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Scotland, France and the International

The Programme, The Party And The International

A Reply To Murray Smith (France), From The International Secretariat (...continued)

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An over-emphasis on Recruitment ?

134. It is wrong for Murray Smith to present "Arithmetic growth" crudely as something to be avoided. This can lead to the idea that recruitment can be left until the future and neglecting of the work of building and developing the revolutionary organisation today. The issue is really how to avoid sectarianism in our activity. If there are no other formations with which one can work with, or intervene in, then sections have to strive as much as they can to develop their independent activity.

135. Even regarding the UIT there are very few countries where both the Committee for a Workers' International and the UIT have sections, and it is only in France that they are roughly of similar size. So what does Murray Smith's sweeping statement "over the last period, the whole orientation towards regroupment has been replaced by the insistence on building our own sections" (paragraph 93), mean for the comrades in Belgium, Britain, the CIS, Greece, Nigeria, Sri Lanka or Sweden just to name a few sections? Are they working incorrectly, should they reduce emphasis on recruitment, instead today becoming "the motor force of regroupment" (paragraph 92)? And today, precisely with whom should they attempt to regroup or launch new parties with? Significantly in his general critique of the work of the sections Murray Smith does not give a single specific example from any countries apart from Scotland and France.

136. In this regard the Swedish section's development provides a positive example to the whole International. Despite the absence of large scale class struggles, the attacks on the welfare state provided the comrades with the opportunity to build. The Swedish section's emphasis on recruitment has resulted in a growth from a membership of 196 at the end of 1991 to 702 at the time of the last European School. It is not clear whether Murray Smith is making a critique of the Swedish section's emphasis on recruitment. Was the Swedish comrades strategy "a conservative and potentially sectarian conception of party-building" (paragraph 7)1 Certainly Murray Smith should clarify whether he thinks that the Swedish comrades should have pursued an alternative strategy, and if so, precisely which one?

137. In Britain, during a period of generally sharpening class relations and a number of serious class struggles, our section grew from about 30 to over 8,000. This was not simple single recruitment, but often recruitment of groups of workers and youth involved in struggle. During the 1984/5 miners strike over 500 miners joined the British section. It could be discussed whether this was individual or group recruitment! And the British section did not only intervene in struggles, it also initiated and led two mass campaigns, in Liverpool from 1983 to 1985 and against the Poll Tax from 1988 to 1991. Again we should ask whether this was generally the correct strategy.

138. These types of gains are only possible if the membership is instilled with political confidence in our ideas and organisation, so that they are enthusiastically able to recruit from interventions and from their work and social milieu. Murray Smith's approach would have the effect of lowering the "recruiting consciousness" of comrades.

139. In some countries, such as France, the issue of fusing with forces from existing "Trotskyist" groups is of greater importance than in others. However, even where this is achieved it is not a substitute for recruiting and building a base amongst the fresh new forces of the workers and youth, the vast majority of whom are not organised in either of the existing revolutionary parties. Our capacity to reach the best of the forces in other Trotskyist groupings will be greatly enhanced by us showing in practice how we can build amongst the fresh layers. It was the initiative of the Committee for a Workers' International in launching the Youth Against Racism in Europe that was a big factor in attracting the French comrades towards us.

140. Throughout his document when Murray Smith gives historical examples they are often wrong or are interpreted in a one sided manner.

141. For example in paragraph 93 Murray Smith writes, in effect critically, that "our sections are now systematically described as parties or at least as the nuclei of parties" and in the following paragraph quotes Cannon as saying "We are not yet a party". But this is completely misleading. At the time this quotation from Cannon refers to, late 1935/early 1936, not "1934" as Murray Smith writes, Cannon was not actually talking about the Trotskyists name. Cannon was in fact arguing, at that time, for the Trotskyists entry into the Socialist Party in order to take a further step towards building a mass party. The date is quite significant, because in December 1934 the US Trotskyists had created a new organisation with the followers of Muste, called the Workers' Party of the US. Obviously the term "party" was not the issue in the debate over entry into the Socialist Party in late 1935/early 1936. This is confirmed by the fact that, after leaving the Socialist Party, the US Trotskyists created the Socialist Workers Party at the end of 1937.

142. Trotsky had no problem with the use of the term "party" in the 1930s. For example in May 1938 Trotsky wrote explaining to a Belgian comrade that "our national organisations call themselves parties (Trotsky's emphasis) or leagues" (Trotsky Writings 1937-38, page 346). The question today is still how we work, not whether or not, according to the national situation, our sections are publicly called parties.

Recent relations with the UIT

143. Murray Smith critically writes that "since March relations between the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers' International and the UIT have been reduced to a strict minimum and there is no more talk of fusion" (paragraph 87). This is unfortunately largely true and is disappointing in view of the hopes which were raised last year. But there are political reasons for this.

144. Murray Smith seeks to downplay the two incidents which have undoubted led to a cooling of relations between ourselves and the UIT leadership. He writes that "the two incidents in question do not justify allowing the whole process which was under way with the UIT to seize up. What is at stake in the discussions with the UIT is the question of fusing with an international that shares with us the objective of building a revolutionary Marxist international and parties in every country, and that represents serious forces" (paragraph 88).

145. The material published in this Bulletin's Appendixes show how our relations with the UIT have unfolded this year.

146. Reading this material it should be clear that, in his document, Murray Smith avoids the main underlying issues when he tries to describe the dispute with the UIT.

147. As Murray Smith writes in paragraph 87 the initial problem with the UIT leadership occurred over a "refusal to discuss allegations about their past". These questions were raised by Carlos Petroni, a member of our United States National Committee, who had previously been active alongside the UIT leadership when both were members of the LIT. While the UIT International Secretariat said formally that they were willing to discuss these points, they refused to so in the presence of Carlos Petroni. But Carlos Petroni is the only Committee for a Workers' International member who had personal experience of the UIT's past and his exclusion would effectively prevent a full discussion of the issues. We could not accept the UIT leadership hampering this discussion by attempting to have a veto over which Committee for a Workers' International members were present, especially excluding the Committee for a Workers' International member who raised serious questions about the UIT's past methods.

148. The CWI International Secretariat made efforts to overcome this problem. In early March the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers' International actually held a meeting with two UIT leaders to attempt to resolve this issue, but the UIT did not agree to our position that the Committee for a Workers' International should be able to itself decide who was in its delegation. Without agreement on this issue we were unable to discuss the actual points raised by Carlos Petroni.

149. A fusion cannot only be based upon political agreement on the current situation. It also has to be based upon an examination of the past record and traditions, political and organisational, of the organisations fusing. The French comrades themselves did this during their discussions with the Committee for a Workers' International in 1992/3. Their 1993 "Report on the Militant" precisely dealt with historical questions, starting in the 1940s, as well as contemporary issues.

150. Any successful fusion will not only be achieved on political agreement, it also requires the building of mutual trust and honesty between the members of the organisations coming together. The November 1997 "Joint Declaration" said that "these discussions (between the Committee for a Workers' International and UIT) have to be developed in a frank and loyal debate". But the UIT's attempts to effectively limit this discussion placed a serious question mark over how open they were prepared to be.

151. It inevitably raised serious doubts about the UIT leadership's working methods. For our part, we have always made it clear that are prepared to discuss any issue relating to our past and present work, including controversial issues like Ireland, the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war.

152. The serious doubts that developed during the discussion relating to the history of the UIT were re-enforced by subsequent developments in Germany.

A 'Loyal Debate' In Germany?

153. In regard to Germany, Murray Smith while writing that the SL (the UIT's German section) carried out a "manoeuvre" (paragraph 87), then goes onto dismiss the issue by saying "this is not the place to go into details". But Murray Smith completely ignores both the question of trust and the main political issues involved.

154. As the material in the Appendix shows the UIT International Executive Committee apologised over reaching a political agreement with a small split from the Committee for a Workers' International "without having first fully informed the SAV and the leadership of the Committee for a Workers' International" (UIT emphasis). But lack of information is not the sole point of dispute. The UIT International Executive Committee have not answered the SAV Executive Committee's main questions about the SL's effective concentration on discussing with SAV members in opposition to the SAV leadership, the fact that the SL's leading comrade attended factional meetings of the then SAV opposition or the SL's sudden loss of interest in a second round of discussions with the SAV Executive Committee. The SL's approach was not the "loyal debate" mentioned in the "Committee for a Workers' International/UIT Joint Declaration", but was, as Murray Smith says, a "manoeuvre".

155. After the problems involving Carlos Petroni developed the SL's activity increasingly took on the appearance of a raid to gain some members. The fact that the July meeting of the UIT International Executive Committee declared "itself favourable" to taking the breakaway from us, the SI, into the UIT at their next International Executive Committee meeting shows that they are putting a small numerical gain in Germany above their future relations with the Committee for a Workers' International.

156. Currently, at the time of writing, the SI are consciously campaigning to persuade the SAV members they personally know to leave the Committee for a Workers' International. In this situation the only conclusion we can come to is that, in Germany the UIT have, and are still, carrying out a "manoeuvre" to try and split the SAV. After this experience how is it possible for the Committee for a Workers' International to have any confidence about the intentions of the UIT leaders to work towards a genuine and principled fusion?

157. At the same time the UIT International Executive Committee have totally avoided even commenting on the political questions we have raised about the new journal, Was Tun!, which the SL have jointly launched in Germany with the SI split away from us.

158. On 1 July the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers' International and SAV Executive Committee jointly wrote to the UIT International Secretariat concerning, among other points, the political basis of the split in the SAV and the political character of Was Tun!:

"The UIT International Secretariat's letter, while implying disagreement with the SI's split, avoids making any political characterisation of the disputed issues in Germany. This is surprising given that the UIT comrades have been aware for some time of the debate and, via the SL comrades in Berlin, actually participated in it. Indeed on 29 January 1998 Pedro F had a personal discussion with Bob L in London on the situation in Berlin. PF then said that he was not sure about all the disputed issues, particularly in regard to the SAV standing in the coming 1998 Bundestag election. However PF, correctly in our view, commented that "it seemed that the Berlin opposition (now the SI) did not emphasise enough building the party". Given that comrade PF later visited Berlin in April, when presumably he would have had the opportunity to examine the disputed issues for himself, we are surprised at this absence of any political comments in the UIT International Secretariat's letter...

"the 'proof of the pudding is in the eating'. Now the SL is producing a joint journal, Was Tun!, with the SI whose content seems to show that there now is political agreement between the SL and SI.

"This new journal is a precise example of the political mistakes of the former Berlin opposition. Apart from other questions, generally this journal does not use the transitional method as it does not raise the question of changing society. The journal does not describe itself as a socialist paper, rather a "paper for employee's politics". This reflects the policy of the SI grouping. When the SI members were still in the SAV the one branch which they controlled, Berlin Wedding, decided not to sell the SAV paper to or produce a SAV leaflet for the workers involved in a struggle in the AEG/AMC factory, instead organising solidarity action simply as "activists".

"Only in one small Was Tun! article, which describes the SI and SL, is the word "socialism" actually used. In the main political article, "For a different policy! For Workers Lists!", there is no mention whatsoever of the need for the expropriation of the capitalists and a planned economy, despite the fact that the authors mention the Communist Manifesto. In other words it seems that the SL agrees with the SI that a transitional programme does not have to raise the question of nationalisation or socialism. If this is the case, then it is easier to understand why the SL lost interest in discussing with the SAV Executive Committee. Furthermore the article, while calling for "Workers Lists", does not put forward any concrete position or steps that activists should take towards the coming Bundestag election."

Once More on the UIT

159. Murray Smith writes that "what is needed now is ... to go back on the offensive for discussions and joint campaigns to verify whether a fusion is politically possible" (paragraph 90). Murray Smith does not mention the UIT International Executive Committee's non-response to our political questions regarding Germany. So how can the Committee for a Workers' International "verify whether a fusion is politically possible" if the UIT leadership simply ignore the political questions we raise?

160. Have the French comrades raised these political issues with the membership of La Commune and, if so, what response did they receive? During discussion between the UIT International Secretariat and the CWI International Secretariat in Paris in September this year the UIT argued that the points of difference in Germany between the SAV and the SL/SI were "tactical" and consequently their International Secretariat had not got a position on the disputed issues! Once again the issues were evaded with a proposal for joint campaign in solidarity with the Russian miners.

161. Murray Smith correctly writes "we have a duty to verify if a fusion is possible on a principled political basis" (paragraph 88). We await the reply from the UIT on the political and tactical issues that developed in Germany.

162. The International Secretariat is also waiting for the French comrades to produce their long promised political analysis of La Commune and the UIT. As we have said before the model for this report should be the "Report on the Militant" which the French comrades wrote as part of our 1993 fusion discussions.

163. In regard to the French comrades discussions with La Commune the International Secretariat is not trying to "impose" (paragraph 89) anything on the French section except to insist that before there is any joint paper or fusion there is a serious political discussion, which includes programme, perspectives and the International. As Trotsky pointed out "...unity is an excellent thing. But demarcation on the question of the Marxist programme must precede unity (fusion of the mass newspapers) in order for that unity to be honest and long lasting" (4 January 1936 Letter to the GBL CC, in Crisis of the French Section page 127).

164. As we have stated earlier, a merger it is not simply a question of formal political agreement or the following of correct procedures. There is also the question of trust. In 1938 Trotsky, writing to the then French section about fusing with Molinier's group, said that "we must explain to them that the elimination of every suspicion in this respect is for us as an international organisation an imperative condition for any further discussions. If they oppose this verification in spite of our insistence, they doom themselves" ("Thoughts on the French Section", Writings of Trotsky 1937-38, page 320). While obviously the then situation with Molinier was different from that with the UIT today, we have the same approach as Trotsky. There must be "the elimination of every suspicion" before any fusion can take place.

165. For this reason, our future relations with the UIT can only be determined by their willingness to fully discuss their history, fully repudiate their raiding tactics in Germany and comment on the political issues that arose in Germany.

166. The Committee for a Workers' International does not have a hostile or sectarian attitude to the UIT members. We respect the majority of them as genuine revolutionary socialists, notwithstanding the political differences we have with them. However, we need to try and ensure that they are fully aware of the wrong methods and dishonest attitude that their leaders have adopted in dealing with the Committee for a Workers' International.

Trotsky's approach to regroupment and recruitment in the 1930s.

167. As the International Secretariat explained at the European School, Trotsky while striving to achieve principled revolutionary unity did not, as Murray Smith implies in paragraph 88, have an open door policy to all who claimed to be "revolutionary" or even "Trotskyists". Boundaries had to be maintained against both centrism and sectarianism. Trotsky's tactics were not fixed. They were determined by the stage of development of the objective situation, developments within the workers' movement and the concrete position of the Trotskyist movement.

168. The first ever international Trotskyist conference in February 1933 in reviewing its past development agreed that:

"In approaching the task of assembling its ranks on the national and international scale, the Left Opposition had to begin with the various groups that actually existed. But from the very beginning it was clear to the basic nucleus of the International Left Opposition that a mechanical combination of separate groups which count themselves among the Left Opposition is permissible only as a starting point, and that later on, based on theoretical and political work as well as internal criticism, the necessary selection must be made...

"The principle of party democracy is in no way identical with the principle of the open door...

"As far principled methods are concerned, the International Opposition has never broken with any group or any individual comrade without exhausting all methods of ideological persuasion...

"The proposal to call a conference with each and every group that counts itself in the Left Opposition (the groups of Landau and Rosmer, the Mahnruf, Spartakos, the Weisbord group, etc.) represents an attempt to turn the wheel backward and shows a complete lack of understanding of a revolutionary organisation and of the methods of selection and development of its cadres. The pre-conference not only rejects but condemns such an attitude as being in radical contradiction to the organisational policies of Marxism". (The International Left Opposition, its tasks and methods, Documents of the Fourth International, 1933-40, pages 27/8)

169. Within months the entire world situation was transformed with the victory of Hitler in Germany. In July 1933 Trotsky called for the Left Opposition to abandon its previous position of attempting to reform the Communist International and called instead for a new, Fourth International. The Trotskyists started discussions with other left organisations on the call for a new International. In August 1933 the Trotskyists issued with the German SAP and the two Dutch parties, the OSP and RSP, the "Declaration of the Four" for a new International. Despite bringing together organisations with differing positions, this Declaration was principled, putting down some markers against centrism: While ready to co-operate with all organisations, groups and factions that are actually developing from reformism or bureaucratic centrism (Stalinism) towards revolutionary Marxist policy, the undersigned, at the same time, declare that the new International cannot tolerate any conciliation towards reformism or centrism. The necessary unity of the working class movement can be attained not by the blurring of reformist and revolutionary conceptions nor by adaptation to the Stalinist policy but only by combating the policies of both bankrupt Internationals." (Documents of the Fourth International, 1933-40, page 58)

170. However a few months later this alliance, the "Bloc of Four", broke down. During the 1930s the Trotskyists combined calls for revolutionary unity with the work of building the forces of the Fourth International. The emphasis being given at any moment was linked to the concrete objective situation nationally and internationally. After the collapse of the "Bloc of Four" Trotsky wrote: "The Bloc of Four as such was an indispensable step on the way to the Fourth International, a step that must and will be repeated on a higher level. Nevertheless, we should not close our eyes to the fact that following the demise of the Bloc of Four, the ICL is at the moment the only organisation that openly and consistently raises the question of a new, communist, Fourth International. This fact imposes new and important tasks on our organisation and imparts increased significance to it and its development...

"Alongside independent propaganda and active work all means must be employed - always keeping with the concrete situation - to link up with the masses, push them forward, and consolidate new revolutionary cadres from their ranks.

"Above all this includes:

Systematic fraction work in the trade unions...

Systematic fraction work in all workers' parties and organisations...

Very special attention to promoting work among the youth in existing youth organisations as well as by building and broadening new youth organisations.

Forming alliances and blocs with organisations striving for a new communist party and International. These must be based on a clear principled basis and concrete formation of goals.

Fusion with such organisations on the basis of a clear communist programme" (Tasks of the ICL, July 1934, Writings of Leon Trotsky Supplement (1934-40), pages 508 and 511/2)

171. The above resolution, like all documents, reflects the time when it was written. Trotsky was always flexible in tactics. For example, while the resolution strongly argues in support of the French Trotskyists entering the SFIO (Socialist Party), a year later Trotsky was arguing for the French Trotskyists to end their entry work because the situation had changed again. But the essential point in this resolution is that it shows Trotsky's emphasis on building, especially among youth, while arguing that in the future there would be new alliances probably "on a higher level". This rounded approach is absent from Murray Smith's document with its criticism of our "insistence on building our own sections" (paragraph 93).

Conclusion

172. In the best sense of the word the Scottish Militant Labour is carrying out a manoeuvre in forming a "broad" Scottish Socialist Party. This step is a political manoeuvre which attempts, in the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee's view, to strengthen the socialist movement.

173. But, as both the British Executive Committee and the International Secretariat have tried to explain, this manoeuvre is based upon the Scottish Militant Labour forming a "broad" party in which, at first, Committee for a Workers' International members will be a majority but which will carry out day to day activity on a non-Marxist programme. Simultaneously there will be a weakening of the structures of the Committee for a Workers' International section, with it having, at least at first, monthly aggregate meetings in each city, one Full Timer and only a quarterly publication in Scotland in which they can develop their analysis and programme.

174. Bearing in mind these considerations we can only conclude that the Scottish Militant Labour's decision to launch a Scottish Socialist Party on this basis is not only wrong but also dangerous.

175. In 1928 Trotsky wrote about how Marxists should approach manoeuvres, especially in regard to the Marxist organisation itself: "The most important, best established, and most unalterable rule to apply in every manoeuvre reads: you must never dare to merge, mix, or combine your own party organisation with an alien one, even though the later be most "sympathetic" today. Undertake no such steps as lead directly or indirectly, openly or maskedly, to the subordination of your party to other parties, or to organisations of other classes, or constrict the freedom of your own agitation, or your responsibility, even if only in part, for the political line of other parties. You shall not mix up the banners, let alone kneel before another banner.

"It is the worse and most dangerous thing if a manoeuvre arises out of the impatient opportunistic endeavour to outstrip the development of one's own party and to leap over the necessary stages of its development (it is precisely here that no stages must be leaped over), by binding, combining, and uniting superficially, fraudulently, diplomatically, through combinations and trickery, organisations and elements that pull in opposite directions. Such experiments, always dangerous, are fatal to young and weak parties...

"that is why - and we arrive here at point which is of paramount importance for the Comintern - the Bolshevik party did not begin with manoeuvring as a panacea but came to it, grew into it in the measure that it sunk roots deeply into the working class, became strong politically and matured ideologically...

"It was not flexibility that served (nor should it serve today) as the basic trait of Bolshevism but rather granite hardness...This is what the communist parties of both the West and the East must begin with. They must first gain the right to carry out great manoeuvres by preparing the political and material possibility for realising them, that is, the strength, the solidity, the firmness of their own organisation". ("Strategy and Tactics in the Imperialist Epoch", in Third International After Lenin, 1957 edition, pages 140/1)

176. Reading Trotsky, especially the last sentence quoted, we can see how far the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee have forgotten the ABCs which our movement was built upon.

177. The dangers of the Scottish Militant Labour's new tactics are that it will lead to the disappearance of a politically effective Committee for a Workers' International organisation in Scotland and, flowing from that, the "broad" Scottish Socialist Party adsorbing the Committee for a Workers' International comrades.

178. We would not rule out that, in the future, the Scottish Socialist Party could possibly develop. But, if it did, then it would be even more important to maintain and develop the "the strength, the solidity, the firmness" of the Committee for a Workers' International section. Only on this basis could any reformist or centrist trends be combated and the new Scottish Socialist Party members be won to a revolutionary socialist position and the Committee for a Workers' International.

179. Right at the end of his document, in paragraph 115, Murray Smith raises the issue that "there is at least the beginning of a sectarian turn" in the Committee for a Workers' International because of the reaction of both the International Secretariat and British Executive Committee to the Scottish Militant Labour's plan.

180. But nowhere does Murray Smith give any examples of a sectarian approach in practice. Where are the British Executive Committee or International Secretariat advocating stopping joint activities with other forces in Scotland? Murray Smith says that no-one pretends that "broad forces ... exist at this stage" (paragraph 13). So Murray Smith is arguing that we have a sectarian approach because we are against using the bulk of our resources in Scotland to form a party with a "broad appeal as possible" while at the same time effectively downgrading the role and functioning of the Committee for a Workers' International section?

181. Internationally Murray Smith does not give any examples other than that of France where the International Secretariat is opposed to fusion with La Commune not because we are sectarian but because we are not convinced that there is the political basis to achieve a fusion on a principled basis.

182. In effect Murray Smith is hoping for the best on the basis of a few months limited co-operation with La Commune. Co-operation which has mainly taken the form of some joint leaflets, petitions, joint interventions and joint meetings of the Executive Committee's of both organisations.

183. In April we urged the French comrades' to produce a document on La Commune. This, we understand is still being prepared. It is necessary for the comrades' to explain what balance sheet they have drawn regarding the political and organisational character of the La Commune. Do they envisage La Commune leaving the UIT and if not how is the question of international affiliation to be resolved? It is necessary to see how the comrades estimate the political differences we have with La Commune.

184. However La Commune are also the French section of the UIT. We cannot close our eyes to the behaviour of the UIT regarding their past and Germany tells us about their methods. In his enthusiasm to secure agreement with La Commune, Murray Smith implicitly accepts, in paragraph 87, the UITs apology over their procedure in Germany. However he does not comment on the attitude adopted by either the UIT or La Commune to the political issues and methods used by them in this dispute.

185. Murray Smith seems, in regard to our differences with the UIT, to have a position of registering them but then hoping they can be overcome in practice. But serious questions, as opposed to smaller differences, cannot be treated in this way. Closing your eyes and hoping for the best is not the way for a Marxist to proceed, we need to face reality and ask questions. Otherwise there can be a tendency to look for short-cuts through rose tinted glasses.

186. Murray Smith is correct that wider issues-have been raised in this debate which will continue to be discussed internationally.

187. Our coming World Congress will have to draw up a balance sheet of our discussions with international tendencies like the USFI, LIT, UIT and ITO and national groupings like the DSP.

188. These discussions have shown that there is not the political basis for a fusion to take place with these organisations. Of course, in some national section some forces from some of these organisations have fused together with us.

189. In this situation the 1934 resolution, "Tasks of the ICL", provides a good outline of our task of building the Committee for a Workers' International today, while not ruling out in the future alliances, blocs and even fusions "on a clear principled basis and concrete formulation of goals".

INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, 23 SEPTEMBER 1998.

APPENDIX A: MATERIAL ON SCOTLAND

SOCIALIST PARTY NATIONAL COMMITTEE. 5-6 SEPTEMBER 1998

Resolution 1

We consider that it is necessary, at this point in the discussion, to briefly summarise our position on the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee's latest proposals for a Scottish Socialist Party (Scottish Socialist Party).

There has been an intensive discussion on the issues, with an exchange of documents between the SP Executive Committee and the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee and debates at the National Committee, regional meetings, and at the Committee for a Workers' International European School. In our view, the main documents produced by the Scottish Militant Labour Executive to justify their proposals (Initial Proposals, For a Bold Step Forward, New Tactics) fundamentally question our ideas on the role of a revolutionary party and party-building, the character of a Marxist programme, the role of the International, and important aspects of the perspectives. The SP Executive Committee's documents have replied to all the Scottish Militant Labour's points in detail, but the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee has not responded to our arguments. The Scottish Militant Labour Executive's latest document, Scottish Socialist Party - A Political Justification, ignores all the theoretical, historical, and programmatic issues raised in their earlier documents, without any indication that the comrades are now withdrawing any of their previous arguments. We believe that, in reality, the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee's proposals for a Scottish Socialist Party flow from their false political arguments put forward in their documents.

We are totally opposed to the political and organisational proposals put forward in 'Scottish Socialist Party - A Political Justification' and the 'Resolution to Scottish Militant Labour Conference from Scottish Militant Labour Executive' (received by the SP Executive Committee on 25 August).

In case there is any doubt about our general position on Scotland, we would like to make the following points clear: We recognise that there will be exceptional opportunities for Marxism in the next period and that our Scottish organisation has to prepare to seize the possibilities which will develop. Over a year ago, before the current debate began, we raised the need for Scottish Militant Labour to change its name and proposed that the Scottish organisation should become a separate section of the Committee for a Workers' International. We are also in favour, as in England and

Wales, of the formation of a new, broad, socialist party if sufficient forces can be brought together and provided it is done on a principled political basis.

We still believe that the best way forward in Scotland would be for the comrades to adopt one or other of the two options the SP Executive Committee proposed (2 April). Option 1 (favoured by the Executive Committee and by a majority of the International Executive Committee delegation which visited Scotland on 26-29 June) would be to relaunch Scottish Militant Labour as a revolutionary Marxist Scottish Socialist Party, which would continue to collaborate with other forces in a broader alliance, electoral platform or other formation. Option 2 would be for the Scottish Socialist Alliance to be relaunched as a broad Scottish Socialist Party, organised on a united front basis, allowing the participation of different political organisations, groups, trends, etc, in which our revolutionary organisation would play a key role.

However, the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee's document, Scottish Socialist Party - A Political Justification, rejects Option 1, ignores Option 2, and instead proposes a hybrid Scottish Socialist Party. We are opposed to this for fundamental political reasons:

(1) The Scottish Socialist Party being proposed will not be a broad socialist party, organised on united front lines, in which our comrades would participate as a revolutionary organisation; nor will it be a revolutionary Marxist organisation. The Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee's proposal, in our view, is in reality for a centrist party. Some elements of a Marxist programme will be combined with reformist policies on the basis of a false method which is incompatible with the tradition of Marxism and Trotskyism. Leaders of Scottish Militant Labour will come together with reformist and centrist elements in a hybrid leadership of Scottish Socialist Party without the safeguards of a united front structure which would enable our own organisation (while collaborating with other forces in building the new party) to retain an independent Marxist identity and policy.

(2) The Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee's latest proposal for a new organisation (which they now propose should be called International Socialist [IS]), which would form a Scottish Section of Committee for a Workers' International, are politically and organisationally inadequate. The organisational proposals put forward in the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee's resolution must, in our view, be considered in the context of the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee's political justification for the proposed Scottish Socialist Party. The proposal for a "revolutionary platform/tendency" would not ensure the development of a revolutionary Marxist organisation capable of maintaining a clear Marxist banner, formulating correct programme and perspectives, and of recruiting and developing cadres. The proposed approach would not provide an effective means of building a revolutionary organisation capable of withstanding hostile pressures and winning broader support through different stages of struggle in the future.

We note (resolution point 10) that the International Socialists will have the right to have members-only meetings, but the emphasis is on open meetings which will not be weekly but "should meet monthly as a minimum" (point 3). The resolution states (point 9) that International Socialists members who have Scottish Socialist Party positions or are elected representatives "will be accountable to the International Socialists", but the resolution makes no reference to the International Socialists organisation being based on the method of democratic unity.

There is no proposal for a weekly or fortnightly paper. The only public face proposed for the organisation is a quarterly magazine. The proposals for finances indicate that the main finance for the Scottish Socialist Party will come from Scottish Militant Labour members, but (for reasons which are not explained) paying via the new International Socialists for six months and subsequently paying directly to the Scottish Socialist Party.

The Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee's current proposals will not, in our view, enable the comrades to build effectively in the next period, and will pose the serious danger of throwing away past gains. We therefore urge the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee, even at this stage, to reconsider their proposals.

Socialist Party National Committee, 5-6 September 1998

Resolution 2

Scottish Socialist Party Debate: Procedure

This National Committee strongly opposes the refusal of the leadership of Scottish Militant Labour to recommend the postponement of their proposals for the establishment of the Scottish Socialist Party at least until the British Special Congress (3-4 October) if not until the World Congress in November.

We believe that the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee's insistence on going ahead at the Scottish Militant Labour Conference (12-13 September) goes completely against the principles and usual practices of 'democratic unity' on which our organisation rests. The Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee's course of action denies the membership of the SP in England and Wales and of the Committee for a Workers' International as a whole, together with our Scottish comrades, the opportunity of fully and collectively taking decisions on crucial strategic and tactical issues which can determine the fate of the revolutionary movement.

This National Committee wishes to put on record its opposition to the approach of the Scottish Militant Labour leadership in this debate and registers its opposition to their proposals. However, in order to remove any suggestion that we are resorting to formal organisational measures, we very reluctantly accept that Scottish Militant Labour will go ahead and implement these proposals. We similarly accept that Scottish Militant Labour should go ahead with discussions with Committee for a Workers' International with the aim of forming a separate section in Scotland.

These decisions will be reviewed after one year. This decision does not preclude further debate and discussion at the Special Conference and at the World Congress.

A manifesto for a socialist Scotland

(Interim ten point programme for the Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party)

This suggested draft ten point programme was drawn up following a discussion at the September National Council meeting of the Scottish Socialist Alliance.

It is based upon the Charter for Socialist Change, with some modifications.

It is neither a final policy statement, nor a comprehensive political programme, but a preliminary starting point around which we can explain the basic aims of a new Scottish Socialist Party.

There will be ample opportunity in the coming months for the new party to develop and refine these points, as well as to work out a more detailed socialist programme for Scotland

Scottish Parliament

The Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party stands for an independent socialist Scotland.

We reject the idea that the Queen should remain as Head of State and support the principle of a democratic republic in which feudal institutions such as the Monarchy and the House of Lords are swept away.

In the meantime we will fight within the new devolved parliament for socialist policies.

International solidarity

The Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party promotes international solidarity of the working class and the oppressed against global capitalism.

We stand for the eventual establishment of a democratic socialist alliance of European states rather than a Europe dominated by big business.

We are for the cancellation of Third World debt and for international solidarity and cooperation around socialist policies to end poverty, starvation, environmental destruction, exploitation, war and racial hatred.

Equal rights

The Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party is opposed to all forms of racism, sectarianism and national chauvinism.

We stand for full citizenship and equality for all within a socialist Scotland, regardless of race, nationality, religion, disability, age, sex or sexual orientation.

We are in favour of a Scottish parliament in which women have equal representation.

The economy

The Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party is for a radical alternative to the 'free market'. We reject the notion that Scotland's economic policy should centre around attracting inward investment by offering lavish subsidies, low taxes and cheap labour, and natural resources to transnational companies. Instead the Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party stands for an economy which is democratically planned in the interests of society as a whole.

Specifically, we stand for the social/public ownership under democratic management of all industries privatised under the last government; and for an extension of democratic ownership to include Scotland's major industrial, construction, commercial and financial corporations.

Poverty and unemployment

The Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party stands for a radical redistribution of wealth from the rich to the working class and the poor.

The real problem facing Scotland is not lack of wealth - but the concentration of most of the country's riches in the hands of a small clique of multi-millionaire bankers, industrialists, landowners, shareholders and stockbrokers.

As a first step to tackling poverty and inequality, the Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party supports the introduction for a £6 an hour minimum wage (in line with the European Decency Threshold) and a corresponding increase in all welfare benefits.

We also stand for a maximum ceiling on incomes of £ 120,000 a year - the equivalent of ten times the level of the minimum wage. This would represent at least a small first step towards a more equal society.

The Scottish Socialist Alliance/ Scottish Socialist Party also stands for the basic working week to be reduced to 35 hours as part of a phased and planned job creation programme leading to a four day working week.

Workers rights

The Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party stands for the repeal of all anti-trade union legislation and for a new charter of workers rights which will guarantee the right of all employees to take industrial action and join a recognised trade union.

We are for greater autonomy for trade unionists in Scotland within the unitary all-British trade union movement. .

The environment

The Scottish Socialist Alliance/ Scottish Socialist Party stands for the right of people in Scotland to live in a clean, healthy and safe environment.

We support the removal of nuclear weapons in Scotland and internationally and the safe decommissioning of Scotland's nuclear power stations - with guaranteed alternative employment to be provided.

We will fight for an integrated and affordable public transport network to discourage the use of private cars.

We will campaign for all toxic waste dumps to be identified and made safe and for all hazardous substances, including asbestos, to be safely disposed of.

We stand for the setting up of democratically elected bodies at community, city/town, regional and national level to help monitor and protect the environment.

Land

The Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party stands for a radical shift in the pattern of land ownership in Scotland as the first step to regenerating Scotland's desolate rural communities.

We oppose the feudal landholding system in Scotland which has resulted in less than 0.01 per cent of the population owning 80 per cent of all land.

We believe that Scotland's land should be legally recognised as the common property of the people of Scotland.

We stand for restrictions on the size of landholdings with upper limits defined according to the quality of the land.

We stand for the transfer into public and community ownership of unoccupied and unutilised land, including sporting estates.

Public services

The Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party opposes privatisation of public services and will fight for the reversal of Tory and New Labour policies which encourage private profiteers to become involved in the health service, education and other public services.

We stand for the bringing into democratic control, Health Trusts, Water Boards and all other unelected quangos.

We will fight for the restoration of all cuts in health, education, housing and other public services.

We will campaign for the abolition of student fees, and for the restoration of student grants and other benefits.

Housing and homelessness

The Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party stands for a radical socialist housing policy which aims to end homelessness and provide decent, affordable accommodation for everyone.

We will campaign for the cancellation of Scotland's local authority housing debt, estimated to be £3.5 billion, which would release hundreds of millions a year for council housing programmes; and for bringing the major construction companies into the public sector under democratic management.

We will also campaign for the establishment of a democratically-elected Scotland-wide housing forum, consisting of representatives from local authorities, housing associations, tenants associations and relevant trade union.

This forum would play a key role in coordinating a national house-building and renovation programme.

We also stand for an end to the sale of council houses; and oppose the privatisation of council housing.

We will campaign to bring rents and tenancy agreements in the private sector into line with those in the public sector.

Continue to Appendix B