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Collapse of Stalinism | Home | News | Donate | Join | Print The Collapse of Stalinism debate
CWI document The Nationalities84. The national question in the Soviet Union is extremely complex, perhaps even more so than in Lenin's day. A fuller account of this critical question for the Marxists will be produced in the near future. This statement, therefore, only deals with a general outline of the situation. Of course the Marxists stand for the right of self determination, up to and including separation. However, how exactly we raise our demands in relation to the national question depends on the concrete situation which exists. It requires extreme sensitivity and skill in raising our specific demands. At the same time, we must warn of the dangers posed by the break up of the Union - which we oppose - above all on a capitalist basis. We must explain why we would stand for and defend a genuinely free Union of workers' democracies in the republics. This is still the only programme to resolve the national question. Recent events in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia demonstrate that neither decaying Stalinism or capitalism is capable of solving this problem. 85. The question of the minorities, especially the Russian minorities in the republics, will be decisive in the power struggles that are unfolding. 75 million Soviet citizens live outside their home republic. 25 million ethnic Russians live outside the Russian federation. 86. Like Milosevic, who exploited the position of the minority Serb populations in Kosovo and Croatia to maintain his regime and extend its control, Yeltsin has shown he is prepared to "champion" the rights of the Russian settlers. His threats to the Ukraine (where Russians are 21 per cent of the population) and Kazakhstan (40 per cent) over recognition of their borders, shows how the fears of the Russian population will be utilised by the Russian state in future conflicts with the other republics. Not for nothing did the Ukrainian premier Kravchuk complain of Yeltsin's "imperialist tendencies". 87. Already in Moldova, where the ethnic Romanian majority have declared independence, this is opposed by the 700,000 Russians of the Dnestr region who have declared their own independent republic and the formation of a national guard. This Russian enclave is decisive industrially, controlling all power supplies and most rail and road links to Moldova. 'A blockade by the Russian minority could paralyse the economy of Moldova. Elsewhere too, because of the manner in which Stalinist industrialisation was carried out, the Russian minority form the core of the industrial working class. These workers can play a decisive role in the struggles of the next period. But there are also great dangers of a layer of these workers being driven in the direction of Russian nationalism. 88. In the Transcaucasian republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, a Balkanisation is taking place. Armed conflicts are spreading with significant minorities opposing independence from the Soviet Union, as in the case of the South Ossetians and Abkhazians in Georgia and the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh who are opposed to Azerbaijani rule. 89. The collapse of the coup gave an enormous impetus to these processes. The shock of the coup and fear of a return to Stalinism has increased support for independence among the nationalities. But also the bureaucracy in the republics are increasingly basing themselves on the pro-independence movements in order to maintain their own positions. Within hours of the coup collapsing, Kravchuk (Ukraine), Nazarbayev (Kazakhstan) and Mutalibov (Azerbaijan) all performed political somersaults, coming out for independence and cutting their links with the now discredited Communist Party. The Baltic States90. The newly independent Baltic states face an extremely uncertain future. Unlike the economies of Eastern Europe, these economies were completely integrated into the Soviet economy. Two-thirds of the industrial production of Estonia and Latvia goes elsewhere in the Soviet Union. They are entirely dependent on the Soviet Union for electricity, gas and oil. 91. The change to hard currency payments for Soviet fuel and raw materials has had disastrous effects on the former COMECON economies of Eastern Europe. A switch to world prices for trade with the Soviet Union could bring the Baltic economies to their knees. This could more than cancel out the gains from foreign, especially German, Swedish and Finnish, investment which these pro-bourgeois regimes hope to tempt in. For this reason, it cannot be ruled out that some or all of the Baltic states may opt to retain, in a diluted form, "associate membership" of a new economic confederation with the rest of the Soviet Union. 92. At the same time the Baltic states are in a somewhat different position to the other republics. Western capitalism will now try to draw the Baltic states into its orbit. A certain level of Western investment is possible as these were technologically the most advanced economies in the Soviet Union. Estonia's productivity, for example, is 40 per cent above the Soviet average. Geographically and economically they occupy an important position and could develop as a bridgehead for foreign companies looking for a production base for the Soviet market. Already there are 140 Scandinavian joint ventures operating in Estonia. Because these are small economies, foreign aid and investment could have a greater effect than elsewhere. Such an economic development however, means that these states will be pawns in the hands of the regional powers: German, Scandinavian and if restoration is carried through to a conclusion, Russian capitalism. Workers' illusions in capitalism, and in "independence" on a capitalist basis, will be cruelly shattered. 93. The EC is discussing "associate membership" for the Baltic states. But the treatment of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia is an indication of the limits of the EC's generosity. Despite its offer to increase their access to European markets, the EC still keeps out steel, textiles and farm produce from these countries. This has provoked new splits within the EC, with France particularly opposing farm imports from Eastern Europe. Walesa recently threatened to withdraw Poland's application to become an "associate member" of the EC. 94. But the problems confronting the Baltic states are not just on the economic plain. The position of the Russians (33 per cent of Latvia's population, 28 per cent of Estonia's), and other minorities could be a source of fierce conflicts in the future. A section of the Russian minority actually support independence, believing that the switch to the market will eventually raise living standards. Others were already resigned to independence, seeing it as inevitable. But the large Russian, Ukrainian and Polish minorities could move into violent opposition if, as is likely given the character of the nationalist governments, they face discriminatory legislation on one hand, and find themselves at the sharp end of the market reforms on the other. Many of the big enterprises facing rationalisation or closure employ all-Russian workforces from management down to the shop floor. 96. A re-establishment of the Soviet Union's domination of its former East European satellites is extremely unlikely. But there are significant differences in the position of the Baltic states, especially the presence of the large Russian minority. Despite acceptance of their independence by the central bureaucracy and the generals today, new conflicts are inevitable. They will be permanently under pressure from the military colossus over their border. Disputes have already arisen over the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the question of the naval bases. In the economic sphere too, there will be bitter wrangling over Soviet demands for compensation for industry and investments in the Baltics. The position of the Russian minority will undoubtedly be utilised by the Soviet and Russian regimes in these disputes.
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