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The Scottish debate

For a Bold Step Forward

(a reply from Scottish Militant Labour EC to British EC)

Continued...

We believe that the activities, the tactics, and the strategy of our organisation in Scotland - methods incidentally which have been largely adopted by the Scottish Socialist Alliance and which will certainly be adopted by any new Scottish Socialist Party - stand up to any objective examination. That is not to suggest that we never make political mistakes, nor that there are no weaknesses or deficiencies in our structures. No organisation has ever existed which would fit that description.

We should also state here and now that this proposal has not been presented purely for electoral reasons, as the comrades suggest. From a purely electoral standpoint, we could easily live with the continuation of the Alliance in its present form, or for that matter with a cosmetic change whereby the Scottish Socialist Alliance changed its name to the Scottish Socialist Party, and everything else carried on as before.

There is even a case to suggest that some of the Euro MPs, councillors, and Westminster MPs who may defect from Labour in the next period could more easily be accommodated in the looser structure of an Alliance.

The British EC letter refers to our suggestion that there could be a breakaway from the Scottish Labour Party, then poses the question: "Do the comrades seriously believe that the proposals for a new Scottish Socialist Party outlined in this document will guarantee the inclusion of a significant section of Scottish Labour dissidents in the new party?"

Of course these proposals will not guarantee anything. But the comrades miss the point. If a breakaway from the Scottish Labour Party takes shape, it could succeed in attracting into its ranks an important layer of trade unionists and non-aligned socialists who are moving into political activity. This, in turn, could complicate the electoral plans of the Scottish Socialist Alliance for 1999, especially given the form of Proportional Representation under which the Scottish parliamentary elections will be held.

But if before such a formation takes shape, a new Scottish Socialist Party has already been launched - involving the current membership of the Scottish Socialist Alliance and possibly other forces - accompanied by a mass recruitment drive with dozens of public meetings, hundreds of thousands of leaflets, and a drive into the workplaces, we could at least partially succeed in occupying that ground in advance of any breakaway from the official movement.

Electoral pact

At the very least, this could help ensure that even if a breakaway did occur and bypassed the new Scottish Socialist Party, it could not ignore it completely. The Scottish Socialist Party would then be in a strong position to demand negotiations with the aim of securing an electoral coalition or pact.

The comrades may argue that a recruitment drive on this scale could be carried out anyway under the banner of the Scottish Socialist Alliance - and that is true, up to a point. But unless our existing apparatus, including our branches, our full-time apparatus and our paper are directed towards that goal, then it would have only a limited impact.

The comrades may then say, "Well, in that case maybe we should direct these resources into a campaign to build the Scottish Socialist Alliance." But merely posing this suggestion illustrates the quandary that we face. There is a persistent discord between the public tasks that rest on the shoulders of our organisation and the internal demands of maintaining and building our "independent organisation".

The EC letter offers no solution to this contradiction. In a 40-paragraph letter, literally one sentence is devoted to the vague suggestion that we may need to "strengthen the Scottish Socialist Alliance, or move towards the formation of a new broad socialist party with a federal structure which would allow the participation of various organisations, trends, etc, including our own" (i.e. simply change the name of the Alliance). In that sense, the EC letter is entirely negative and fails to even begin to address either the difficulties we face or the opportunities that are presented by the developing political situation in Scotland.

We also have to say that the comrades appear to have a lightminded attitude to the electoral possibilities that are posed. We can debate the exact wording of the original statement; frequently socialists - not just in Scotland - are accused of exaggerating the potential that exists. But what cannot and should not be disputed is the key importance of election results and successes in the eyes of the broad mass of the working class.

The comrades suggest that we are "gambling the whole future of our organisation on achieving a unified platform". Leaving aside the wild exaggeration of the comrades, the fact is that "achieving a unified platform" is just one consideration out of many that we have to take into account.

Preconditions

A serious possibility is now presented of creating a sizeable socialist party in Scotland with significant forces, some trade union links, a clear revolutionary programme and outstanding electoral potential. That is the prize that we are fighting for in the short term. But in order to win that prize it will be necessary to display a certain degree of organisational flexibility, and to consider transitional arrangements which may not conform exactly to the recent norms of our International.

Specifically, we are proposing that, subject to political agreement with the other forces involved, we consider merging the apparatus of Scottish Militant Labour with the apparatus of the Scottish Socialist Alliance and possibly of other socialist forces. It is premature to attempt to set out detailed criteria for negotiation at this stage, before we have even begun to seriously raise the general principle.

Of course, once we have established broad agreement to enter into negotiations, and when we know exactly who is prepared to participate in these discussions, we can then proceed to work out more detailed proposals as a basis for further negotiations. No-one is suggesting that we write a blank cheque, to be filled in by our negotiating partners. At each stage, we would seek the agreement of the organisation before entering into any commitments.

On the other hand, the implication by the comrades that we should at this early stage, before the general idea has even been seriously floated, draw up a list of demands and preconditions would be completely counterproductive. Of course we can set out some general preconditions, most of which are self-evident in any case.

For example, the existing programme and policies of the Alliance will almost certainly be accepted as the political basis of a new Scottish Socialist Party - although we will probably want to insist on a more clear cut policy on socialist independence, given the increasing intensity of the national question.

We would also insist on a proper branch structure which provided political education and co-ordinated campaigns, recruitment, fund-raising, etc. We would obviously also argue for tighter political cohesion than currently exists within the Scottish Socialist Alliance, including a commitment to 'unity in action'.

And of course, we would oppose the monolithic type of structure which has proven so disastrous for the SLP; instead, we should argue for a more open structure which, as well as allowing for affiliation of trade union organisations, will also guarantee the right of tendencies, factions and other groupings to exist and to produce their own publications and circulate their own material. Other aspects of the constitution, including internal elections, leadership accountability, and democratic policy-making procedures will also have to feature on the agenda of future negotiations.

These points can be further discussed and elaborated within our own organisation before and during negotiations. But what we are essentially aiming to achieve is the drawing together of our existing internal organisation and the Scottish Socialist Alliance - the organisation through which all of our public activity is conducted. To achieve that type of merger, it is likely that an organisational compromise will be required; we cannot realistically expect to impose the current structure of Scottish Militant Labour upon the new party, even if we wanted to.

And of course, the fact that we have opened up this discussion flows from our conviction that that the current structure of the Alliance is inadequate to carry us forward into the next period.

Internationalism

Understandably, the comrades have expressed anxiety regarding the difficulties we have explained about setting affiliation to the Committee for a Workers' International as a precondition of any merger. Yes, we can raise the issue in a general way, and have done so in initial informal discussions. But all the indications are that if we attempted to pose the question of affiliation to the Committee for a Workers' International as a precondition for the establishment of a unified party, we would not get past first base.

This is not a question of disloyalty to our comrades internationally. The greatest disservice we could do to our comrades internationally would be to fail to grasp every opportunity to advance the struggle for socialism in Scotland. Lenin himself made the point clearly that the first task of any internationalist is "to strengthen the revolutionary forces in one's own country".

Nonetheless, we will make this point crystal clear: we have not at any stage proposed that the existing members of Scottish Militant Labour break with the Committee for a Workers' International. In the original statement we posed one of two possibilities: either forming within a Scottish Socialist Party an organised formation (whether it be called a tendency, a platform, a society or whatever) which would be part of the Committee for a Workers' International; which would promote the ideas, literature, etc of the Committee for a Workers' International; which would ensure the continuation of at least the existing level of financial support for the Committee for a Workers' International; and which would organise meetings, etc with Committee for a Workers' International speakers.

The other alternative we posed, albeit in a roundabout way ("the new party would become the vehicle... for maintaining British-wide and international links"), was that the new party itself may affiliate to the Committee for a Workers' International. It is quite frankly bare-faced scaremongering for the comrades to suggest that "the document's proposal is really for the dissolution of our organisation and the detachment of our comrades from the Committee for a Workers' International".

On the other hand, we have openly explained that the issue of international affiliations will pose difficulties for us at least in the short term. The British EC appear really unable to comprehend these difficulties. Instead of assisting us address them, the comrades pronounce - again in an extremely formalistic fashion - that that this difficulty "precisely points to the underlying political differences that still exist."

Elsewhere in the document, the comrades invoke the examples of the CPGB being part of the Communist International, and of the relationship between the fused Cannon-Muste party in the USA and the international Trotskyist movement. Yet any close examination of these historical examples actually reinforces our appeal for a more flexible approach.

Authority

Firstly, as we have already described, the Communist International was truly at that stage a world party of socialist revolution. Across the world, organisations were queuing up to join it, such was the authority and prestige of its leaders, who had just led an earth-shattering victorious revolution and defeated 21 capitalist armies of intervention.

In one sense, the position we face in Scotland today is exactly the opposite of the position that existed in Britain following the first world war. At that stage, even the largest Marxist grouping, the BSP, did not possess the authority to unite the left into a single party. The CPGB was only established after various disparate organisations had first gravitated to the Communist International, including the BSP; the Socialist Labour Party; the Workers Socialist Federation; the South Wales Socialist Society; and the Shop Stewards and Workers' Committee Movement.

The fusion that led to the formation of the CPGB took place following an appeal by Lenin: "In my opinion, the British Communists should unite their four (all very weak, and some very, very weak) parties and groups into a single Communist Party on the basis of the principle of the Third International and of obligatory participation in Parliament." (From Left Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder)

In Scotland today (in contrast to the position of the BSP) Scottish Militant Labour has significant authority within the Scottish Socialist Alliance and among a wider layer of workers, trade unionists, single issue campaigners and even activists within the Labour Party, the SNP and the SLP. They recognise the role that Scottish Militant Labour has played over the years: leading the victorious anti-Poll Tax struggle; organising to stop warrant sales and leading numerous occupations of Sheriff offices; launching the first socialist breakaway from Labour and demonstrating that an electoral alternative is viable; and establishing the hugely successful Hands Off Water Campaign which saw off the threat of water privatisation.

We have also led the battle against repeated attempts by the Nazi BNP to organise in Scotland; united socialists, trade unionists and single issue campaigners in a big illegal mass movement against the Criminal Justice Act; led the successful battle against school closures in Glasgow which led to the reprieve of 17 threatened primary schools; organised the Save Our Services campaigns against cuts which mobilised thousands of trade unionists and communities onto the streets; led community occupations against closure-threatened centres and schools; and invaded and occupied Glasgow City Chambers two years running, creating serious disruption of Labour council budget meetings to carry through cuts.

In addition, we have built mass solidarity for the Timex workers' struggle and for the Glacier workers' sit-in and provided detailed tactical advice in both these struggles which led to a momentous victory for the Glacier workers and the defeat of Timex's plans to turn Dundee into a 'Scab City'.

We also initiated and led the Clydeside Dockers' Support Group which for two years organised some of the most effective backing for the Liverpool dockers anywhere in Europe. We have also recently formed the Clydeside; Workers Support Group, which is about to take major initiatives on the minimum wage and on trade union recognition.

In addition, Scottish Militant Labour initiated the idea of the Scottish Socialist Alliance and has provided the main organisational and political backbone of the Alliance. We have also been able to launch the only Scottish newspaper which reports and analyses events from a socialist standpoint.

Strength

It is because of that track record that we are now in a position to proceed, from a position of strength, towards the creation of a bigger, stronger socialist party with clear principles and a combative character.

At this stage, the Committee for a Workers' International does not possess the authority in Scotland that Scottish Militant Labour possesses; nor does the Socialist Party. For a layer of activists who work closely with Scottish Militant Labour there remains a residue of suspicion of London-based political leaders. This in turn partly reflects attitudes and, in some cases perhaps, even prejudices - linked to the national question - which extend into all sections of society in Scotland.

We also believe it is necessary to challenge the comparison that has been drawn between the Committee for a Workers' International today and the Fourth International and its international forerunners under the leadership of Trotsky.

It is true these did not involve mass parties in the way that the Communist International did in its early stages. Nonetheless, during the 1930s, Trotsky's international organisation was the only anti-capitalist anti-Stalinist revolutionary International - and it was headed by the most outstanding leader of the October Revolution, who had spearheaded the battle against Stalinism in the Soviet Union, had suffered ferocious repression including the physical liquidation of his closest collaborators and members of his immediate family, and who was himself so feared by the international bourgeoisie that he was shunted from one country to another in exile.

The authority of such an International was clearly on a different plane from that possessed by the Committee for a Workers' International today. Even then, as the British EC letter concedes, when the idea of a new party was posed in the USA in the 1930s, the Trotskyist CLA did not insist that affiliation to Trotsky's international organisation be a precondition for the merger. In fact, although Trotsky kept in touch with former CLA leader, James Cannon, the new merged party (the Workers Party of the United States) did not have any organisational connection with Trotsky's international organisation.

Moreover, there are many other historical examples of Marxist parties developing independently of any formal international affiliation. In the USA itself, under the Voorhis Act of 1940, any organisation linked to a wider international organisation was required to turn a list of all its members names and addresses over to the government for publication - thereby opening up all members to reprisals by employers, fascists, etc. As a result, the American Trotskyist Party - then known as the Socialist Workers Party - formally discontinued its affiliation from the Fourth International. Of course, that did not stop informal collaboration between the leadership of the SWP and the Fourth International.

Here in Britain our organisation evolved independently of any international organisation, particularly in the period 1964 to 1974, the year that the Committee for a Workers' International was formed. Even the Bolsheviks' international links were with the discredited and reformist Second International.

Role of the Committee for a Workers' International

However, in case there is any misunderstanding we will repeat the point: we have no intention of "detaching our comrades from the Committee for a Workers' International". What we are suggesting is that insisting on affiliation to the Committee for a Workers' International as a precondition for the creation of a new party is in effect to erect a brick wall between Scottish Militant Labour and all other forces in order to satisfy formal protocol.

Of course, discussions could carry on both formally and informally between the Committee for a Workers' International and our comrades in the leadership of the new Scottish Socialist Party; but for reasons which are not entirely clear, the comrades appear to be demanding rigorous adherence to a standardised procedure. As the comrades themselves have indicated, affiliating to the Committee for a Workers' International is not just a question of signing on the dotted line, or even of merely donating money.

Tony Saunois, Secretary of the Committee for a Workers' International, stated at the last National Committee meeting that if Scotland becomes a separate section of the Committee for a Workers' International, the international leadership will expect to "intervene and discuss all the detailed questions of programme, tactics, strategy, organisation and so on."

Lynn Walsh of the British EC and International Secretariat went further in an unofficial meeting at the National Committee and effectively accused the leadership of Scottish Militant Labour of dishonest political behaviour by deliberately keeping the British EC and the Committee for a Workers' International in the dark over political issues and initiatives in Scotland.

We completely reject that slur; and we note that Lynn's suggested solution to the perceived problem is to establish Scotland as an independent section of the Committee for a Workers' International under the close supervision of the international leadership.

But that is precisely one of the problems about obtaining agreement over Committee for a Workers' International affiliation: people with whom we are trying to collaborate politically do not at this stage accept the authority of the Committee for a Workers' International leadership or their right to intervene in the fashion that the comrades have described.

To be fair to the British EC, Scottish Militant Labour has up until now been given a great deal of latitude to work out our own tactics, policies, initiatives, etc. We believe that has resulted in a generally healthy situation in Scotland; and we would certainly hope that whatever organisational arrangements are finally agreed, this is the type of relationship that will continue.

The comrades predict "outrage throughout the International" because we have made the point that "the idea has been posed of the new party itself having an open relationship with several or more internationals." The British EC letter inadvertently, we assume, misquotes this statement so that it reads "the idea of the new party itself having an open relationship with several or more internationals has been posed in the longer term." (sic). This is not to quibble over words; the original statement actually goes on to say: "In the long term, a broader regroupment on the left in England and Wales and on an international scale could begin to resolve this dilemma."

Rival organisations

The comrades are surprisingly silent on this critical point - therefore let us clarify exactly what we meant in the original statement and pose several pertinent questions. First, the idea of an 'open relationship' was not posed by us, but by others in the Alliance - precisely because they do not clearly understand the political differences that exist on the left internationally; nor do they understand the necessity for separate organisations which appear, at least on the surface, to have broadly similar aims and objectives.

In the past, as we indicated at the National Committee, the same point has been posed in relation to British politics. Peter himself has informally and tentatively pointed out that most ordinary workers would require a magnifying glass to discern the political differences between ourselves and the SWP. This in turn raises inevitably in the minds of many people moving towards political activity: why are these organisations separate and should they not be united?

In France - and we have no real knowledge of the organisations concerned - Lutte Ouvrière took a dozen regional council seats in the recent elections and 483,000 votes nationally - 4.83 per cent of the total. The Ligue Commiuniste Révolutionnaire took another 200,000 votes. Both these organisations claim to stand in the tradition of Trotskyism. Clearly, our organisation in that situation will be presented with difficulties if our strategy is entirely based upon achieving arithmetical growth in competition with these other forces.

And even in Britain, a layer of youth and workers turning to political activity for the first time will inevitably end up in the ranks of the SWP, especially in areas where they have more members, simply because that is the first organisation that they will come across.

That is not to suggest that the comrades in France or in England should adopt the same tactics that we are proposing in Scotland. Scottish Militant Labour is in a much stronger position to take radical tactical initiatives without our ideas, methods and traditions being swamped. But these examples do pose the necessity for a clinical and sober weighing up of tactics and strategy in relation to other left forces in an atmosphere free from outraged indignation at the very idea that we would even consider giving these people the time of day.

On an international scale, the Committee for a Workers' International itself has formed an 'open relationship' with other international forces, including USEC and the UIT, with whom we understand merger negotiations are currently taking place.

We are not demanding or even advising that any other section of the organisation adopt the strategy that we have proposed for Scotland. However, we are asking the comrades to acknowledge that the tasks of the organisation in Scotland are not exactly the same as the tasks posed in some of the smaller sections of the International where the organisation is still at an embryonic stage.

Politics and organisation

Lynn in one of his contributions the National Committee drew a comparison between the type of structure that we are proposing as a transitional compromise to maintain relations with the Committee for a Workers' International and the so-called Fourth International Supporters Caucus (FISC). This point is repeated in the British EC letter.

We do not pretend to be familiar with the details of this organisation. And we accept that the type of structure that we are proposing would not simply be a continuation of Scottish Militant Labour. It would, in effect, be an extra safeguard to ensure the continuation of a formal link with the Committee for a Workers' International and the Socialist Party until such time as a formal link can be established via the Scottish Socialist Party.

However, we believe that the comparison with FISC betrays an obsession with organisational forms. The comrades appear to be suggesting that the source of the apparent disintegration of FISC is its organisational character. Perhaps that is the case. But then again, perhaps it would be more productive to examine the political track record and outlook of the individuals concerned and compare them with the leadership of the Scottish Militant Labour.

These individuals are, in fact, notorious opportunists who in decades of political activity have failed to build anything. Their political adaptation to the methods of the leadership of the SLP has led these former self proclaimed Trotskyists into playing the role of the SLP's in-house KGB.

In contrast, the leadership of Scottish Militant Labour has built an organisation in Scotland which is one of the most influential Trotskyist organisations in Europe. We pioneered the Poll Tax tactics and strategy which led to the downfall of Thatcher; we pioneered the concept of an independent socialist organisation providing an electoral as well as a political alternative to Labour; we have launched countless campaigning initiatives; we initiated the idea of the Scottish Socialist Alliance and played a key role in shaping its policies and structures; we have fought scores of election campaigns, producing all our own material and carrying the ideas of socialism to a mass audience; we have analysed in detail the specific political situation in Scotland and formulated a programme on the national question which we believe will become the adopted programme of the socialist left in Scotland in the next period; we have launched and sustained the production, with threadbare material resources, of a fortnightly newspaper.

We raise these points not in any sense in a boastful way - but to forcibly illustrate the completely false comparison that has been drawn between our position and that of the FISC.

Arid schemas

We could also point out that the old Workers Revolutionary Party had a highly regimented apparatus, including a daily paper, an open public profile and an extremely rigid structure. Organisationally, it could be described as the polar opposite of FISC. It too disintegrated. Whether or not an organisation thrives or disintegrates depends first and foremost upon its political programme, orientation, tactics and strategy.

There are many historical examples of Trotskyist and Marxist groupings armed only with ideas which have been extremely effective. There are times in the history of our own organisation in Britain where this has been case. And again, we can draw from the experience of the American Trotskyists in the 1930s, who a year or so after the fusion with the 'Musteites' opened up negotiations to join the American Socialist Party.

In order to gain admittance, Cannon's 'new revolutionary party' - to use the description of the British EC letter - agreed to close down its press, dissolve its open organisation, and join the Socialist Party as individual members rather than as part of a group. They worked in this party with nothing more than the 1930s equivalent of a photocopied bulletin. But at the same time Cannon himself edited Labour Action, published under the auspices of the Socialist Party of California. In his history of American Trotskyism, Cannon makes the comment "if Labour Action was not a Trotskyist agitational paper, I will never be able to make one".

Of course, we are dealing in Scotland with a completely different situation. But we have to recognise that the organisational history of the Marxist movement is much more complicated than the British EC letter would suggest; Bolshevism itself, as Trotsky explained "was always strong because of its historical concreteness in elaborating organisational forms. There were no arid schemas. The Bolsheviks changed their organisational structure radically at every transition from one stage to the next."

There can never be organisational guarantees against disintegration. Ultimately politics and ideology - including programme, presentation, tactics and strategy - will determine the success or failure of the forces of socialism. That is not to dismiss the importance of organisation. Indeed, the proposals that we have brought forward are designed precisely to strengthen organisationally the forces of socialism in Scotland.

Germany

Although these are not mentioned in the British EC letter, we understand that some of the EC comrades have verbally drawn a comparison between our proposals and examples from the history of the workers' movement in Germany and Spain. However, instead of clarifying the issues under discussion, half-digested analogies which are not followed through to their conclusion tend instead to spread confusion.

The comrades, for example, have apparently invoked Marx and Engels' opposition to the union between the German Socialist Workers Party and the so-called 'Lassalleans', named after their dead former leader. However, Marx and Engels criticised the Socialist leaders, not on organisational grounds, but because of the fact that they had almost completely surrendered their political programme in order to achieve unity.

The Lassalleans were, in fact, a hopelessly confused grouping which placed the demand for state aid from the government to form workers co-operatives at the heart of their political programme. Marx pointed out that, at best, this would create a few isolated enclaves - a prediction that has been clearly confirmed by experience since Marx wrote his 'Critique of the Gotha Programme.'

The Lassalleans also advanced a utopian policy of the elimination of all inequality; accepted reactionary Malthusian theories on population; replaced the principle of international working class solidarity with the sentimental notion of 'the brotherhood of man'; argued that the workers should receive 'the undiminished proceeds of their labour' - i.e. there should be no social expenditure or even capital investment; and adopted a thoroughly sectarian approach to the peasantry and petty-bourgeoisie, insisting that all social classes apart from the working class were one reactionary mass. They combined this semi-mystical, ultra-left philosophy with wheeling and dealing with some of the most reactionary forces in German society, including Bismarck.

Marx was naturally outraged that the German socialists, in order to carry out a fusion with this group, abandoned its own socialist programme, except for some points promoting democratic rights, substituting for it many of these confused ideas: "Almost every word in this programme could be criticised," said Marx.

It was not the principle of unity that Marx opposed - even with this "religious sect", as he described the Lassalleans:

"Our Party has so frequently made offers of reconciliation, or at least of co-operation, to the Lassalleans and has been so frequently and contemptuously repulsed... that any child must have drawn the conclusion that if these gentlemen are now offering reconciliation they must be in a right damn fix... They should have been received with extreme coolness and mistrust and union made dependent on the extent to which they were willing to drop their sectarian slogans and their state aid and accept in its essentials the Eisenach programme [i.e. the Socialists' original programme] or a revised edition of it adapted to the present day... The first condition of union should be that they cease to be sectarians, and that the universal panacea of state aid should be, if not entirely relinquished, at any rate recognised by them as a subordinate transitional measure."

These quotes illustrate clearly that the central principle for Marx was not organisational separation, but rejection of ideas which were economically illiterate and politically bankrupt. In fact, Lassalle's ideas were so far fetched that they eventually died out completely, and the German Social Democratic Party reverted to a more orthodox Marxist programme in 1891, although it later degenerated.

Catalonia

Similar points can be made about the false analogy that has been drawn between our proposals and the establishment in Catalonia in 1935 of the POUM (Marxist Party of Workers Unification) whose activists played a heroic role in the Spanish Civil War.

The POUM was formed in the white heat of the Spanish Revolution, when even detailed differences over tactics and strategy could potentially mean the difference between revolution and reaction - a vastly different situation from that which we now face in Scotland. Notwithstanding the heroism of its membership, the leadership of the POUM, which included Andres Nin, a friend and former political ally of Trotsky, made major strategical blunders, eventually participating in a government coalition which included several bourgeois parties.

However, even leaving aside the gigantic differences between Spain in the mid-thirties and Scotland in the late nineties, the comparison that the comrades have attempted to draw is unfortunate. Andres Nin, previously the leader of the Trotskyist Left Opposition in Spain, had repeatedly stood aloof from developments on the left, seeking to preserve his small party's independence at all costs.

When the mass Socialist Youth organisation swung over to the ideas of Trotskyism in 1934, Nin had spurned their efforts to fuse with the forces of the Left Opposition. "The proposal was rejected by Andres Nin and Andrade with the disdain of conservative philistines: they wanted 'independence' at all costs, because it left them in peace and put them under no obligations," wrote Trotsky. As a result, the Socialist Youth fused instead with the Communist Youth and travelled in the direction of Stalinism.

Of course, it would be absurd to compare the Scottish Socialist Alliance today with the Spanish Socialist Youth of 1934; conditions are entirely different. But it would be even more absurd to compare those forces with whom we are proposing discussions with the grouping which Andres Nin did eventually merge with to form the POUM - the Catalan Federation (later the Workers and Peasants Bloc).

This grouping first emerged as an anti-Stalinist right-wing breakaway from the Communist Party, influenced by the ideas of Bukharin. It retained certain illusions in Stalinism, although it was pushed to the left under the impact of the unfolding Spanish revolution. Trotsky himself had sharply criticised its platform (i.e. manifesto) for failing to mention the words socialism or communism and for deliberately blurring class issues through formulations such as "the republic must be a victory not only for the bourgeoisie, but also for the workers".

When Nin eventually joined forces with Maurin's Catalan Federation, he did so from a position of political and organisational weakness. Most importantly of all, the merger was essentially on the basis of Maurin's programme, rather than that of Nin.

By citing the example of the POUM, we believe that the comrades are essentially attempting to manufacture fictitious parallels, which simply do not stand up to serious scrutiny. In Scotland we are advancing this proposal from a position of political and organisational strength. Any new Scottish Socialist Party set up under our initiative would inevitably be established principally on the basis of our programme and our methods.

We also believe that if there is to be any lesson drawn from Spain in the 1930s and applied to the situation in Scotland today it is that rigidity in ideological matters must be combined with flexibility in matters of organisation, tactics and strategy.

Dangers

Trotsky in the 1930s wrote that: "Whenever a movement enters a new higher stage, there are always elements who defend the past. A wider perspective frightens them. They see nothing but difficulties and dangers."

We accept that there are risks and dangers associated with this proposal as there are with any new initiative. But there are even greater dangers and risks involved in accepting the EC analysis: not least of which is the danger that we lock ourselves away in an organisationally pure prison cell. Yes, this would guarantee that we would remain uncontaminated by opportunism, reformism, ultra-leftism, etc; but it would also guarantee that we would fail to move forward and build the type of mass party necessary to defeat capitalism.

In the same article quoted above, Trotsky also said: "Long experience has shown that precisely when an organisation is ready to get out of the narrow alley into a wider arena, elements can always be found who have grown accustomed to their alley, know all their neighbours, are used to carrying all the alley news and rumours." He explained that they invariably justify themselves with terribly "revolutionary" and "principled" arguments.

The British EC has in the past, we believe, been prepared to accept and even initiate bold new tactics when the need has arisen. We are, therefore, appealing to you to withdraw your opposition to this proposal, campaign in support of the initiative within the British and international organisations and, on the basis of obtaining agreement from the organisation, assist us to work out the details of how this exciting new leap forward can be implemented.

Comradely

Scottish EC

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