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Collapse of Stalinism | Home | News | Donate | Join | Print The Collapse of Stalinism debate
CWI document The Marxists' Attitude to the Coup36. From its earliest pronouncements it was clear that the junta, though drawn from the old guard, was not seeking to restore a Stalinist regime on the old model based on the planned economy. There was no mention of "the defence of socialism" or the Stalinist jargon of the past. On the contrary, they made clear their support for continuing the market reforms, albeit at a more controlled pace. 37. They stated that they were for "developing the mixed character of the national economy, we will also support private enterprise, granting it the necessary opportunities for developing production and the sphere of services." During this conflict, therefore, neither of the opposing camps was acting to defend the planned economy. 38. Yeltsin's "liberal" camp, based on the bureaucracy of the Russian republic and the city administrations in Leningrad and Moscow, favour a rapid shift to capitalism and, in order to bolster the relative position of the Russian federation over the centre and other republics, favour a looser Union. The other camp, drawn from the central Union bureaucracy, the army and KGB chiefs, acted to restore "order" and prevent what they saw as the imminent break up of the Union, with the signing of the now defunct new Union treaty. This, and not a fundamental disagreement over economic policy, was their primary consideration. 39. The coup leaders sought to reimpose an open dictatorship in order to carry through the transition to capitalism. All wings of the bureaucracy are terrified of the opposition of the working class. It is possible that, in an effort to stabilise itself, this regime might have taken partial steps to recentralise control of the economy. Temporarily, the moves towards capitalism may have stalled or slowed down. But inevitably, after a possible brief interregnum, they would have continued in the direction of capitalism. 40. In China, the Stalinist wing purged Zhao Ziyang and the open pro-capitalist wing after the massacre in Tiananmen Square. For a period they reasserted greater central control over the economy and the provinces and took emergency measures to squeeze credit and bring down inflation. But after this short period of re- adjustment, Li Peng and the hardliners have adopted pro-capitalist policies which are not fundamentally different from Zhao's. The Chinese bureaucracy succeeded in crushing the 1989 movement because the vast peasantry (80 per cent of the population) and continued strong economic growth mean that the regime still has substantial reserves of support in society. This is a decisive difference with the situation in the Soviet Union. 41. Given that the defeat of the coup has undoubtedly accelerated the processes towards capitalist restoration, should the Marxists have given critical support to the coup? Trotsky after all raised the possibility in 1938 that if the bourgeois restorationist wing "should attempt the conquest of power, the 'faction of Reiss' (Trotskyists) inevitably would align itself on the opposite side of the barricades. Although it would find itself temporarily the ally of Stalin, it would nevertheless defend not the Bonapartist clique but the social base of the USSR, ie. the property wrenched away from the capitalists and transformed into state property... 42. "Although it is thus impermissible to deny in advance the possibility, in strictly defined instances, of a 'united front' with the Thermidorian section of the bureaucracy against open attack by capitalist counter-revolution, the chief political task in the USSR still remains the overthrow of this same Thermidorian bureaucracy. Each day added to its domination helps rot the foundations of the socialist elements of economy and increases the chances for capitalist restoration." (The Transitional Programme p55.) 43. The leap of the counter-revolution in recent weeks is a chilling confirmation of Trotsky's warning that the continued rule of the bureaucracy was preparing the ground for capitalist restoration in the USSR. Of course our tendency, analysing the changed situation immediately following the Second World War, pointed out that "for a whole historical period, Stalinism was temporarily strengthened" (Programme of the International p7.) 44. During this period, the threat of capitalist restoration seemed not only remote, but totally excluded. Then, Nikita Khrushchev boasted that 'The present generation of Soviet people will live in the time of Communism." The sweeping gains of the planned economy, despite bureaucratic mismanagement, filled the bureaucracy with confidence in their own future. Support for a return to capitalism among the bureaucracy and the population as a whole was miniscule. 45. But this temporary strengthening gave way to a long drawn-out decay throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Now once again the perspective raised by Trotsky in the 1930s is raised. Two stark choices confront the proletariat of the USSR and Eastern Europe: either the working class will take over the running of society or we will see a descent towards capitalist anarchy, further chaos and possible civil war. 46. For the working class to come to power it must carry through a political revolution which now will combine elements of the social revolution: renationalisation of privatised companies, re-establishment of the plan but on a democratic basis. 47. However, there is a fundamental difference in the situation today as compared to when Trotsky was alive. Such is the complete degeneration of the bureaucracy, the collapse of their confidence in the old system of central planning, that capitalism is seen as the only way forward by all significant sections of the bureaucracy in today's situation. 48. In the future, faced with a massive movement of the proletariat, the ruling strata could attempt to re-establish greater state control and be compelled to take measures against the capitalists' interests. In many semi-colonial countries in the past we have seen bourgeois Bonapartist regimes forced to extend state control over the economy in order to defend their own position. Given the extremely unstable nature of the new regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe it is difficult to determine in advance how far this process could go. 49. The situation in the USSR is not unique. In Romania, despite the crushing of the open elements of bourgeois counter- revolution in June 1990, with Iliescu and the National Salvation Front leaning on the miners and Bucharest workers, the ex-Stalinist leaders of the Front have still shifted decisively towards capitalism. In the concrete situation which existed in Romania, a movement of workers against a perceived threat to their revolution, we gave critical support to the miners. However, we did not support all the methods used and called upon the workers to place no confidence in the Front leadership, building their own democratic workers' committees instead. 50. In the conflict in Yugoslavia, Marxists do not give the slightest 'critical' support to the Serbian Stalinist regime of Milosevic. Ifs true that the Croatian and Slovenian governments are revolting nationalist pro-bourgeois regimes whose policies spell catastrophe for the Croatian and Slovene workers. But Milosevic and the army generals are not motivated by a desire to defend the planned economy. 51. They are acting to defend the power, privileges and territorial interests of the Serbian ruling elite which also seeks to move to capitalism. Their latest blueprint for 'Greater Serbia' which concedes Slovenian independence but envisages Serbian control of East Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo, also clearly advocates a market economy. 52. Clearly Marxists cannot give, even in the sharply critical fashion posed by Trotsky, the slightest support to either the open pro-bourgeois camp of Yeltsin and Sobchak or to the hardliners behind the coup. The working class, acting independently through its own organisations and under a revolutionary leadership, is the only force capable of re-establishing and developing the planned economy today. 53. During the coup therefore, the Marxists in the USSR called for support for the general strike, not on the programme of Yeltsin (for the return of Gorbachev and the continuation of the market reforms), but to defeat the coup with a revolutionary programme for workers' democracy. We explained that the limited democratic rights of the last period could only be safeguarded by the working class taking power. We called for the building of democratic workers' committees, arming of the workers and an appeal to the rank and file soldiers. 54. Marxists could not stand aside or adopt a position of passive neutrality in the conflict that developed. It would be entirely wrong to present these events in a one-sided manner and dismiss all those forces involved against the coup as counter-revolutionary. We must distinguish between the masses involved in the struggle against the coup and the counter-revolutionaries around Yeltsin. For the reasons we have mentioned, above all the absence of the subjective factor, these events have given a big impetus to the process towards restoration. But this is a dialectical process, with many similarities to events in Eastern Europe although here events were concentrated into a matter of days rather than weeks or months. 55. It is impossible for revolutionaries to orient in such a situation if they only see one element, to the exclusion of all others, in what is an extremely complex process. The working class opposed the coup seeing its own interests threatened, with the attack on the partial democratic gains of the last period. Their struggle therefore began around limited objectives, reflecting the limitations of workers' consciousness at this stage. The setting back of workers' consciousness is, as we have said, above all because of the long experience of dictatorship. It would be wrong to confuse the aims and aspirations of the working class and the diametrically opposed, counter-revolutionary aims of Yeltsin. 56. The logic of such a position would mean that in practice we would have opposed the general strike and placed ourselves on a collision course with the best workers and youth. There are certain analogies with Kornilov's attempted coup in 1917 where the Petrograd workers, despite their hostility to Kerensky, mobilised against an attempt by open reaction to overturn the gains of the revolution. Then Trotsky called on workers to "use Kerensky as a gun-rest to shoot Komilov. Afterwards we will settle with Kerensky". Clearly this did not imply any support for the Kerensky government. The critical difference in the situation in the Soviet Union today is the absence of the subjective factor. 57. As we have said, the crucial factor determining the attitude of workers was the need to defend their limited democratic gains. This was the starting point for the propaganda and agitation of the Marxists. By struggling alongside the strikers and the youth on the barricades we demonstrate that we are the most determined fighters in defence of workers' interests including their democratic rights, while at the same time warning of the thoroughly anti-working class and anti-democratic nature of Yeltsin and the restorationists, and explaining that only by the working class taking power can these democratic rights be guaranteed.
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