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Collapse of Stalinism | Home | News | Donate | Join | Print The Collapse of Stalinism debate
CWI document The working class movement97. Huge battles are inevitable in the coming period, although the timing and scale of the movement depends on many factors. While the failure of the coup has emboldened the counter-revolution, it has also raised the confidence of important layers of the proletariat. Of course this is a very complex and contradictiory situation. The consciousness of the working class, for reasons we have explained, has been thrown back. Enormous illusions and confusion exists. Big sections of the Soviet workers are not at this stage conscious of their position as a class. 95. This situation holds enormous dangers, both for the nationalist governments, but also for the workers' movement in the Baltics and in Russia. Already the sacking of Russian managers and councillors who supported the coup has been denounced by leaders of the Russian community in Estonia. The Estonian nationalist leadership want to limit citizenship to those whose families lived in the country before 1939. These conflicts, especially if refugees begin to pour back into Russia, can be seized upon by Russian nationalists and Yeltsin to fan the flames of nationalism within Russia. 98. But this mighty proletariat will be educated by experience in struggle. The practical effects of the market reforms will jar against the current illusions in capitalism and bourgeois democracy. As in Eastern Europe, developments will not proceed in a straight line. The weakness of the subjective factor means that, while battles are inevitable, so too are defeats and even moods of despair and reaction. But with political clarity and firmness in the face of a complex situation, there are also great possibilities for the small forces of Marxism to build initially among the most advanced workers and youth. 99. At a certain point, despite the confusion that exists, big battles will develop. The overwhelming concentration of industrial workers in huge factories adds to the restorationists' problems. 73.4 per cent of Soviet industrial workers are in enterprises employing more than 1,000 workers. In West Germany this accounts for only 39.7 per cent of the industrial workforce. Many of these enterprises would become frontline targets for sackings or closure. 100. Developments in Eastern Europe give an indication of how the illusions in capitalism will begin to break down. We have seen the beginning of a shift in the mood of the working class in a number of countries. This does not mean there are not illusions still, or that the mass of workers have drawn all the conclusions from the situation. These changes in the outlook of some sections of the working class are just beginning. But in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary there is a growing disillusionment with "the market". 101. In Poland there is now enormous opposition to the policies of the government. The Finance Minister's 'Balcerowicz Plan' is supported by only 21 per cent of the population. 77 per cent of Poles believe that these measures will provoke "a massive protest movement" and 52 per cent said they "would join such a movement"! More people now oppose Walesa than opposed Jaruzelski during his last months in office. There has been a big strike wave with an average of 20 strikes a day in July and August. Because of the obstructive role of both the OPZZ and NSZZ (Solidarity) leaders, this was largely a localised and sporadic movement, but it reflects a new preparedness to struggle on the part of Polish workers. 102. We must remember the deep illusions in the market that existed two years ago in Poland. This is a proletariat, unlike the Soviet working class, which suffered defeats in 1956, 1971 and especially in 1981. The ex-Stalinist Social Democrats are undoubtedly gaining from the growing disillusionment. It is increasingly common to hear workers say "we were better off under the Communists". Michnik of Solidarity even predicted that the ex-Stalinists could get 20 per cent of the vote (compared to 3 per cent in local elections in 1990) in the coming general election. This is perhaps an exaggeration, but it is clear that the Social Democrats have made gains. 103. In Slovakia opinion polls now show a majority for the left parties. The Party of the Democratic Left (ex-Stalinist) have around 16 per cent and Democratic Slovakia have around 38 per cent. The Slovak Prime Minister Meciar (Democratic Slovakia) who frustrated the implementation of the Prague government's market reforms was removed by a constitutional coup and replaced by the nationalist Christian Democrat Camoguvsky. Because of the parlous state of the Slovak economy Meciar resisted the plans to close big sections of the arms industry and other heavy industry. On the basis of quite a radical programme, calling for guarantees against unemployment and the need for continued state support, Meciar's party is the most popular force in Slovakia. A partial general strike developed and 100,000 surrounded and stormed the Slovak parliament when Meciar was deposed. Of course the national question is an important factor in the situation, but this does not explain workers' support for the left parties. The programme of the openly bourgeois parties is far more nationalist. 104. Marxists need to be sensitive to every indication of shifts and changes in the mood of the workers. We still have to overcome enormous illusions. But the criticisms of the Marxists of capitalism meet with a much more open response today. In Eastern Europe the pro-market euphoria of the previous period has given way to a questioning attitude among an increasing layer of workers and youth. 105. In the Soviet Union we must watch closely the developments in industry in the coming months. The failure of the coup could provide a new impetus to the formation of genuine workers' organisations. In some areas the independent unions, which in most cases were not unions at all but small political pressure groups, could begin to develop. It's also possible that the old official unions will undergo a transformation in the next period. Without the link to the party and the state, the old corrupt leaders connected to management could be pushed out by an infusion of workers, or these leaders could themselves adapt for opportunist reasons to a growing mood of opposition. Some of the old official organisations could become the focal point of opposition to the pro-capitalist policies. International Effects106. In assessing the international repercussions of events in the Soviet Union, once again we must consider all sides of the process. The outcome undoubtedly represents a victory for Imperialism. The US, fresh from its crushing defeat of Iraq is beating its chest at its 'victory' in the cold war. It will attempt to press home its current advantage, with the paralysis of the USSR in the international arena, to establish its political domination in the semi-colonial world. 107. Therefore we must recognise that this signifies an important shift in the international balance of forces in favour of Imperialism. But this relative strengthening of Imperialism does not rest either on a strengthening of capitalism economically and the lessening of its internal contradictions, or on serious defeats for the workers in the advanced capitalist countries. In the semi-colonial countries we have seen an enormous development of the proletariat and its organisations in certain countries: Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, Malaysia and other countries in South East Asia. The dispute in the Philippines over US bases shows the difficulties confronting US Imperialism in its attempts to play the role of world policeman on behalf of capitalism. 108. In Asia and Latin America there is a general downturn in the guerrilla struggle, with some exceptions such as Peru. The collapse of 'the model' - of a powerful Stalinist pole of attraction - during the last period is the major reason for this. The regimes in Africa which moved in the direction of proletarian Bonapartism during the 1970s were weak, crisis-ridden regimes which did not exercise the same attractive power in the region as, for example, the Cuban revolution did throughout the Americas and internationally. Along with the conscious efforts of the Soviet bureaucracy to prevent new proletarian Bonapartist regimes - as in Nicaragua - and economic decline in the Soviet Union while capitalism experienced a boom, the 1980s marked a period when no new proletarian Bonapartist regimes were established. 109. The disintegration of Stalinism in the Soviet Union will compound this process. Events in Eastern Europe have already had a disorientating effect within the various guerrilla organisations. The FMLN in El Salvador are discussing abandoning the armed struggle and contesting the 1994 presidential elections. Four of Columbia's six guerrilla groups have abandoned their military campaign. The defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the collapse of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia have reinforced this trend. These events have dealt a blow to the confidence of the guerrilla organisations and reinforced the leadership's shift to the right. 110. In the short-term these processes will tend to mitigate against the establishment of new proletarian Bonapartist regimes. It would be a mistake to exclude their establishment in the medium or longer term, especially against the background of a major economic crisis. How stable such regimes may be is, of course, another question. 111. The coming to power of a restorationist regime in the Soviet Union will inevitably undermine the position of the remaining proletarian Bonapartist regimes. US Imperialism has demanded an end to Soviet support for Cuba and the Afghan regime. Already the cut in Soviet subsidies and oil supplies has had a devastating effect on the Cuban economy. Imperialism clearly intends to intensify this pressure on Castro. But the situation in Cuba is different in a number of respects to that which existed in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, not least because the masses' perception of the gains of the revolution is greater, as is the hostility to US Imperialism. 112. Nevertheless, given the economic disaster which has now opened up, and against the general international background, a struggle against the regime is a strong likelihood. The absence of any alternative can result in similar illusions in the market taking hold. It is however, not excluded that the Castro regime could attempt to make a stand and fight it out. 113. However, despite this relative strengthening of Imperialism, the turmoil in the semi-colonial world will shatter any illusions of a "new world order" of peaceful capitalist development. Far from alleviating conditions, the capitalist boom of 1982-90 was accompanied by an unprecedented driving down of the living conditions of the working class and the peasantry. As we have explained, this was a critical element feeding the boom in the advanced capitalist countries. During the 1980s, there was a net transfer from the semi-colonial countries to the advanced capitalist nations of $220 billion. This is a recipe for explosive revolutionary upheavals in the coming period. 114. One effect of the coup's collapse will be to further encourage the masses in the semi-colonial world in the struggle against military Bonapartist regimes. The movements in Eastern Europe during 1989 undoubtedly had an enormous effect in the semi-colonial countries. In Nepal, we saw this with the overthrow of the monarchy by a general strike and in the fall of Ershad in Bangladesh. In Africa we have seen a wave of struggle in one country after another, which Der Spiegel referred to as an "African Intifada". One example was the movement of workers and students against Kaunda in Zambia, which resulted in the miners' union calling for the formation of a workers' party. As with the movements in Eastern Europe, at this stage, the masses have big illusions in parliamentary i.e. bourgeois democracy. 115. Nevertheless, what these developments signify, especially when we consider the general decline in the activity of peasant guerrilla movements, is an increasing tendency for the proletariat in these countries to assert itself. The rotten bourgeois Bonapartist regimes in the colonial world are terrified by these events. This explains the shift taking place in sub-Saharan Africa whereby more than half the region's 38 military dictatorships will have moved to some form of "multi-party democracy" - at least in name - by the end of this year. 116. These regimes have seen the writing on the wall with the toppling of the Stalinist one-party regimes. They are trying to head off a movement from below by partial democratisation from above. As Gorbachev discovered, however, these measures can embolden the masses and lead to an explosion of the class struggle in the coming period. Against the background of a fall in real wages of more than 30 per cent in Africa during the 1980s, 80 per cent in some African countries, far from pacifying the working class these limited democratic rights will be seized by the proletariat to advance its own position in society. 117. The movement against the coup has had a contradictory effect on the consciousness of workers internationally. Many, especially the broad mass of workers in the advanced capitalist countries see the outcome as a victory, another example of a mass movement bringing down a dictatorship and defending democratic rights. This can raise the confidence and preparedness to fight of workers' in the West. The movement against the poll tax in Britain, for example, undoubtedly drew encouragement from the mass movements in Eastern Europe. 118. At the same time, however, the acceleration of the counter-revolution and the capitalist propaganda offensive, in the context of the recent boom have succeeded in sowing confusion. For many workers, at this stage, the planned economy is not seen as a viable alternative to the market. Unless important class battles cut across this, in the short term, the leadership of the workers' organisations will probably drift even further to the right. 119. One important outcome of these events will be their profound effects on the consciousness of the US proletariat. By removing the bogey of an external threat from "communism" these events disarm the bosses of their main propaganda weapon against workers in struggle. In the course of the inevitable battles of the American workers in the next period, this removes a major obstacle to the politicisation of US workers and greater readiness to accept socialist ideas. 120. In the semi-colonial countries too, we see a contradictory situation. On one hand an important section of the working class, particularly where the Stalinists still have strong roots, supported the coup. They believed that Gorbachev's removal was striking a blow against Imperialism and that the coup would preserve 'socialism' in the Soviet Union. For these workers, the coup may have a disorientating effect. In the short term, some could draw the most pessimistic conclusions. 121. Where the Stalinist model exercised a powerful attraction for the masses in the past, such moods could be widespread. But despite this, the shattering of illusions in Stalinism and the hold of Stalinist organisations over important sections of workers has a very positive side. This period opens an historic opportunity for the Marxists on soil which was difficult, if not impossible, to penetrate in the past. A mood of enormous questioning and searching for explanations exists among workers traditionally aligned with the Stalinists, especially the youth. In a number of semi-colonial countries we have already begun to make important new inroads among this layer since the failed coup. 122. In the advanced capitalist countries too, important opportunities exist among workers who supported the Stalinists. The effect of the latest events will perhaps be even more traumatic within the CPs and ex-CPs than the events in Hungary in 1956. Even before the coup virtually every CP in the advanced capitalist world was wracked by crises and splits. The coup's defeat and the abandonment of the planned economy and 'socialism' by the regime in the USSR will enormously accelerate these processes. If the Marxists make a bold turn - as the defenders of the planned economy and the tradition of Lenin - we can make important gains where the Stalinists or ex-Stalinists represent a significant layer of the advanced workers. 123. Therefore, while taking account of the complexities in the new international situation, the Marxists must seize the opportunities which present themselves. The collapse of Stalinism sweeps away one of the greatest obstacles that has existed to the development of genuine revolutionary ideas among the working class. Now with the banner of Marxism and even 'socialism' being trampled underfoot by both the reformists and yesterday's Stalinist leaders, our tendency has been presented with an historic opportunity. By conducting a tenacious defence of the ideas of genuine Marxism in this period we can attract the most determined and spirited fighters within the working class • East and West - who have nowhere else to turn. September 1991 The next document is The Truth about the Coup by the minority
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