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The Scottish debate

Scotland, France and the International

A Contribution To The 'Scottish Debate' (continued)

Questions of history

61. A number of historical examples have been evoked. We've already touched on the Bolshevik party, and we'll come back to it. Let's take two examples which have perhaps more relevance to us today, concerning tactics in the 1930s by organisations more closely resembling some of our sections than did the Bolshevik Party.

62. In 1934 Trotsky advised the British Trotskyists, who were at that time a group of about forty, to enter the ILP. The objective that he fixed was not to recruit individuals, but "to work for the Bolshevik transformation of the party (that is, of its revolutionary kernel)". Furthermore, as time passed and the ILP weakened, his appeals to the British Trotskyists to enter the party became more urgent, as he tried to save something from the wreckage.

63. Trotsky's method of posing the question of entry into the ILP to the British Trotskyists is enlightening: "The publication of a small, monthly paper under the circumstances is senseless, because the same articles are published earlier or at the same time in the (American) Militant. We can make good use of the Militant as a 'central organ' for our work within the ILP". And later: "I believe (and this is my personal opinion) that even if you should give up your special organ you will be able to use to advantage the press of the ILP, The New Leader (the paper of the ILP) and the discussion organ. The American Militant as well as the International Bulletin could well supplement your work" (Writings, 1933-34).

64. So Trotsky thought it was all right for a group of forty, (which had yet to prove itself in the class struggle) to enter a party of ten thousand (at the time he was writing) in which there were all sorts of reformists, centrists and Stalinists, giving up its paper, using the press of the ILP and the international press of the ICL. In other words he was posing less stringent conditions than the British Executive Committee which is dealing with a Scottish organisation of several hundred with a proven record in the class struggle and considerable political authority: an organisation which is not just "entering" a party, but helping to launch a party in which we will be close to a numerical majority and certainly a political majority and whose paper we will edit.

65. Was Trotsky worried about the dissolution of Trotskyist forces? "The great advantage of the Left Opposition lies in the fact that it has a theoretically elaborated programme, international experience and international control. Under these conditions there is not the slightest basis for the fear that the British Bolshevik-Leninists will dissolve without a trace in the ILP".

66. Ah, comrades may say, Trotsky talks about "international control". Yes, but in terms of political discussion and persuasion, not organisational control. "Of course the International Secretariat did not intend to and could not intend to force you by a bare order to enter the ILP. If you yourselves will not be convinced of the usefulness of such a step, your entry will be to no purpose". (Writings, 1933-34). Two years later he wrote: "We cannot make any claim to leading our national sections directly from a centre, even if this centre were much more united than it is at present. Within the bounds of the united programme and the common political line, every section must necessarily lay claim to a certain elbow room in which to act. I am a little surprised that I am obliged to say this to the Dutch friends, who, up to now, have carried on their policy absolutely independently and in many important respects in direct contradiction with the firm opinion of the international organisation". In the same article, Trotsky added of course that "we retain the right to our opinion". It is worth recalling this very flexible interpretation of international democratic centralism in view of some of the positions that we heard expressed in the debates in Leuven.

67. As a matter of fact, of course, Trotsky failed to convince the British Trotskyists to enter the ILP (only a minority did so, and late). That was a serious lost opportunity for Trotskyism in Britain.

68. The example of the fusion of the American Trotskyists with the Musteite organisation in 1934 has been cited by both the Scottish comrades and by the British Executive Committee. Two points which have some relevance for this discussion are worth underlining. Firstly, the new organisation, which was called the WPUS, was not a section of the ICL, whereas the CLA had been. Article III of the WPUS constitution read: "The Party, at its launching, is affiliated with no other group, party or organisation in the United States or elsewhere. Its National Committee is empowered to enter into fraternal relations with groups and parties in other countries and, if they stand on the same fundamental programme as its own, to co-operate with them in the elaboration of a complete world programme and the speediest possible establishment of the new revolutionary International. Action on any organisational affiliation must be submitted to a National Convention of the Party".

69. The British Executive Committee say that Cannon and Trotsky did not set out to build a hybrid or transitional party with Muste. However this is what they did, aiming of course to "transform the new party into a revolutionary party as quickly as possible". Compromises were made. And, although acting in a concerted way to influence the WPUS the Trotskyists did not constitute themselves a "party within a party" which was formally affiliated to the ICL.

70. In fact, over a four-year period 1934-38, there was no openly affiliated organisation in the USA to the international Trotskyist movement. That did not prevent the American Trotskyists from carrying out mass work and tactical turns (the fusion that led to the WPUS, entry into the Socialist Party) which led to the American Socialist Workers Party becoming the strongest section of the Fourth International when it was founded in 1938. Of course, the leadership remained in close contact with Trotsky, and the Trotskyists caucused during the entry into the SP in a much tighter way that they had done in the WPUS. Both the Scottish and British comrades have pointed out that Cannon was politically intransigent on the programme and flexible on organisation. That is exactly the point. The British Executive Committee is being extremely rigid on organisation, practically elevating the frequency of meetings of the Committee for a Workers' International tendency to a level of principle, while leaving the Scottish comrades to politically prepare the launching of the Scottish Socialist Party on their own. In practice, the British Executive Committee concentrates entirely on the narrow question of the form of organisation of the Committee for a Workers' International tendency in the Scottish Socialist Party, to the detriment of how the comrades would in fact "actively work" in the party.

71. These examples don't mean that we shouldn't be organised in the Scottish Socialist Party. They do underline that the precise way in which the comrades are organised within the Scottish Socialist Party is a question not of principle but of tactics, which depends on the character of the Scottish Socialist Party and which is subordinate, as are all organisational questions, to the political goal, in this case the fight to build and politically transform the Scottish Socialist Party.

Bolshevism

72. The history of Bolshevism has been brought into the debate. The Scottish comrades say that "prior to 1912, Bolshevism existed as a loosely organised faction or tendency within the broader RSDLP". The British Executive Committee replies that "Lenin consistently strove to build an ideologically coherent, democratic centralist organisation (whether termed a faction or a party)". There are problems with both these definitions.

73. First of all, it is necessary to make a correction. The Scottish comrades quote Trotsky in 'My Life' as saying: "The history of the struggle of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks is also a history of ceaseless efforts towards unity". The British Executive Committee replies that "the real meaning of the quote is exactly the opposite of what is claimed in the comrades' document. Trotsky refers to the fact that Stalin's hack historians used the episode of the 1912 'August bloc' as a pretext for presenting Trotsky as a 'splitter' and to falsely paint the picture that 'the history of the struggle of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks is also a history of ceaseless efforts towards unity'", (my emphasis, Murray Smith)

74. Unfortunately, this interpretation is quite inaccurate, as becomes clear on reading the passage in question. Trotsky actually wrote: "For novices and the ignorant, Bolshevism is furthermore represented as springing fully armed from the laboratory of history. Now, the history of the struggle of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks is also a history of ceaseless efforts towards unity". He then goes on to give several examples of these "ceaseless efforts towards unity". Of course, the history of the struggle between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks was not only made up of efforts towards unity, but also of splits. To avoid having a unilateral vision of the history of Bolshevism both have to be taken into account and analysed.

75. In general, Bolshevism was more than a loosely organised faction. Precisely how tight or how loose depended on the circumstances. As Trotsky pointed out: "The Bolsheviks changed their organisational structure radically at every transition from one stage to the next". At the top the faction was quite tightly organised, but probably much less so at the base. Sometimes the faction had its own paper, sometimes it used various RSDLP publications. Was it an "ideologically coherent, democratic centralist organisation (whether termed a faction or a party)"? It would be better to say "politically coherent", but also flexible. In 1905, Lenin had no qualms about building a party which included, in his own words, "Christians who believe in God, and those intellectuals who defend mysticism (fie upon them!)", because he was confident in the power of Marxist ideas to dominate the party. He had sharp philosophical differences with Bogdanov and Lunacharsky and he did not avoid the debate on these questions (writing in particular 'Materialism and Empiric-criticism'). But in 1904 Lenin formed a bloc with Bogdanov to lead the Bolshevik faction, leaving questions of philosophy on one side. This was not a minor question, considering that in 1904 and even more so in 1906 Bogdanov's philosophical ideas were scarcely Marxist.

76. Throughout his political life Lenin split, unified, fought or compromised for political reasons. He split with the Mensheviks in 1903 to defend the kind of party which was necessary at that point in time; in 1905 he fought against his own "committee-men" (who had backed him in 1903) in order to "open the gates of the party"; in 1905-07 he was for a united party with the Mensheviks in the context of an ongoing revolution; in 1909 he split with the Bolshevik ultra-lefts (the Vperiodists) and sought to ally the Leninist Bolsheviks with the party Mensheviks of Plekhanov.

77. Even in what was to all intents and purposes the final split with the Mensheviks in 1912, Lenin did not simply transform the Bolshevik faction into a party. At the Bolshevik school at Longjumeau in 1911 both Vperiodists and party Mensheviks participated and gave lectures, though they were a small minority. Both were invited to the Prague Conference in January 1912, called by the Bolshevik faction and open to all except the Menshevik liquidators. Only the party Mensheviks came, though Plekhanov himself stayed away. The Vperiodists preferred to get involved with Trotsky's "August Bloc". Both Plekhanov and Bogdanov wrote for the Bolshevik 'Pravda' in 1912-13. The really definitive splits came in 1914, with those who supported the imperialist war, and in 1917, with those who opposed the taking of power by the Soviets.

78. At each turning-point, political realignments occurred around concrete issues which arose in the class struggle and the workers movement. The idea of splitting or unifying around pre-determined ideological criteria would have been profoundly foreign to Lenin. Again in the period after 1917, currents in the international workers' movement were judged first of all by where they stood on the socialist revolution in Russia and in their own countries, not by questions of ideology.

79. To simply say that Lenin's faction or party was democratic centralist shows a certain misunderstanding of the difference between a faction and a party. A revolutionary party exists to intervene actively in the class struggle and it demands of those who join it discipline in action, not ideological discipline. Differences are permissible within the broad framework of the programme of the party. A faction exists to influence the policy of the party in a certain direction and for this its adherents have to have a certain unity of thought, at least on the points that constitute the faction's raison d'etre.

80. Democratic centralism, first adopted by the RSDLP congress in 1907, is about action. As defined by Lenin, it implies the fullest possible debate (very often open, public debate) before decisions are taken, and discipline, united action once a decision is taken. A faction does not have the same discipline on all questions. For example, at an RSDLP party conference held in July 1907 eight of the nine Bolshevik delegates voted to boycott the Duma elections. The ninth, Lenin, voted with the Mensheviks and others to defeat the boycott, because he put the interests of the party before the discipline of his faction. That was one isolated disagreement. When the disagreements between Lenin and the ultra left Bolsheviks became systematic the Bolshevik faction split down them middle in 1909 and the ultra lefts formed their own faction. At that point Lenin refused to call a Bolshevik congress and sought to ally with those Mensheviks who rejected liquidationism.

An international turn

81. In the Scottish debate, the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers' International very quickly came out in support of the British Executive Committee, and indeed assumed a leading role in the debate, as was seen very clearly at Leuven. This is unfortunately no accident. It coincides with a clear retreat by the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers' International on the question of fusions, regroupments, new parties and relations with other revolutionary forces.

82. In their first document the Scottish comrades write: "But the worst mistake that we could make now would be to turn back the calendar and return to the strategy of building an independent Marxist organisation in isolation from the rest of the left" (They subsequently modified "in isolation" to "independently"). The response of the British Executive Committee is very revealing. They react by - correctly - pointing out that in the past, both in the Labour Party period and subsequently, we have worked in a variety of fronts, campaigns and caucuses with other forces, and still do. This factually correct reply misses the political point. As far as can be seen there is no problem with our sections not working in this way with other forces. The problem arises when it is a question of building parties with other forces.

83. There have been cases of already existing national organisations fusing with/joining the Committee for a Workers' International, the most recent being the French section in 1993. Small regroupments with other forces have also taken place in the framework of national sections (France, Belgium, Australia, USA). But the dominant position has been for sections to grow by arithmetical recruitment.

84. If the Scottish debate were an isolated case then there would be less cause for concern. The attitude of the British Executive Committee and the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers' International would still be seriously mistaken, but the problem would be limited. However, taken together with the change in attitude on the question of regroupment internationally, and in particular what can only be called a U-turn on the perspective of fusion with the UIT, there is a clearly identifiable tendency. In France, this began to be obvious to us during discussions with the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers' International in April, May and June this year concerning our relations with La Commune, the French section of the UIT, with which we are discussing fusion.

85. Discussions began with the UIT last year and they participated in the European School last summer. After a meeting in Barcelona last November between delegations of the leaderships of the Committee for a Workers' International and UIT, a joint declaration was issued which ended by announcing that the discussions would be pursued "with the objective to explore the possibility of unifying our two organisations as part of the regroupment of revolutionary currents and Trotskyist organisations, which defend revolutionary socialism". An accompanying letter from the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers' International to the sections added: "Such a development (a fusion) could mark an historical turning-point in building a more powerful revolutionary international organisation of workers and young people". Subsequently Tony Saunois attended their World Congress and visited their sections in Latin America and came back with a highly positive report.

86. These developments encouraged us in France to reinforce our (already existing) collaboration with La Commune and we increasingly found that we could work together on a wide range of issues in the class struggle with few problems, not any more than could be contained in a single organisation. Certainly, there were the differences on international questions, which did not however impede the collaboration of our two organisations in France, and which were of course known to the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers' International when the perspective of an international fusion was being put forward as a possibility. Today we cannot guarantee that we will successfully fuse with La Commune: simply that it is a realistic perspective. And the French section is not out for unity at any price. We have taken a very firm attitude towards another revolutionary organisation in France which put considerable pressure on us to rush into a fusion without testing out whether it was possible through common work and discussion in the way that we are doing with La Commune.

87. Since March relations between the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers' International and the UIT have been reduced to a strict minimum and there is no more talk of fusion. For the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers' International, this is supposedly justified by the UIT leadership's refusal to discuss allegations about their past made by Carlos Petroni (an ex-leader of the Moreno current, now a leading member of our US section) and by a manoeuvre by their small German section to link up with a group who left our German section in Berlin. This is not the place to go into details. On the substantive issues in question, the UIT leadership was at fault. They should have been prepared to discuss their own past, whatever the rights and wrongs of the question. And they were wrong over Germany, as they have now admitted. By the way, in both cases the comrades of La Commune were openly critical of their own International Secretariat.

88. However, these two incidents have been used to freeze discussions and common action with the UIT and since then the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers' International has made it clear that it thinks the French section is proceeding too fast with La Commune. There are two things wrong with this attitude. In the first place the two incidents in question do not justify allowing the whole process which was under way with the UIT to seize up. What is at stake in the discussions with the UIT is the question of fusing with an international that shares with us the objective of building a revolutionary Marxist international and parties in every country, and that represents serious forces - "largely proletarian" and made up of "committed revolutionaries" to quote the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers' International letter of last November. That has not changed because we have run into some problems with them. We have a duty to verify if a fusion is possible on a principled political basis and not to be side-tracked by incidents of secondary importance. No serious member of the UIT, even those critical of their International Secretariat over the two incidents in question, will take us seriously otherwise. We should decide our attitude towards other political forces in terms of our political characterisation of these forces and what they represent, not on this or that incident. You only have to look at the way Trotsky persevered in trying to regroup with other forces in the 1930s in spite of all sorts of political errors and organisational manoeuvres by their leaderships, much worse than anything the UIT has done.

89. The second mistake has been to try and impose this attitude towards the UIT on the French section. We have no problem with the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers' International being involved in our discussions with La Commune. In principle this can be useful. However it is quite clear that what the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers' International is attempting to do is to put the brakes on the fusion process which is underway in France, to bring us into line with its own mistaken policy towards the UIT. Of course the present state of relations between the two internationals makes the perspective of a fusion in France more complicated than it needed to be. The question of the international affiliation of a fused organisation in France would have to be resolved. But this would be possible on the basis that both La Commune and ourselves would keep our international affiliations. We would not try to railroad them out of the UIT or let ourselves be railroaded out of the Committee for a Workers' International.

90. The attitude of the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers' International could have been seen as an over-reaction to a couple of incidents, which could be corrected. Various statements have been made at Leuven and elsewhere by comrades of the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers' International to the effect that we have not abandoned the perspective of regroupment. However what is needed now is not just verbal assurances but to go back on the offensive for discussions and joint campaigns to verify whether a fusion is politically possible. Unfortunately the reaction of the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers' International to the resolution adopted by the recent International Executive Committee of the UIT concerning relations with the Committee for a Workers' International gives absolutely no grounds for optimism on this score. That is something that will have to be taken up in the discussions for the World Congress

91. The Committee for a Workers' International, by the forces that it represents and by its programme and perspectives, is well placed to play a central role in the regroupment of revolutionary forces on an international level, involving both national and international currents. As well as the UIT, that should particularly involve the LIT. Apart from the general objective which we should have of uniting revolutionary Marxist forces, we will have great difficulty building anything in Latin America without a policy of regroupment, in particular with the forces that come from the Morenoite tradition.

92. What is apparently lacking is the political will to be the motor force of regroupment, and to stick to this objective, overcoming temporary obstacles. Contrast this with the attitude of the American Trotskyists in the 1930s: "We campaigned for the new party. Our great advantage over the other groups - the advantage which assured our hegemony - was that we knew what we wanted. We had a clearly defined programme and that gave us a certain aggressiveness". (Cannon, 'History of American Trotskism', pp 143-144).

93. Over the last period, the whole orientation towards regroupment has been replaced by the insistence on building our own sections. Any lingering doubts that could have been entertained on this question were dispelled at Leuven. We are now told that the Committee for a Workers' International is not only a revolutionary international but the revolutionary international. Our sections are now systematically described as parties or at least as the nuclei of parties.

94. One of the things, one of the many things that attracted the present French section to the Committee for a Workers' International in 1993 was the absence of this kind of posturing, of self-proclamation of parties and an International. We even found that the name 'Committee for a Workers' International', for all its disadvantages, showed at least some sense of proportion compared to much of the rest of the Trotskyist movement. This is not a minor question. In 1934 Cannon, who was at the head of an organisation stronger than many of our sections today, had to explain in defence of his tactics to sectarian elements in his own organisation: "We are not yet a party. We are only a propaganda group. Our problem is to become a party" (emphasis in the original). And further on: "You set up the principle (of the independence of the party) in such a way as to make it a barrier against the tactical moves necessary to make a real party possible". (Cannon, 'History of American Trotskyism', pp 223-224).

95. As for the term "nucleus of the revolutionary party", it shows slightly more modesty. However, as Marxists we do not believe in predestination. There is no guarantee that a nucleus will grow into a party or help to build one. That depends on correct programme, perspectives, strategy and tactics. And especially for a small group, it depends on avoiding what Cannon called "the political disease" of sectarianism.

96. The current trend towards self-affirmation, towards reducing the question of building the party to building our own forces, would rapidly isolate us in France. Serious workers and youth will not be convinced by a group that just considers itself as the revolutionary party, or even as its nucleus. They will want to know what strategy we have for building the party and how we relate to other forces in the workers' movement. It is perfectly clear that not only in the distant future but in the short to medium term the road towards a revolutionary party will involve fusions, regroupments, and the question of a new workers' party. Even on our own modest scale our not insignificant growth over the past period has been achieved both by direct recruitment and by mini-regroupments, the one reinforcing the other.

97. Is there a special climate in France? Certainly there are specific characteristics of the workers movement here, as in other countries. In particular there are large Trotskyist organisations and a Communist Party which, though greatly weakened, is still a mass party and has a significant left wing. There is even a definite left wing in the Socialist Party. There are also important developments in the unions. And all this has to be placed in the context of a rise in the class struggle since 1993 and especially since 1995. So we have specific problems and specific opportunities.

98. But in Scotland there are no big Trotskyist organisations, the old CP has disappeared and the different fragments which subsist are relatively weak. Our own organisation occupies a dominant position on the Left and still we have come up against the limits of simply building our organisation arithmetically, as demonstrated by the experience of the Alliance and the discussion over the Scottish Socialist Party. This has not taken place against the background of the same level of industrial struggle as in France but in the context of a political sea-change which presents us with big opportunities and big challenges.

99. What if neither Scotland nor France was really exceptional but for different reasons the evolution of the political situation meant that possibilities existed today of taking bold initiatives which are not reducible to simply building our own forces by arithmetical recruitment? What if, as the Scottish comrades say: "Before emerging as mass revolutionary parties, our sections in every part of the world will at certain stages be forced to participate in and, from time to time, initiate hybrid, transitional and broader formations"?

100. For us, building revolutionary organisations is not an end in itself. It is clear that big struggles are on the agenda in France. We have a responsibility to try and ensure that there is an organisation capable of intervening on a qualitatively higher level than in 1995. Of course at the present time we build our own organisation. But we are also in favour of building a new workers' party along with other forces, a party which would certainly not be a classical revolutionary party but hopefully a combat party with a programme capable of arming the working class and of attracting into its ranks the best workers and youth. Of course, within such a party we would maintain our own Committee for a Workers' International tendency: that is not negotiable.

101. We need to discuss how new workers' parties can come into being. The Scottish comrades pose the question clearly enough: "This in turn must throw into question the assumption that new mass formations will in the future necessarily take on everywhere a left reformist character. We accept that among the general mass of the working class left reformist and centrist illusions will grow in certain periods. These ideas will inevitably be reflected within any future mass parties of the working class. However we would have to challenge the assumption that these parties will necessarily be led by left reformists" (New Tactics for a New Period 38).

102. The British Executive Committee replies: "We will not intervene in new formations especially if we are able to take a major part in launching them, fatalistically accepting that it is predetermined that they will be led by left reformists. We would fight for a bold anti-capitalist programme and radical socialist demands, attempting to win a majority to revolutionary ideas. But we have to start with a realistic assessment of our own forces and of the other forces coming into such a formation" (the Socialist Party Reply to New Tactics for a New Period 41). They develop the same sort of idea in their reply to A Political Justification. Yet the dominant idea is still that new workers' parties will appear independently of our own initiatives, and that they will be tend to be led by reformists. This was particularly the case at Leuven.

103. There is an exchange of views between the Scottish Militant Labour-Executive Committee and the British Executive Committee in the section "Isolation" of New Tactics for a New Period and the corresponding section of the Socialist Party Reply to New Tactics for a New Period. In the first place it is not possible to accept the British Executive Committee's version of the "real line of argument of this section" (of New Tactics for a New Period), given in paragraphs 33 and 34 of their own document, which they then proceed to conveniently demolish in paragraphs 35 to 38. This an old and not very reputable debating trick. In general it is better to stick to what people actually say or write.

104. What the Scottish comrades actually say is that it was not possible "to create mass parties or even to seek to create broader formations of revolutionaries and left-wing socialists" in the postwar period. The debate over what is objective and what is subjective in the failure of Trotskyists to build mass parties is potentially endless. But yes, Trotsky, as the British Executive Committee say, "continually sought ways of developing new mass revolutionary formations" in the 1930s. And we might add, without much success. Trotsky himself attributed that failure in the last analysis to objective causes, notably in an interview with CLR James, 'Fighting Against the Stream' (Writings 1938-39). Of course, even in difficult objective conditions correct or incorrect tactics can make a difference: witness the relative success of the American Trotskyists as against the errors and missed opportunities of in particular the French and Spanish sections. We could also discuss to what extent the wrong policies of many Trotskyists groups during World War Two and the difficulties in understanding postwar reality contributed to the weakness of the movement. What is incontestable is that the huge strengthening of Stalinism and reformism and the postwar boom created objective conditions which left the Trotskyist movement isolated and ruled out the building of mass revolutionary parties, at least in the advanced capitalist countries, for a whole period. That situation only began to be modified in the late 1960s, and has changed qualitatively over the last decade.

105. The important question, therefore, is what is the situation now? We all agree that the consciousness of the working class has been pushed back since the collapse of Stalinism. But in what direction is the arrow pointing? Is it continuing to be pushed back? It is rather the case that the ideological effects of the collapse of Stalinism are giving way to the effects of capitalist crisis, neoliberalism and globalisation. Workers and youth are beginning to look for answers. And reformism and Stalinism as organised forces, not only as ideological currents but as massive bureaucratic machines, have been enormously weakened.

106. That does not mean that there will be no more reformism or centrism in the working class or that it will not take an organised form. But new reformist organisations will be weaker, less stable than before. There are therefore considerable opportunities for revolutionaries to increase their influence, find a mass audience and build parties. We should avoid like the plague any sort of "stages theory" whereby the working class would have to go through reformism and centrism before arriving at revolutionary Marxism. The weaker the forces of Marxism, or the more mistakes these forces make, the longer the road and the stronger the influence of reformism. But if the Marxist forces have sufficient strength and are capable of taking bold initiatives while remaining firm on their programme, we can significantly influence the situation and build strong revolutionary organisations which can challenge reformism in the working class. What else can be the meaning of building a "small mass party numbering tens of thousands, particularly in the next two, three or four years". Without going into the time-scale in each country, such possibilities can exist. But we will only be able to take advantage of them if we are capable of bold tactical initiatives.

107. We should also beware of establishing too linear a connection between economy and politics. It is not necessarily the case that the developing economic crisis will produce, in that order, big struggles and new mass workers' parties. History, and Trotsky, should warn us against such simplistic reasoning. As the 1930s showed, economic crisis does not automatically produce big struggles immediately. Sometimes the impact of economic crisis and international political events can provoke a crisis and recomposition of the workers' movement before there are big movements of the working class. That was certainly the case in France in the early 1930s, and not only in France.

108. In the present crisis of the international workers' movement is it the case that, as the Scottish comrades write: "Not only in Scotland, but internationally, the traditional ideological battle lines which divided the left have become blurred"? (Blurred, not erased). If we approach the question on a strictly ideological level, the difference is as sharp as ever between reform and revolution, popular front and united front, permanent revolution and revolution by stages. That is indisputable. But two things have changed. Firstly, the forces defending reformist and Stalinist ideas have been qualitatively weakened by the collapse of Stalinism and the working class's experience of social-democratic governments, and therefore we are in a stronger position to fight those ideas.

109. Secondly, those militants who did not "hoist the white flag" are in many cases looking for a red flag. They are open to our ideas and you can easily find CP members defending ideas which in the past would have been dismissed as Trotskyism. As the Scottish comrades say: "These general long term processes, combined with the specific experience of working together within various campaigns, have led to a breaking down of political barriers which at an earlier stage may have appeared almost insurmountable". We can clearly see this in the breaking down of barriers between Trotskyists and members of the French CP, which were indeed until quite recently almost insurmountable.

110. Paragraph 34 of the Socialist Party Reply to New Tactics for a New Period attributes to the Scottish comrades, the idea defended by "one or two comrades who now evidently reject the idea of building a Marxist revolutionary party: Trotskyism was a reaction to Stalinism; Stalinism is finished; therefore Trotskyism is (wholly or largely) redundant".

111. If "one or two comrades" want to defend such ideas we can debate with them, once we know who they are. In the meantime it is more important to understand what is the relationship between Trotskyism and Stalinism (and reformism) in the workers' movement today. To say that in the past Trotskyism was simply a reaction to Stalinism is of course mistaken. Trotskyism at its origin was the continuation in an programmatic and organised form of communism, of revolutionary Marxism after the degeneration of the Communist International. Having failed to build mass parties in the 1930s Trotskyism had to exist for several decades faced with powerful Stalinist and Social-Democratic parties who held the allegiance of the majority of the working class. Thus Trotskyism was obliged to exist as a left opposition, to delineate itself programmatically from the reformists and the Stalinists, while seeking to address the workers and youth who followed them.

112. Trotskyism is neither wholly or partly redundant. But it has to rise to the challenge of a new situation. Now Trotskyists have to build parties not in opposition to powerful reformist and Stalinist parties, but more and more to replace these parties. That means that we have to increasingly take on positions of leadership in struggles and in the unions. And we have to build parties capable of providing political answers and leadership in struggle. We still have to criticise the Socialist and Communist parties and in particular fight against the trade union bureaucracy, but especially we have to provide political answers, a way out of the capitalist crisis that points towards socialism. The days when a Trotskyist organisation could simply exist and recruit to its own ranks while criticising Stalinism, Social-Democracy and other Trotskyists are over. Now Trotskyists will be judged above all by their capacity to give a lead to workers in struggle and to build new parties which really defend the interests of the working class.

113. We have often criticised Lutte Ouvriere for not following up the call for a new party that it made in the wake of the 1.6 million votes it received in the 1995 presidential elections. It was thus, through its own sectarianism, not only unable to fully capitalise on its own electoral success, but actually suffered a split. The remarks made by the Scottish comrades in New Tactics for a New Period are perfectly apt. If LO had followed through with its initiative what would have been the result? Certainly not a revolutionary party as defined by the British Executive Committee. Nor would it necessarily have been a really "broad" party in the sense of Option 2. It could however have attracted broad layers of workers and youth around the initial nucleus of LO militants, leading to quite a "hybrid" result.

114. An opportunity was lost in 1995, but the necessity of building a new workers' party in France remains. And the task of revolutionaries is not simply to wait for a new party to appear and then enter it, but to work to create such a party along with those workers and youth who are coming to see the need for it. And to the degree that we were able to influence the course of events, we would seek to launch it as on as clear an anti-capitalist transitional programme as possible.

115. The Committee for a Workers' International will have big opportunities in the coming period, as an International and in many countries. But to take advantage of them we will have to show great tactical flexibility and be capable of innovating. In the reaction of the British Executive Committee and the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers' International to the projected Scottish Socialist Party in Scotland and in their general approach to the question of the party and the International, there is at least the beginning of a sectarian turn which would prevent us from taking advantage of the possibilities which will arise. It is not too late to correct this, but if we do not correct it we will pay a heavy price in missed opportunities.

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