
have been sent to impose a solution in the interests of British and
Ulster big business." (British Militant, September 1969).
We immediately raised the call
for the troops to be withdrawn, but we did not leave it at this. While
the troops were not capable of protecting working class areas — their
withdrawal without some alternative would have left the armed forces of
unionism on one side, and, on the other, would have moved thousands of
Catholics to look to their own paramilitary and defence organisations.
It would have sparked civil war.
Alongside the demands for the
withdrawal of troops we called on the unions to act bring Catholic and
Protestant workers together in a trade union defence force. The
non-sectarian committees which patrolled parts of Belfast and which
prevented intimidation in 1969 offered a model of what could be done. By
the 1980s, with the trade union leaders moving to the right and losing
any confidence they might have had among the working class, and with the
sectarian tensions subsiding, we changed our formulation and called on
trade unionists and community activists to take the lead in setting up
anti-sectarian committees and in attempting to link these across the
sectarian divide.
Throughout the Troubles we have
consistently opposed repression, but have done so in a class manner,
explaining how repressive measures introduced today against republicans
or against loyalists can be used in the future against working class
movements which threaten the interests of capitalism. In so doing we
have been able to gain the ear of Protestant and Catholic workers where
others, including the SWP, have not.
In fact the only time a motion
calling for the withdrawal of any section of the troops was passed by a
major trade union was in 1993 when Socialist Party members proposed an
emergency motion at the NIPSA Conference calling for the withdrawal of
the parachute regiment. We won the argument and succeeded in getting
this motion passed overwhelmingly in a conference hall packed with
delegates from Protestant and from Catholic backgrounds. Interestingly
the one SWP member who was a delegate neither spoke in favour of the
motion, nor voted for it.
We also successfully took up
the H Block issue in a number of unions. We organised a visit by the
Young Socialist representative on the NEC of the British Labour Party to
the H Blocks to meet prisoners. He then successfully moved a motion on
the NEC which committed the Labour Party to support our position.
It is quite true that, unlike
the SWP, we did not simply parrot the demands of the republican movement
but put forward our own class programme on the prison issue. We put
forward a charter of prisoners’ rights which went further than the
five demands of the hunger strikers. As to the question of political
status we did not go along with the call that all convicted on offences
arising out of the Troubles should automatically be granted political
status.
To recognise that someone is a
political prisoner is to acknowledge that he or she has been unjustly
imprisoned for political reasons. We stand not just for political status
and special conditions for such people; we stand also for their release.
While many of those in the H Blocks could justifiably be called
political prisoners, we were not prepared to apply this label to those
who, for example, had carried out heinous sectarian crimes and done so
quite consciously. We were not going to campaign to award political
status to people like the Shankill Butchers, then early into their
sentence. Instead we called for a labour movement investigation of all
cases so that the working class could determine for itself who was a
political prisoner, and not simply read off a script supplied by the
Republican movement or by loyalists.
Just as revolutionary phrase
mongering is the stock in trade of the SWP on all other issues, so the
defiant breast beating about "oppression" in Northern Ireland
is just radical sounding rhetoric which quickly turns into opportunism
in practice. Here, again SWP policy is determined by, and changes with,
the prevailing wind.
The duty of Marxists is to tell
the working class the truth, even when the price of doing so may be
temporary isolation. When the troops were sent onto the streets in 1969
it was difficult to stand against the mood of support and explain what
their real role would be. The SWP capitulated to the mood and welcomed
the arrival of the troops. Whenever this is raised the current SWP
leadership in Ireland merely shake their heads and deny that this was
their position.
Here is what Socialist Worker
actually said at the time the troops were sent in: "The breathing
space provided by the presence of British troops is short but vital.
Those who call for the immediate withdrawal of the troops before the men
behind the barricades can defend themselves are inviting a pogrom which
will hit first and hardest at socialists." (Socialist Worker, No.
137, 11 September 1969).
Yes, your position was for that
troops should ultimately be withdrawn when the time was right. In the
meantime you supported their presence and role as the only
"realistic" means of offering defence of the Catholic areas.
But then everyone, including the Labour Government, was for the eventual
withdrawal of the troops — after they provided the necessary
"breathing space." Your position was nothing more than a left
echo, a "socialist" justification of the standpoint of the
government and the ruling class.
When, under the whip of
repression, the mood in the Catholic areas changed, so did the position
of the SWP. By 1973/4 Socialist Worker headlines were demanding
"Troops out." The shift was from one opportunist position to
another, from talk of the troops providing a breathing space, to
opposition to their presence but from an out and out nationalist point
of view. Completely absent from this material is even a hint of a class
analysis, a class perspective or a socialist perspective. It is
undiluted nationalism from beginning to end.
4. "Root of the problem"
The SWP analysis on the troops
and on Britain’s role was a left echo of the arguments of the
Provisionals and other Republicans. The British presence was the root of
the problem. They were in Ireland propping up Protestant supremacy.
Force out the troops, end the Protestant veto, call the Unionist bluff,
and the door to progress will be open!
This is what you argued:
"The supporters of Protestant supremacy and its right wing
paramilitary groups can only be encouraged by the presence of the
troops. British support, British troops, provide the essential support
for Protestant power. They give it the confidence necessary to wage
sectarian war on the Catholics. As long as Britain supports a Protestant
state in Northern Ireland, and is prepared to commit troops to support
that state, Protestant and Catholic sectarianism will flourish. The
removal of the troops would take the crutch away from Protestant
superiority. It would weaken its confidence and its influence with the
majority of Protestant workers." (Socialist Worker, 16 October
1974)
This argument is wrong on every
count. The British ruling class were responsible for laying the seeds of
the conflict at the time of Partition. But, by the 1960s, before the
Troubles began, they would have preferred to withdraw and allow the
creation of a capitalist united Ireland which they would have hoped to
dominate by economic, not by direct political or military, means. They
were unable to do so because there was no way they could convince the
million Protestants in the North to accept a united Ireland.
To have attempted to coerce the
majority in Northern Ireland into another state would have meant armed
resistance and civil war. The British ruling class would then have paid
the price for their past role of fomenting the divisions between
Protestant and Catholic. The SWP may not have understood that Protestant
resistance to a capitalist united Ireland was no bluff, but the British
ruling classes were not so blind.
By the 1960s, their strategic
objective was to disengage. They have been unable to move even a step in
this direction because of the realities on the ground. After 1969, they
were faced with a revolt in Catholic areas and chose to lean on the
Protestant majority while trying to crush this revolt by military means.
This was not to try to preserve the Orange State or allow a return to
Stormont. While using repression with one hand the British ruling class
attempted to offer concessions to woo the Catholic middle class with the
other. They tried to limit and curtail, as far as possible, the
sectarian excesses of the Unionists. The policy pursued by the British
government during the recent peace process is not something new. It is a
continuation of the policy they tried to pursue, under less favourable
circumstances, at the outset of the Troubles.
Instead of attempting to
analyse the real interests and real policy of the British ruling class,
the SWP swallowed the Nationalist argument and arrived at Nationalist
conclusions. The "root of the problem," is described as
"the British political and military presence in Northern
Ireland," ("H Block — Workers action can win," p. 2).
If this is the problem the prescription to resolve it becomes the unity
of the so-called "anti-imperialist forces." It is a slither
away from the Stalinist idea of stages and a canyon away from Marxism.
As to the obvious fact that the
withdrawal of the troops, without an alternative to provide defence,
would have led to Unionists and Nationalists arming to fill the vacuum
and brought about a Bosnia, the SWP glibly shrugged their shoulders.
"If the troops leave won’t all hell break out? Maybe people in
Northern Ireland, mostly Catholic workers, have been living through
enough hell for the past three years anyway, one of the reasons being
the troops’ presence." (Eamonn McCann, Socialist Worker, 25 May
1974.)
During the H Block campaign the
SWP published a pamphlet called "H Block — Workers action can
win." It is a good example of how the SWP took up the issue of
repression. The objectives are agreed — to win a victory which can
loosen the British presence, the "root cause of the problem."
The only criticism of the Nationalist leadership of the H Block campaign
is that they are too compromising on the issue of political status and
that they haven’t done enough to mobilise the working class to action.
Of a socialist perspective, or
the independent interests of the working class, there is absolutely
nothing. And the problem of Protestant opposition to the H Block
campaign is solved simply by ignoring it. In fact, while there are
occasional references to "loyalists" the pamphlet manages not
to mention the word Protestant even once! It talks of strikes in
"Waterford Dundalk, Derry Drogheda and parts of Belfast."
("H Block — Workers action can win," p. 11). For "parts
of Belfast," read "Catholic parts of Belfast." This is in
line with the general attitude of the SWP at the time which was to write
off the Protestant working class and call for unity between Catholic
workers in the North with Catholic workers in the South as the way
forward.
We therefore find it ironic
that you accuse others, and ourselves by implication, of a condescending
attitude to the Protestant working class when you state: "We
categorically reject the patronising approach that issues to do with
sectarianism of the state and oppression cannot be discussed in areas
such as East Belfast." (11 January letter). We have never held this
view. We have always worked in both Protestant and Catholic areas and
have been able to put forward all aspects of our programme — because
we raise these issues in a class, not a sectarian manner.
The SWP did not do so. The real
truth is that when you were presenting a nationalist rather than a
socialist case on the issues of "sectarianism and the state"
you not only did not attempt to put your case to the Protestants, you
justified this by dismissing the Protestant working class and arguing,
in effect, for "Catholic class unity." Only by changing your
programme and then vehemently denying that you ever had done so, have
you attempted, more recently, to make a partial turn to Protestant
areas.
5. The Parades Issue
That this has been only a
partial turn, brought about by the change in mood and the fact of the
united class movements against sectarianism, and not by an honest
reappraisal of past mistakes, has been shown by your approach to the
parades issue. You attack us for referring to the dispute over parades
as a "clash of rights" and for not clearly opposing the
"so-called ‘right to march’ of bigoted Orangemen through
Catholic areas," (11 January letter).
Let us set out our actual
position on parades. We view the Orange Order as a reactionary,
sectarian organisation which has been one of the props of Unionist power
in Northern Ireland. However, there is a question of degree. It is an
exaggeration to portray it as a semi-fascist organisation equivalent to
the British National Front or the Ku Klux Klan.
Orange parades, whether the SWP
likes it or not, are part of life in Protestant working class areas.
There are many working class Protestants who would have nothing to do
with the Order or with Orange culture, and it is true that the Order has
been in decline — until the parades controversy.
But, if the thirty years of
repression directed against Catholic areas have taught anything, it is
that the surest way to promote an ideology or culture is to try to ban
it and drive it underground. The vast majority of Protestants, including
those opposed to the Orange Order, would defend the right to march. They
would particularly do so when the opposition to marches is clearly seen
to come from republican-inspired groups.
The Socialist Party does not
defend the right of Orangemen to march through Catholic areas. Nor do we
uphold the right of republicans to hold parades through Protestant areas
if there are objections from residents. However, the disputed marches
are not through housing estates, but along what organisers consider to
be main arterial routes or through town and village centres. Here the
issue is more complex and needs to be looked at concretely.
To say a road or a town centre
is Catholic/nationalist or Protestant/loyalist is to say more than
"no feet" of the opposite religion are welcome on it. Signs
painted up saying a village is 100% nationalist are intimidating and
offensive to Protestants who live in or around it, just as the red,
white and blue graffiti which bedecks many areas is offensive and
threatening to Catholics.
For many years, nationalist
parades were banned from Belfast city centre. The excuse given was that
they caused offence to the majority of people, especially given the IRA
bombing campaign which devastated much of the city centre. Our position
was to defend the right of nationalists, and other minorities, to march
through the city and to oppose the narrow sectarian view that the space
outside Belfast City Hall was for only one religious tradition.
At a time when both communities
feel their rights and traditions are under threat, there needs to be
sensitivity on all aspects of the national question. To deny the Orange
Order the right to march would only serve to inflame Protestants and
would increase support for the Order.
We do not support the right of
the Orange Order to march through Catholic housing estates or through
any strictly residential areas where they are not wanted and cause
offence. Where there are disputed routes which residents view as
Catholic districts, but parade organisers see as arterial routes or as
open town centres, we uphold the rights of residents to object and to
insist on negotiation. In such circumstances of two conflicting rights,
the right to march and the right to object to march, there will either
be negotiation and agreement or else force will decide. In that event
there is a danger of all out sectarian confrontation which could engulf
the North and which would disastrously set back the cause of working
class unity and socialism. To the two opposing rights of residents and
parade organisers we add a third — the right of the working class to
insist that we are not going to be drawn into a sectarian maelstrom due
to the intransigence of either side.
In calling on community
activists and trade unionists to take the initiative in brokering local
agreements we rejected the slogan initially put forward by nationalists
of "no consent — no parade." The idea of consent or
permission runs counter to the notion of dialogue and negotiation. On
the other hand, where parade organisers refused meetings, as at Drumcree,
we have fully supported the right of residents to say no to parades
until such time as face-to-face discussions take place.
In the summer of 1996, the
whole issue came to a head over Drumcree. Northern Ireland was taken to
the brink of all out sectarian conflict. The weeklong stand off tapped a
mood of sympathy and support in Protestant areas which went far beyond
the membership and periphery of the Orange Order. Then, under pressure
of widespread and possibly uncontainable violence, the state backed down
and forced the parade down Garvaghy Road.
Instantly, the mood within the
Catholic community changed to rage and anger at what was universally
seen as a betrayal. All eyes became fixed on the next major flashpoint
— the annual Apprentice Boys march through Derry. A confrontational
mood developed in Catholic area, whipped up by residents’ groups which
had been formed under republican influence to oppose parades. There were
proposals to block the centre of Derry to keep the Apprentice Boys out.
At that moment the call which
we issued — for pressure from the working class on both sides to
negotiate and come up with an agreement — jarred with the general mood
and was not widely accepted. Nonetheless we persisted. We argued the
point in a meeting with the Bogside Residents Committee. We went onto
the streets in Derry city centre calling for negotiation — at a time
when the mood in the city was that the Apprentice Boys should be
physically prevented from crossing the Foyle and entering the city
centre.
This was an unpopular position
but, once again, it was our responsibility to tell the truth, no matter
how unpalatable it might seem. To halt the Apprentice Boys would have
been to send out a signal, intentionally or unintentionally, that
Protestants are no longer welcome in Derry City Centre. The result would
have been widespread violence with attacks on Catholic communities like
the Garvaghy Road and the Lower Ormeau Road. It could very quickly have
spilled into civil war.
In the end, there were
negotiations and while there was no formal agreement, it was enough to
defuse the situation. Since then attitudes on parades have moved
somewhat. There are intransigents on both sides who want to use the
issue to provoke sectarian confrontation and derail the peace process.
But most people now accept that there must be negotiation and local
agreement on the regularity, route, conduct and stewarding of parades.
The republican movement has moved a little. The "no consent — no
parade" formula is no longer used. Instead, the common slogan is
"no talk — no walk," unnecessarily confrontational language
for what is a more reasonable position — that unless parade organisers
talk to residents their parades will be opposed.
What of the SWP stance on
parades? How has it stood the crucial test of time?
Your view is that Orangemen
should not be given any rights. "But Drumcree has shown that
Orangeism has as much to do with culture as the Ku Klux Kan…Like
racism it is a poison which should be oppose by all workers…
Socialists do not call for rights for Orangeism — but militant
opposition to it everywhere it emerges." (Undated leaflet,
"Mass resistance can beat Orangeism")
Unfortunately, you do not
follow this line of thought to its logical conclusion which is, not that
Orange parades should be kept out of Catholic areas, but that they
should be blocked everywhere. If you were consistent, you would be
organising opposition to the Orange Order on the Shankill Road every bit
as much as in Derry.
When the Orangemen were forced
down the Garvaghy Road in 1996, the SWP was swept along by the angry
mood in Catholic areas. Your party did not pause for thought to consider
what the nature of this movement was or where it was leading. Your paper
eulogised at the riots which were taking place. You talked of an
uprising in Derry arguing that the riots were "political"
because they tried to burn council offices and the unemployment
exchange! You criticised republicans for trying to keep a lid on the
situation.
As to the Apprentice Boys
parade, you not only echoed the call for it to be halted, you tried to
make yours the most defiant voice of the opposition. A leaflet you
issued carried the headline, completely meaningless in the
circumstances: "Workers’ unity against sectarian Orangeism."
The leaflet began: "Every worker, Catholic or Protestant, should
oppose the Apprentice Boys March on the 10th." Your
paper, under the slogan "Stop this Sectarian March," carried
an advertisement for an SWP bus from Dublin to go to Derry on August 10th.
In your enthusiasm, you mistook
Derry 1996 for Derry 1968-69, not recognising that this movement was
fundamentally different in character. The former was a radical movement
directed away from nationalism and sectarianism towards class ideas. The
more recent was a movement in the direction of all out sectarian
conflict. Its ideological wellspring was nationalism, not socialism. The
greater the development of the earlier revolt, the greater the
opportunity for united class action and socialist ideas. The more
developed and sustained the upheaval in 1996, the more likely that the
prospects for call unity would be subsumed in a sectarian bloodbath.
In cheering on the
"uprising," and mobilising to block the Apprentice Boys, you
were cheering on sectarian reaction, not revolution. You were
encouraging events which would have had a disastrous consequence on the
class struggle. As over the restoration of capitalism in Russia and
Eastern Europe, you showed yourselves, yet again, incapable of
differentiating between revolution and reaction.
It is clear that some SWP
members in the North, because they were closer to the reality of the
situation, did not look on these events in the same positive manner as
the Dublin-based leadership. Your 1997 Conference Bulletin rebukes your
Northern membership for not sharing the leadership’s enthusiasm for
what was happening: "Unfortunately the SWP in the North is not
entirely immune to these moods. It was obvious that deep elements of
pessimism surfaced in the Northern branches when the Drumcree crisis
exploded. The temptation was to see events spiralling out of control,
back into the mould of sectarian politics." In fact, the
‘temptation’ of your members in the North was to see things as they
were, not to accept the unreal picture which the SWP leadership was
trying to paint.
Today, the call for negotiation
over parades is accepted by all but the most die-hard bigots on both
sides — and standing alongside them, the SWP. If you were to be
consistent you would oppose dialogue between residents and the Orange
Order. You would denounce any compromise agreement which allowed
Orangemen to march as a "sell-out." Instead, you should be for
physical confrontation to prevent all Orange parades. The only basis on
which this position would gain support would be in the context of an
upsurge in sectarianism such as developed in the summer of 1996. A
supposedly "socialist" position which takes on flesh only as
part of a wider sectarian reaction is untenable.
6. National Question
On the national question, your
letter states your position clearly: "The SWP calls for the
smashing of the North’s sectarian state and the formation of an Irish
workers’ republic." Even leaving aside the fact that words can
lose their original meaning and the terminology you use is that of
left-Republicanism, not Marxism, this formulation is wholly inadequate.
It ignores the fact that
partition created not one, but two "sectarian" states. It
takes no account of the changes which have taken place over the past ten
to twenty years which mean that the characterisation "sectarian
state" is one sided and only partly true. The state which exists in
Northern Ireland today cannot exactly be equated with the Unionist state
of 1921-72, just as it is now a caricature to label the Southern state
either "backward" or "clerical dominated."
Your formulation is also one
sided in that it says nothing about the relationship of the working
class in Ireland to the working class in Britain and beyond. You have
clearly made a significant concession to nationalist, anti-British
sentiment in leaving this out of your programme.
The Socialist Party advocates a
socialist Ireland as part of a free and voluntary socialist federation
of Scotland, England, Wales, and Ireland and of a broader European
Socialist Federation or Confederation. It is necessary to put this
forward to counter those nationalist prejudices which may exist within
the Irish working class. Nowhere in your paper or other material do we
find any formulation which does this.
We have updated our position to
take into account the current realities and the existing consciousness
of the working class, Catholic and Protestant, North and South. The
national question is not exactly the same today as it was even thirty
years ago. Then the burning issue was the rights of the Catholic
minority who had suffered 50 years of discrimination at the hands of the
Stormont regime. Among Protestants there was still a sense of security
in the fact that they were the majority and had the backing of a heavily
armed state.
Catholics today still feel
themselves an oppressed minority within the North. But among Protestants
there is a difference. The old sense of security has largely gone. With
politics increasingly acquiring an all-Ireland and international
dimension, Protestants also feel themselves to be a minority whose
rights are under attack.
If we are to build unity on the
national question the genuine aspirations and fears of both communities
have to be taken into account. This means campaigning against all
remnants of discrimination and opposing the status quo which forces
Catholics into a constitutional arrangement they do not accept. It also
means recognising that Protestant fears that they would finish up as
second class citizens in a capitalist united Ireland are real and
justified. Understanding that Protestants would never voluntarily accept
a capitalist united Ireland we are as opposed to this outcome as we are
to the status quo.
We believe that Protestants can
be won to the idea of a socialist Ireland, that is a single socialist
state with the maximum devolution of power to the local level and with
the rights of all minorities fully guaranteed. But at this point the
majority of Protestants have made plain that they are opposed to any
form of united Ireland. The question has therefore to be answered: if
the Protestant working class remain opposed to a socialist united
Ireland would socialists coerce them into it? Only if we answer this
question with a clear guarantee of no coercion will there be any
possibility of overcoming working class Protestant opposition to
reunification, even on a socialist basis. Taking the argument further, a
guarantee of no coercion means, in practice, upholding the right of
Protestants to opt out of a single socialist state and put in place an
alternative administrative arrangement for a period. This is a
concession, but a concession which is necessary to make in order to
build class unity now.
The national question is one of
the most difficult questions faced by Marxists. It has to be examined
concretely, with an understanding of how it has arisen, as well as where
it is headed. It cannot be viewed statically but rather as it changes
and develops. It requires sensitivity as well as an ability to register
the subtle shifts in consciousness taking place among various layers in
society.
There is no once and for all
set of demands which Marxists can dust off the shelf and put forward as
the socialist answer to every conflict. Demands have to be worked out
for each situation and amended as necessary as circumstances change. The
key in formulating a programme is to pose the question whether or not a
demand raises class consciousness and points towards the unity of the
working class across national, ethnic or religious divisions, or whether
it reinforces those divisions.
In a sense the programme of
Marxism on this issue is a concession, a concession to the fact that
nationalist sentiments exist and that this nationalism has the potential
to overshadow class solidarity and to push class issues to the
background. The slogan of self-determination — that is of the right of
a nationality to secede from a state — which Lenin defended against
Rosa Luxemburg and others who had an ultra-left position, is a
concession to the fact that nationalism has a hold, or can develop a
hold, over the working class. Were Marxists to deny this right it would
be the forces of nationalism which would benefit, being able to put
themselves forward as the only "champions" of
"their" people.
Rosa Luxemburg made a mistake
in one direction, tending to dismiss nationalism. It is possible to make
mistakes in the opposite direction and lean too far into the nationalist
camp. By making too many concessions to the programme of nationalists,
Marxists can find themselves on the nationalist side of the
consciousness of the working class, and their actions can reinforce that
consciousness.
Working out a programme on the
national question which answers the fears and concerns of the various
nationalities but at the same time raises class consciousness is a
skilful task, and one which the SWP has shown not even the slightest
capacity to carry out. During the Troubles, you were found on the
nationalist side of the Catholic working class, putting forward ideas
which emphasised their separation from Protestants and could only have
had the effect of reinforcing nationalism.
When it comes to Protestants
you are in the opposite corner. Protestants, you tell us, are not a
"community," they have no "separate rights." Echoing
the sentiments of Rosa Luxemburg on the national question you protest
that there are not two "communities," that there is one
working class; that all talk of separate rights becomes a prescription
for "a form of Orange and Green socialism that would make permanent
the divisions of the working class," (11 January letter).
So when the parades controversy
arises there are "Catholic areas," and a besieged Catholic
"community." When you talk about the "Orange state,"
there is a "minority Catholic community" who have been denied
basic rights. All this is correct, although not in the manner you raise
it or the conclusions you draw. But when it comes to Protestant
sensitivities or Protestant rights there is only one community and any
suggestion of anything different is working class heresy.
It is correct to talk of two
"communities" in Northern Ireland. By "community,"
we do not mean a separate nation. It is a term to describe the fact that
the sectarian divide has deepened and that there has been a growing
sense among working class people that they are either
"nationalists" or "unionists." To deny this after
thirty years of sectarian conflict is to deny reality. Recognition of
what exists is not the same as acceptance or acquiescence to it. If we
are to overcome a problem it is first of all necessary to be able to see
it and understand it. The development of a united class movement will
not be possible in Northern Ireland without acknowledging the fact that
the working class is divided; that there are two communities separated
on many questions, but still united on many; and requires putting
forward a programme which recognises and upholds the rights of both
these communities.
Lenin explained that the
Russian Revolution would not have succeeded had it not been for the
understanding by the Bolsheviks of the national question and the
programme which flowed from this. In Ireland, as in Tsarist Russia, the
national question is a burning issue. The failure of the SWP to absorb
even a single grain of the method of Marxism on this question means
that, unless corrected, you can make no positive contribution to the
struggle to overcome the sectarian divide.
Continued...
