The Class, The Party and the Leadership
This article is an unfinished work written by Trotsky
and first
published in 1940. It nevertheless forms a very valuable text.
THE extent to which the working class movement has been thrown backward
may be gauged not only by the condition of the organisations but by
ideological groupings and those theoretical inquiries in which so many
groups are engaged.
In Paris there is published a periodical "Que
Faire" (What To Do) which for some reason considers itself Marxist
but in reality remains completely within the framework of the empiricism
of the left bourgeois intellectuals and those isolated workers who have
assimilated all the vices of the intellectuals.
(Trotsky in 1940)
Like all groups lacking a scientific foundation, without a programme
and without any tradition, this little periodical tried to hang on to the
coat-tails of the POUM — which seemed to open the shortest avenue to the
masses and to victory. But the result of these ties with the Spanish
revolution seems at first entirely unexpected: the periodical did not
advance but on the contrary retrogressed. As a matter of fact, this is
wholly in the nature of things. The contradictions between the petty
bourgeoisie's conservatism and the needs of the proletarian revolution
have developed in the extreme. It is only natural that the defenders and
interpreters of the policies of the POUM found themselves thrown far back
both in political and theoretical fields. The periodical "Que
Faire" is in and of itself of no importance whatever. But it is of
symptomatic interest. That is why we think it profitable to dwell upon
this periodical's appraisal of the causes for the collapse of the Spanish
revolution, inasmuch as this appraisal discloses very graphically the
fundamental features now prevailing in the left flank of pseudo-Marxism.
"Que Faire" Explains
We begin with a verbatim quotation from a review of the pamphlet
"Spain Betrayed," by comrade Casanova: "Why was the
revolution crushed? Because, replies the author (Casanova), the Communist
Party conducted a false policy which was unfortunately followed by the
revolutionary masses. But why, in the devil's name, did the revolutionary
masses who left their former leaders rally to the banner of the Communist
Party? ‘Because there was no genuinely revolutionary party.' We are
presented with a pure tautology. A false policy of the masses; an immature
party either manifests a certain condition of social forces (immaturity of
the working class, lack of independence of the peasantry) which must be
explained by proceeding from facts, presented among others by Casanova
himself; or it is the product of the actions of certain malicious
individuals or groups of individuals, actions which do not correspond to
the efforts of 'sincere individuals' alone capable of saving the
revolution. After groping for the first and Marxist road, Casanova takes
the second. We are ushered into the domain of pure demonology: the
criminal responsible for the defeat is the chief Devil, Stalin, abetted by
the anarchists and all the other little devils; the God of revolutionists
unfortunately did not send a Lenin or a Trotsky to Spain as He did in
Russia in 1917."
The conclusion then follows: "This is what comes of seeking at any
cost to force the ossified orthodoxy of a chapel upon facts." This
theoretical haughtiness is made all the more significant by the fact that
it is hard to imagine how so great a number of banalities, vulgarisms and
mistakes quite specifically of a conservative philistine type could be
compressed into so few lines.
The author of the above quotation avoids giving any explanation for the
defeat of the Spanish revolution; he only indicates that profound
explanations, like the "condition of social forces" are
necessary. The evasion of any explanation is not accidental These critics
of Bolshevism are all theoretical cowards, for the simple reason that they
have nothing solid under their feet. In order not to reveal their own
bankruptcy they juggle facts and prowl around the opinions of others. They
confine themselves to hints and half-thoughts as if they just haven't the
time to delineate their full wisdom. As a matter of fact they possess no
wisdom at all. Their haughtiness is lined with intellectual charlatanism.
Let us analyse step by step the hints and half-thoughts of our author.
According to him a false policy of the masses can be explained only as it
"manifests a certain condition of social forces," namely, the
immaturity of the working class and the lack of independence of the
peasantry. Anyone searching for tautologies couldn't find in general a
flatter one. A "false policy of the masses" is explained by the
"immaturity" of the masses. But what is "immaturity"
of the masses? Obviously, their predisposition to false policies. Of just
what the false policy consisted, and who were its initiators: the masses
or the leaders — that is passed over in silence by our author. By means
of a tautology he unloads the responsibility on the masses. This classical
trick of all traitors, deserters and their attorneys is especially
revolting in connection with the Spanish proletariat.
Sophistry Of The Betrayers
In July 1936 — not to refer to an earlier period — the Spanish
workers repelled the assault of the officers who had prepared their
conspiracy under the protection of the People's Front. The masses
improvised militias and created workers' committees, the strongholds of
their future dictatorship. The leading organisations of the proletariat on
the other hand helped the bourgeoisie to destroy these committees, to
liquidate the assaults of the workers on private property and to
subordinate the workers' militias to the command of the bourgeoisie, with
the POUM moreover participating in the government and assuming direct
responsibility for this work of the counter-revolution. What does
"immaturity" of the proletariat signify in this case?
Self-evidently only this, that despite the correct political line chosen
by the masses, the latter were unable to smash the coalition of
socialists, Stalinists, anarchists and the POUM with the bourgeoisie. This
piece of sophistry takes as its starting point a concept of some absolute
maturity, i.e. a perfect condition of the masses in which they do not
require a correct leadership, and, more than that, are capable of
conquering against their own leadership. There is not and there cannot be
such maturity.
Our sages object: but why should workers who show such correct
revolutionary instinct and such superior fighting qualities submit to
treacherous leadership? Our answer is: There wasn't even a hint of mere
subordination. The workers' line of march at all times cut a certain angle
to the line of the leadership. And at the most critical moments this angle
became 180 degrees. The leadership then helped directly or indirectly to
subdue the workers by armed force.
In May 1937 the workers of Catalonia rose not only without their own
leadership but against it. The anarchist leaders — pathetic and
contemptible bourgeois masquerading cheaply as revolutionists — have
repeated hundreds of times in their press that had the CNT wanted to take
power and set up their dictatorship in May, they could have done so
without any difficulty. This time the anarchist leaders speak the
unadulterated truth. The POUM leadership actually dragged at the tail of
the CNT, only they covered up their policy with a different phraseology.
It was thanks to this and this alone that the bourgeoisie succeeded in
crushing the May uprising of the "immature" proletariat. One
must understand exactly nothing in the sphere of the inter-relationships
between the class and the party, between the masses and the leaders in
order to repeat the hollow statement that the Spanish masses merely
followed their leaders. The only thing that can be said is that the masses
who sought at all times to blast their way to the correct road found no
new leadership corresponding to the demands of the revolution. Before us
is a profoundly dynamic process, with the various stages of the revolution
shifting swiftly, with the leadership or various sections of the
leadership quickly deserting to the side of the class enemy, and our sages
engage in a purely static discussion: why did the working class as a whole
follow a bad leadership?
The Dialectic Approach
There is an ancient, evolutionary-liberal epigram: every people gets
the government it deserves. History, however, shows that one and the same
people may in the course of a comparatively brief epoch get very different
governments (Russia, Italy, Germany, Spain, etc.) and furthermore that the
order of these governments doesn't at all proceed in one and the same
direction: from despotism — to freedom, as was imagined by the
evolutionist liberals. The secret is this, that a people is comprised of
hostile classes, and the classes themselves are comprised of different and
in part antagonistic layers which fall under different leadership;
furthermore every people falls under the influence of other peoples who
are likewise comprised of classes. Governments do not express the
systematically growing "maturity" of a "people" but
are the product of the struggle between different classes and the
different layers within one and the same class, and, finally, the action
of external forces — alliances, wars and so on. To this should be added
that a government, once it has established itself, may endure much longer
than the relationship of forces which produced it. It is precisely out of
this historical contradiction that revolutions, coup d'etats, counter-
revolutions, etc., arise.
The very same dialectic approach is necessary in dealing with the
question of the leadership of a class. Imitating the liberals our sages
tacitly accept the axiom that every class gets the leadership it deserves.
In reality leadership is not at all a mere "reflection" of a
class or the product of its own free creativeness. A leadership is shaped
in the process of clashes between the different classes or the friction
between the different layers within a given class. Having once arisen, the
leadership invariably rises above its class and thereby becomes
pre-disposed to the pressure and influence of other classes. The
proletariat may "tolerate" for a long time a leadership that has
already suffered a complete inner degeneration but has not as yet had the
opportunity to express this degeneration amid great events. A great
historic shock is necessary to reveal sharply the contradiction between
the leadership and the class. The mightiest historical shocks are wars and
revolutions. Precisely for this reason the working class is often caught
unawares by war and revolution. But even in cases where the old leadership
has revealed its internal corruption, the class cannot improvise
immediately a new leadership, especially if it has not inherited from the
previous period strong revolutionary cadres capable of utilising the
collapse of the old leading party. The Marxist, i.e. dialectic and not
scholastic, interpretation of the inter-relationship between a class and
its leadership does not leave a single stone unturned of our author's
legalistic sophistry.
How The Russian Workers Matured
He conceives of the proletariat's maturity as something purely static.
Yet during a revolution the consciousness of a class is the most dynamic
process directly determining the course of the revolution. Was it possible
in January 1917 or even in March, after the overthrow of Czarism, to give
an answer to the question whether the Russian proletariat had sufficiently
"matured" for the conquest or power in eight to nine months? The
working class was at that time extremely heterogeneous socially and
politically. During the years of the war it had been renewed by 30-40 per
cent from the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie, often reactionary, at the
expense of backward peasants, at the expense of women and youth. The
Bolshevik party in March 1917 was followed by an insignificant minority of
the working class and furthermore there was discord within the party
itself. The overwhelming majority of the workers supported the Mensheviks
and the "Socialist-Revolutionists" i.e. conservative
social-patriots. The situation was even less favourable with regard to the
army and the peasantry. We must add to this: the general low level of
culture in the country, the lack of political experience among the
broadest layers of the proletariat, especially in the provinces, let alone
the peasants and soldiers. What was the "active" of Bolshevism?
A clear and thoroughly thought out revolutionary conception at the
beginning of the revolution was held only by Lenin. The Russian cadres of
the party were scattered and to a considerable degree bewildered. But the
party had authority among the advanced workers. Lenin had great authority
with the party cadres. Lenin's political conception corresponded to the
actual development of the revolution and was reinforced by each new event.
These elements of the "active" worked wonders in a revolutionary
situation, that is, in conditions of bitter class struggle. The party
quickly aligned its policy to correspond with Lenin's conception, to
correspond that is with the actual course of the revolution.
Thanks to this it met with firm support among tens of thousands of
advanced workers. Within a few months, by basing itself upon the
development of the revolution the party was able to convince the majority
of the workers of the correctness of its slogans. This majority organised
into Soviets was able in its turn to attract the soldiers and peasants.
How can this dynamic, dialectic process be exhausted by a formula of the
maturity or immaturity of the proletariat? A colossal factor in the
maturity of the Russian proletariat in February or March 1917 was Lenin.
He did not fall from the skies. He personified the revolutionary tradition
of the working class. For Lenin's slogans to find their way to the masses
there had to exist cadres, even though numerically small at the beginning;
there had to exist the confidence of the cadres in the leadership, a
confidence based on the entire experience of the past. To cancel these
elements from one's calculations is simply to ignore the living
revolution, to substitute for it an abstraction, the "relationship of
forces," because the development of the revolution precisely consists
of this, that the relationship of forces keeps incessantly and rapidly
changing under the impact of the changes in the consciousness of the
proletariat, the attraction of backward layers to the advanced, the
growing assurance of the class in its own strength. The vital mainspring
in this process is the party, just as the vital mainspring in the
mechanism of the party is its leadership. The role and the responsibility
of the leadership in a revolutionary epoch is colossal.
Relativity Of "Maturity"
The October victory is a serious testimonial of the
"maturity" of the proletariat. But this maturity is relative. A
few years later the very same proletariat permitted the revolution to be
strangled by a bureaucracy which rose from its ranks. Victory is not at
all the ripe fruit of the proletariat's "maturity." Victory is a
strategical task. It is necessary to utilise in order to mobilise the
masses; taking as a starting point the given level of their "
maturity " it is necessary to propel them forward, teach them to
understand that the enemy is by no means omnipotent, that it is torn
asunder with contradictions, that behind, the imposing facade panic
prevails. Had the Bolshevik party failed to carry out this work, there
couldn't even be talk of the victory of the proletarian revolution. The
Soviets would have been crushed by the counter-revolution, and the little
sages of all countries would have written articles and books on the
keynote that only uprooted visionaries could dream in Russia of the
dictatorship of the proletariat so small numerically and so immature.
Auxiliary Role Of Peasants
Equally abstract, pedantic and false is the reference to the "lack
of independence" of the peasantry. When and where did our sage ever
observe in capitalist society a peasantry with an independent
revolutionary programme or a capacity for independent revolutionary
initiative? The peasantry can play a very great role in the revolution,
but only an auxiliary role. In many instances the Spanish peasants acted
boldly and fought courageously. But to rouse the entire mass of the
peasantry, the proletariat had to set an example of a decisive uprising
against the bourgeoisie and inspire the peasants with faith in the
possibility of victory. In the meantime the revolutionary initiative of
the proletariat itself was paralysed at every step by its own
organisations. The "immaturity" of the proletariat, the
"lack of independence" of the peasantry are neither final nor
basic factors in historical events. Underlying the consciousness of the
classes are the classes themselves, their numerical strength, their role
in economic life. Underlying the classes is a specific system of
production which is determined in its turn by the level of the development
of productive forces. Why not then say that the defeat of the Spanish
proletariat was determined by the low level of technology?
The Role Of Personality
Our author substitutes mechanistic determinism for the dialectic
conditioning of the historical process. Hence the cheap jibes about the
role of individuals, good and bad. History is a process of the class
struggle. But classes do not bring their full weight to bear automatically
and simultaneously. In the process of struggle the classes create various
organs which play an important and independent role and are subject to
deformations. This also provides the basis for the role of personalities
in history. There are naturally great objective causes which created the
autocratic rule of Hitler but only dull-witted pedants of
"determinism " could deny today the enormous historic role of
Hitler. The arrival of Lenin in Petrograd on April 3, 1917, turned the
Bolshevik party in time and enabled the party to lead the revolution to
victory. Our sages might say that had Lenin died abroad at the beginning
of 1917, the October revolution would have taken place "just the
same." But that is not so. Lenin represented one of the living
elements of the historical process. He personified the experience and the
perspicacity of the most active section of the proletariat. His timely
appearance on the arena of the revolution was necessary in order to
mobilise the vanguard and provide it with an opportunity to rally the
working class and the peasant masses. Political leadership in the crucial
moments of historical turns can become just as decisive a factor as is the
role of the chief command during the critical moments of war. History is
not an automatic process. Otherwise, why leaders? Why parties? Why
programmes? Why theoretical struggles?
Stalinism In Spain
"But why, in the devil's name," asks the author as we have
already heard, "did the revolutionary masses who left their former
leaders, rally to the banner of the Communist Party?" The question is
falsely posed. It is not true that the revolutionary masses left all of
their former leaders. The workers who were previously connected with
specific organisations continued to cling to them, while they observed and
checked. Workers in general do not easily break with the party that
awakens them to conscious life. Moreover the existence of mutual
protection within the People's Front lulled them: since everybody agreed,
everything must be all right. The new and fresh masses naturally turned to
the Comintern as the party which had accomplished the only victorious
proletarian revolution and which, it was hoped, was capable of assuring
arms to Spain. Furthermore the Comintern was the most zealous champion of
the idea of the People's Front; this inspired confidence among the
inexperienced layers of workers. Within the People's Front the Comintern
was the most zealous champion of the bourgeois character of the
revolution: this inspired the confidence of the petty and in part the
middle bourgeoisie. That is why the masses "rallied to the banner of
the Communist Party." Our author depicts the matter as if the
proletariat were in a well-stocked shoe store, selecting a new pair of
boots. Even this simple operation, as is well known, does not always prove
successful. As regards new leadership, the choice is very limited. Only
gradually, only on the basis of their own experience through several
stages can the broad layers of the masses become convinced that a new
leadership is firmer, more reliable, more loyal than the old. To be sure,
during a revolution, i.e., when events move swiftly, a weak party can
quickly grow into a mighty one provided it lucidly understands the course
of the revolution and possesses staunch cadres that do not become
intoxicated with phrases and are not terrorised by persecution. But such a
party must be available prior to the revolution inasmuch as the process of
educating the cadres requires a considerable period of time and the
revolution does not afford this time.
Treachery Of The POUM
To the left of all the other parties in Spain stood the
POUM, which
undoubtedly embraced revolutionary proletarian elements not previously
firmly tied to anarchism. But it was precisely this party that played a
fatal role in the development of the Spanish revolution. It could not
become a mass party because in order to do so it was first necessary to
overthrow the old parties and it was possible to overthrow them only by an
irreconcilable struggle, by a merciless exposure of their bourgeois
character. Yet the POUM while criticising the old parties subordinated
itself to them on all fundamental questions. It participated in the
"People's" election bloc; entered the government which
liquidated workers' committees; engaged in a struggle to reconstitute this
governmental coalition; capitulated time and again to the anarchist
leadership; conducted, in connection with this, a false trade union
policy; took a vacillating and non-revolutionary attitude toward the May
1937 uprising. From the standpoint of determinism in general it is
possible of course to recognise that the policy of the POUM was not
accidental. Everything in this world has its cause. However, the series of
causes engendering the centrism of the POUM are by no means a mere
reflection of condition of the Spanish or Catalonian proletariat. Two
causalities moved toward each other at an angle and at a certain moment
they came into hostile conflict. It is possible by taking into account
previous international experience, Moscow's influence, the influence of a
number of defeats, etc., to explain politically and psychologically why
the POUM unfolded as a centrist party. But this does not alter its
centrist character, nor does it alter the fact that a centrist party
invariably acts as a brake upon the revolution, must each time smash its
own head, and may bring about the collapse of the revolution. It does not
alter the fact that the Catalonian masses were far more revolutionary than
the POUM, which in turn was more revolutionary than its leadership. In
these conditions to unload the responsibility for false policies on the
"immaturity" of the masses is to engage in sheer charlatanism
frequently resorted to by political bankrupts.
Responsibility Of Leadership
The historical falsification consists in this, that the responsibility
for the defeat of the Spanish masses is unloaded on the working masses and
not those parties which paralysed or simply crushed the revolutionary
movement of the masses. The attorneys of the POUM simply deny the
responsibility of the leaders, in order thus to escape shouldering their
own responsibility. This impotent philosophy, which seeks to reconcile
defeats as a necessary link in the chain of cosmic developments, is
completely incapable of posing and refuses to pose the question of such
concrete factors as programmes, parties, personalities that were the
organisers of defeat. This philosophy of fatalism and prostration is
diametrically opposed to Marxism as the theory of revolutionary action.
Civil war is a process wherein political tasks are solved by military
means. Were the outcome of this war determined by the "condition of
class forces," the war itself would not be necessary. War has its own
organisation, its own policies, its own methods, its own leadership by
which its fate is directly determined. Naturally, the "condition of
class forces" supplies the foundation for all other political
factors; but just as the foundation of a building does not reduce the
importance of walls, windows, doors, roofs, so the "condition of
classes" does not invalidate the importance of parties, their
strategy, their leadership. By dissolving the concrete in the abstract,
our sages really halted mid-way. The most "profound" solution of
the problem would have been to declare the defeat of the Spanish
proletariat as due to the inadequate development of productive forces.
Such a key is accessible to any fool. By reducing to zero the significance
of the party and of the leadership these sages deny in general the
possibility of revolutionary victory. Because there are not the least
grounds for expecting conditions more favourable. Capitalism has ceased to
advance, the proletariat does not grow numerically, on the contrary it is
the army of unemployed that grows, which does not increase but reduces the
fighting force of the proletariat and has a negative effect also upon its
consciousness.
There are similarly no grounds for believing that under the regime of
capitalism the peasantry is capable of attaining a higher revolutionary
consciousness. The conclusion from the analysis of our author is thus
complete pessimism, a sliding away from revolutionary perspectives. It
must be said – to do them justice – that they do not themselves
understand what they say. As a matter of fact, the demands they make upon
the consciousness of the masses are utterly fantastic. The Spanish
workers, as well as the Spanish peasants, gave the maximum of what these
classes are able to give in a revolutionary situation. We have in mind
precisely the class of millions and tens of millions. "Que
Faire" represents merely one of these little schools, or churches or
chapels who, frightened by the course of the struggle and the onset of
reaction publish their little journals and their theoretical etudes in a
corner, on the sidelines away from the actual developments of
revolutionary thought, let alone the movement of the masses.
Repression Of Spanish Revolution
The Spanish proletariat fell the victim of a coalition composed of
imperialists, Spanish republicans, socialists, anarchists, Stalinists and
on the left flank, the POUM. They all paralysed the socialist revolution
which the Spanish proletariat had actually begun to realise. It is not
easy to dispose of the socialist revolution. No one has yet devised other
methods than ruthless repressions, massacre of the vanguard, execution of
the leaders, etc. The POUM of course did not want this. It wanted on the
one hand to participate in the Republican government and to enter as a
loyal peace-loving opposition into the general bloc of ruling parties: and
on the other hand to achieve peaceful comradely relations at a time when
it was a question of implacable civil war. For this very reason the POUM
fell victim to the contradictions of its own policy. The most consistent
policy in the ruling bloc was pursued by the Stalinists. They were the
fighting vanguard of the bourgeois-republican counter-revolution. They
wanted to eliminate the need of Fascism by proving to the Spanish and
world bourgeoisie that they were themselves capable of strangling the
proletarian revolution under the banner of "democracy". This was
the gist of their policies. The bankrupts of the Spanish People's Front
are today trying to unload the blame on the GPU. I trust that we cannot be
suspected of leniency toward the crimes of the GPU. But we see clearly and
we tell the workers that the GPU acted in this instance only as the most
resolute detachment in the service of the People's Front. Therein was the
strength of the GPU, therein was the historic role of Stalin. Only
ignorant philistines can wave this aside with stupid little jokes about
the Chief Devil.
These gentlemen do not even bother with the question of the social
character of the revolution. Moscow's lackeys, for the benefit of England
and France, proclaimed the Spanish revolution as bourgeois. Upon this
fraud were erected the perfidious policies of the People's Front, policies
which would have been completely false even if the Spanish revolution had
really been bourgeois. But from the very beginning the revolution
expressed much more graphically its proletarian character than did the
revolution of 1917 in Russia. In the leadership of the POUM, gentlemen sit
today who consider that the policy of Andres Nin was too
"leftist", that the really correct thing was to have remained
the left flank of the People's Front. Victor Serge, who is in a hurry to
compromise himself by a frivolous attitude toward serious questions,
writes that Nin did not wish to submit to commands from Oslo or Coyoacan.
Can a serious man really be capable of reducing to petty gossip the
problem of the class content of a revolution? The sages of "Que
Faire" have no answer whatever to this question. They do not
understand the question itself. Of what significance indeed is the fact
that the "immature" proletariat founded its own organs of power,
seized enterprises, sought to regulate production, while the POUM tried
with all its might to keep from breaking with bourgeois anarchists who, in
an alliance with the bourgeois republicans and the no less bourgeois
socialists and Stalinists, assaulted and strangled the proletarian
revolution! Such "trifles" are obviously of interest only to
representatives of "ossified orthodoxy." The sages of "Que
Faire" possess instead a special apparatus which measures the
maturity of the proletariat and the relationship of forces independently
of all questions of revolutionary class strategy.
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