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The Collapse of Stalinism debate

The truth about the coup

Minority document

In the most unscrupulous fashion imaginable, the IS majority faction at first attempted to smear the Opposition by claiming that we had "supported the coup". This lie was too blatant to be maintained and they were quickly forced to drop it, while nevertheless insinuating we advocated a "neutral" position and that support for the coup was "implicit" in our analysis of the situation. But what are the facts?

At the December European meeting, several months before the coup, AW pointed out that under certain circumstances it would be correct to give critical support to the Stalinists in Eastern Europe or the USSR in the struggle against capitalist counter-revolution.

What precisely were these conditions? When and if a wing of the Stalinist bureaucracy came out in defence of nationalised planned economy and leant upon the sections of the workers in a struggle against the pro-capitalist restorationist forces.

Such a position is ABC for the Trotskyist movement. It is not a question of supporting the Stalinist bureaucracy, which has led the nationalised planned economy into a complete impasse, but of opposing capitalist counter-revolution, and appealing to the workers to defend by all means possible, what remains of a nationalised planned economy.

The first duty of the Soviet Marxist is to expose the Yeltsins and Sobchaks, to sow distrust in the so-called "democrats" and "reformists" and to implacably oppose every step in the direction of capitalist restoration.

In the past, these ideas were taken for granted by our tendency. In Romania, for example, we maintained an absolutely principled position in support of the miners in University Square, who were not supported by the SWP and the other sects. This was despite the fact that the ex-Stalinist leaders of the NSF, and even the hated securitate, were involved in the miners movement and made use of it to consolidate their grip on power, which they subsequently used to try to move down the road of capitalism.

Our stand in relation to Romania was absolutely correct, and the IS majority faction has (at least for the present) made no attempt to deny this. Did we give "critical support" to the NSF? We gave support to the miners who were fighting against capitalist counter-revolution. Insofar as the NSF was on the same side of the barricades (for their own reasons), you might say we "critically supported" them against the open agents of bourgeois counter revolution. But in the words of comrade PT, it was very critical "support" - "almost all criticism, and very little support". We supported the actions of the miners in smashing the counter revolution, but did not for a moment abandon our implacable criticism of the NSF leadership.

What relation exists between that concrete situation and the August events in the USSR? None whatsoever. The programme of the coup was not to defend the nationalised planned economy, but to move towards a "market economy" in a more gradual and cautious manner. That is why many workers, as the "eyewitnesses" reports reveal, said they could see no fundamental difference between the two rival gangs. Under these circumstances there was absolutely no question of giving "critical support" to the coup. The possibility was never even hinted at by EG and AW, which did not prevent the IS majority faction from putting this disgraceful lie into circulation.

What is, however, undeniable is that the reports carried in our paper, particularly the initial reports, attempted to prettify the movements around Yeltsin, presenting is as a revolutionary movement of the working class. The initial reports carried little or no criticism of Yeltsin. Only under the hammer blows of criticism of the Opposition did the paper subsequently try to rectify this mistake, emphasising an anti-capitalist slant, while at the same time persisting in its earlier position of a mass workers movement. Again under the pressure of our criticism, this was progressively watered down, first by claims that the Yeltsin movement contained "revolutionary elements" and later by the discovery of a "potential general strike" (and insurrection a la Romania) "if the coup had succeeded."

The attempt to face all ways at once leads these comrades into all manner of amusing contortions as we have already seen. The glaring contradictions in this analysis centre on a key question: how does it come about that a "revolutionary" movement of the working class ending, moreover, in a major victory, immediately leads to an orgy of capitalist counter-revolution?

On this issue, the authors of the document try to make up in inventiveness what they lack in Marxist understanding. The movement in Russia, if you please, was "like Eastern Europe" only that the "processes were telescoped into a much shorter time span" (para 23)

This is an astounding proposition. To begin with, the "movement in Eastern Europe" did not take place in the same way in every country. Which countries are these comrades referring to: Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia? One seeks in vain for enlightenment. With a wave of the magic wand, all problems are solved with a vague reference to "Eastern Europe". The quickness of the hand deceives the eye!

In Poland we had a movement of ten million workers in Solidarity, a general strike and the setting up of soviets. In Czechoslovakia, the movement was not on the same scale, but, there too, the working class played a key point in the movement at a certain point. In Eastern Germany, the workers and students originally came out onto the streets, not under the banner of unification, but singing the "Internationale". In Romania, there was a classical uprising of the working class. In all these cases, the movement, which undoubtedly began with important elements of political revolution (above all in Romania) was subsequently de-railed because of the absence of the subjective factor.

But what of the Soviet Union? Where was there a similar involvement of 150 million strong Soviet working class? Evidently the processes were so "telescoped" that nothing remained of it, except, that is a "potential" general strike, "if the coup had succeeded."

In saying this we do not for a moment doubt that there will be a movement of the workers of the USSR. Such a movement is absolutely inevitable, and is possible even in the next few months, especially on the basis of Yeltsin's attempt to move quickly in the direction of capitalism. We are firmly convinced of this. There is not an atom of pessimism or lack of confidence in the Soviet working class in our analysis. But there is no point whatsoever in trying to invent a movement where no one exists, and a midwife who mistakes the first month of pregnancy for the ninth will produce only abortions. The consequence of such a method will unfortunately lead to more than one abortion in Britain and internationally, unless we decisively correct it.

The contradictions in this document are on practically every line. On the one hand, we are told of a revolutionary movement of the workers which will have enormously raised their self confidence. The next we are told that "At a certain stage, they (i.e the pro-capitalist leaders) will inevitably meet fierce resistance from the working class as they attempt to implement their programme of mass sackings, privatisation and price rises." (para 23)

But wait a minute! If the revolutionary workers were responsible for defeating the coup (whether by actual action or by the threat of such action is immaterial, since the threat, if it means anything, means that the workers were ready to act), why don't they act now to defend their interests? Why postpone the movement against privatisation to an ill-defined "certain stage"?

The fact that they have to relegate the real movement of the Soviet workers to the future is clear evidence that it does not exist now. And on that point, we entirely agree with them. There was hardly any movement of the workers against the coup. And, at least for the present, there is not much of a movement against privatisation either. In saying this, we are neither optimistic, nor pessimistic. We just say what is.

That is why the analogy with Kornilov's coup in 1917 is entirely fake. We were dealing then with a mighty independent movement of the proletariat, organised around the Soviets. That is why it was possible, in Lenin's phrase, to "lean on Kerensky as a gun rest" to destroy Kornilov.

The whole point about the coup is precisely that the working class did not act in an independent way. The big majority of the working class did not participate in any way, and those who did were acting, not as an independent class force, but under the banners of pro-capitalist restoration.

The shock troops of Yeltsin were the students, intellectuals, professional people, white-collar workers, petit bourgeois, spies, spectators and others linked to nascent bourgeois elements. There was also a certain number of workers. But the presence of these workers could not in any way alter the essential nature of the movement. On the contrary, these workers, irrespective of their intentions, were compelled to subordinate themselves to the interests of the Yeltsins, Sobchaks and Popovs - that is to say to bourgeois counter revolution. This, and only this, explains how the immediate result of the defeat of the coup was an orgy of counter revolution, which has nothing whatsoever progressive about it.

The anecdotes about individual groups of workers building barricades, of even forming defence squads, changes absolutely nothing. They could not, and did not, dictate the physiognomy of the movement as a whole, its basic class content, its programmes, aims and results. To imagine such a thing is to fall into impressionism of the most vulgar and superficial kind. And lo, behold! Despite all the barricades, defence squads and "potential" general strikes, we are then informed that "Yeltsin's victory represents a bourgeois political counter revolution in the Soviet Union" (para 10).

We have already been duly warned that while "big sections" regard Yeltsin as a hero, there are other "big sections" which are enormously worried about him. "You pay your money and take your choice" as they say. But, anyway the defeat of the coup, despite "revolutionary elements" has led immediately to "an enormous strengthening of the pro-capitalist wing of the bureaucracy" (para 8). The new government is said to be "pro bourgeois", but this "does not represent the final triumph of the capitalist counter revolution" (para 9). The government is a :bourgeois regime in the process of formation."

In reality, the present government of the USSR is already a bourgeois government, which is attempting to move towards the liquidation of the remnants of a nationalised planned economy. Whether it succeeds or not will depend upon the struggle of living forces. The victory of capitalism in the USSR is by no means a foregone conclusion. But it is also entirely fake to argue, as these comrades do, that there are only two alternatives, capitalist counter revolution or a victorious political revolution of the working class. Thus, they argue in para 47 "However, there is a fundamental difference in the situation today as compared to when Trotsky was alive. Such is the complete degeneration of the bureaucracy, the collapse of their confidence in the old system of central planning, that capitalism is seen as the only way forward by all significant sections of the bureaucracy in today's situation."

What are the authors trying to say? That a new movement (including the coup) back to a Stalinist regime of bureaucratically run planned economy is ruled out? That is a clear implication of what they write and say. But as usual, they carefully insert all kinds of get-out clauses... just in case. Thus: "In the future, faced with a massive movement of the proletariat, the ruling strata could attempt to re-establish greater state control(?) and be compelled to take measures(?) against the capitalists' interests." (para 48).

But just in case anyone might think this is a bit too "unconditional"(!), safety clause is piled upon safety clause, "Given the extremely unstable nature of the new regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe it is difficult to determine in advance how far this process could go." (para 48)

And this is called what nowadays passes for "perspectives" in our tendency. Not a single idea is though out to the end. Nothing concrete, nothing precise. It is like the meanderings of a man sinking into a gradual state of pleasant inebriation while philosophising about the problems of the world. This method of "one of sand and one of cement" has nothing in common with Marxism. We ask supporters of the IS majority faction a straight question: is a Stalinist counter-revolution in the USSR possible - yes or no? Let's see if we get an answer.

The completely empirical approach of the document is shown up by little phrases like "in today's situation" and "in the future they could..." These are meant as additional insurance policies ... just in case.

As a matter of fact, even in "today's situation", the arguments of these comrades are entirely false. It is true that bureaucracy has suffered a complete degeneration after decades of Stalinist rule. They are the children and grandchildren of bureaucrats "born into the purple". They have lost any connection with the ideas of Marxism, socialism and the working class, which even the Stalinists had at least to pay lip service to. That explains how they could go over in droves to the idea of capitalism and "market economy", on the basis of impasse of bureaucratically controlled planned economy and the temporary boom in the West.

But it is entirely false and undialectical to imaging that this rules out the possibility of a swing back to a Stalinist planned economy, under certain conditions, even at the present time. What happens does not depend mainly on the subjective intentions of different wings of the bureaucracy, which are also not static, but changes according to all kinds of external factors.

It is not an accident that Gorbachev himself, while playing the role of de facto stooge of world capitalism, has swung constantly backwards and forwards, now advocating a "market economy", and asking to join the World Bank, now talking about "socialism" and appealing to Lenin. What does this reflect? The arbitrary whims of a lunatic or the pressures of different wings of the bureaucracy, as they desperately try to find a way out of the blind alley? On more than one occasion, faced with chaos and social breakdown, sections of the bureaucracy, including Gorbachev, have toyed with the idea of going back to the good old days of Brezhnev, at least.

What would have happened, for example, if Yanayev and co had seized power? Is it a foregone conclusion that they would have carried out their stated aims of moving towards a "market economy" albeit at a more gradual pace? For the IS majority faction this is a simple question to answer: "In today's situation", "objectively" ...yes. But that does not exhaust the question.

The degree of collapse of the Soviet economy has reached such a frightening degree, with the appearance of massive unemployment (the threat of 40 million by the end of the decade), hyperinflation and the threat of actual starvation, that drastic measures would have been required simply to get the economy moving again. Even the bourgeois experts are gloomy about the real prospects for capitalism, despite the defeat of the coup.

A Yanayev regime would have been faced with an economic boycott from the West. Not even the limit amount of food aid which has been given to stave off the threat of hunger this winter, would have been forthcoming. Faced with the risk of social disturbances, the regime would have been compelled to resort to drastic measures of re-centralisation. Draconic measures would have had to be applied against the speculators, black marketers and that layer of the bureaucracy which went too far in swindling, corruption and theft. These measures in themselves would have dealt a severe blow against the nascent capitalists. They would also have received a measure of popular support.

It is true that such measures would not have solved the fundamental problems of the system. Only the assumption of power by the working class could begin to solve the problems by instituting a regime of workers democracy. But the immediate bottlenecks caused by the dislocation of supply, the breakdown of central planning, the creation of artificial shortages through black marketeering, speculation and the holding back of products until prices rise, all these could have been removed, or at least ameliorated for a time.

The IS majority faction argue that had the coup succeeded, it could not have maintained itself for long. That is false. The regime could have maintained itself for a time on the basis of the combination of central planning and terror. The entire experience of coups indicates the hollowness of the arguments of the "majority". Once a coup succeeds in holding power for a few days or weeks, it becomes extremely difficult to overthrow it. The initial mood of resistance among certain layers of the class becomes transformed into its opposite: passivity, apathy and a sense of indifference. We see this everywhere from Chile to Poland - despite the manifest preparedness of the workers to fight in the beginning.

It is entirely different where, as with the Kapp Putsch in Germany in 1920 or the Kornilov affair in Russia, the coup is defeated by a general strike or mass independent movement of the working class. Then the defeat of the coup lays the basis for a new period of working class struggle.

In reality, as the serious bourgeois understand perfectly well, the coup would have been able to maintain itself on the basis of the passive acceptance of wide layers of the population, the working class included.

If, as was entirely possible, the regime had been compelled to carry out a policy based on re-centralisation and a planned economy accompanied by terror, that also would have given a certain impetus to the productive forces for a period of time. Incidentally, that is precisely what happened in China after the Tienanmen massacre, which explains why, for a time, the Chinese regime has succeeded in maintaining itself.

Jarolzeski in Poland held out for seven years. There is no reason why such a regime in the USSR could not have lasted for five, seven or even ten years. This would have also depended upon the development of world capitalism, which also faces an uncertain future. A further boom would give renewed impetus to the pro-capitalist tendencies in Russia, China and Eastern Europe. A slump would have the opposite effect. In that case the possibility, not only of pro-Stalinist coups in Eastern Europe but also of the creation of new regimes of proletarian bonapartism in the Third World would once again be placed on the order of the day.

Again, the document hedges its bets on the question in the most laughable manner: "In the short term, these processes will tend to mitigate against the establishment of new proletarian Banapartist regimes. It would be a mistake to exclude their establishment in the medium or longer term, especially in the background of a major economic crisis. How stable such regimes may be is, of course, (of course!), another question." (para 110).

What are we supposed to make of this? Will there be a new regime of proletarian bonapartism? Won't there? Will they be stable? Won't they? We are told that this is "another question." What is the meaning of this sudden attack of coyness? Could it be that it is because the authors of the document have absolutely nothing concrete to say on this subject?

Thus, on Cuba, we are told that a) the cuts in Soviet subsidies will have a "devastating effect", but that b) Cuba is "different to Eastern Europe" because of the "masses' perception of the gains of the revolution", but, on the other hand, c) "against the international background", struggle against the regime (by whom? For what?) is a strong likelihood, but again, on the other hand d) "It is, however, not excluded that the Castro regime could attempt to make a stand and fight it out." (paras 119-112) And that, believe it or not, is the perspective for Cuba of the IS majority faction. More correctly, it is four different perspectives, one of which will be triumphantly put forward after the event, to show "how correct we were".

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