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Marxists and the British Labour Party

The Open Turn Debate

Minority Document

The New Turn - What Is the Alternative?

Opposition Document

[Editor's note: Some simple spelling and punctuation errors in the original have been corrected. Some bold words (emphasis) were not retained during the scanning, and will be added with the next revision of the site.]

1) The debate over the 'Turn' has given rise to a number of related questions that we were not able to deal fully with in our original document. This was aimed specifically at criticising the 'Turn' and drawing out all the disastrous consequences that would flow from its implementation.

2) The discussion has now been drawn onto a higher plane. The EB majority reply to our document now talks of "two distinct trends in the leadership" one supposedly based on 'political retreat' while the other on "bold audacious independent work" (For the Scottish Turn 3). In the debates, EB speakers have repeatedly stated that the real issues revolve around the type of organisation we want for the 1990s. The question of perspectives has also been raised as well as the Opposition's alternative. We intend to deal with these issues in this document.

Incidentally the broadening of the debate clearly demonstrates that our request for a longer pre-conference discussion was entirely justified.

3) The new "majority" reply is an attempt to shore up the threadbare arguments of the original Scottish Perspectives and Tasks (Scotland Perspectives and Tasks) document. However, the method of this reply is a complete departure from the scrupulous methods of the past. We were always careful not to distort the arguments of opponents, not only in the labour movement but also within our ranks. Unfortunately quotes are ripped out of context and their meaning changed. For instance words are fed into our mouths:

"We will be no better than 'the sects, who try and create phantom "mass" revolutionary parties outside of the time, experience, and consciousness of the masses.'" (For the Scottish Turn 255). The emphasised words have been added by the Majority.

Our document actually says: "We were entirely different to the sects, who try and create phantom 'mass' revolutionary parties outside of the time, experience and consciousness of the masses." (Min 21), our emphasis in this document.

4) Similarly, the document takes half-sentences pulled out of context and sewn together by clever journalistic phrases. Quotes from Trotsky are torn out of context and related to fundamentally different conditions. The quotes from the RCP in the 1940s as well as those about Spain are dealing with a concrete situation, at a particular time, with profound differences compared to Britain at the present.

5) The "majority" reply contains many falsehoods and half-truths about the views of the opposition. Here are a few examples:

a) The Opposition believe that "we should remain in the Labour Party at all costs" (For the Scottish Turn 2). This is a complete fabrication. Where have we ever said this?

b) If we listen to the minority "We would not have boldly led the Anti-Poll Tax struggle. And now we would be advising councillors and MPs to pay up to avoid expulsion" (For the Scottish Turn 25). We advocated and fully supported the Anti-poll tax struggle. No one in the opposition has ever advocated that anyone "pay up" to avoid expulsion.

c) They say 'keep our heads down, educate ourselves and wait for better times.' (For the Scottish Turn 27). Again this is a complete fabrication.

d) The minority are against 'more open work' (For the Scottish Turn throughout). This is completely untrue. What have we been doing for the past 5 years or more?

e) "The leaders of the minority have argued that parliamentary representatives, when it came to the crunch, should retreat and pay their poll tax to avoid removal" (For the Scottish Turn 116). No opposition comrade has ever argued for anyone to pay their poll tax.

f) The Opposition 'would have advocated support for Kilfoyle' (For the Scottish Turn 187). Against the bourgeois parties we would advocate a Labour vote. Have we not done this in every single election, despite the individual candidate?

g) The 'majority' never had any illusions that we could win the seat in Walton. (For the Scottish Turn 188). Hopes were raised that we could win, or that we would come very close. We were told support was 'neck and neck' and that it would be all decided on the doorstep. FC, in charge of the campaign, said Walton could be another Govan. PT stated that we could get 10,15, or 20,000 votes.

h) "The minority do not believe that there are significant opportunities" for growth (For the Scottish Turn 205). Where can you find this fiction?

i) The minority are guilty of gross underestimation, or even outright denigration, of the successes of the organisation. (For the Scottish Turn 216). Another invention. Since when has seeking a sober balance sheet constituted denigration of the organisation?

j) For the minority "the main field of work is the Labour Party" (For the Scottish Turn 222). Where have we ever said this? Our main priorities are trade union and youth work, with the Labour Party as an important field for the future.

k) The minority offer a "prescription for paralysis". (For the Scottish Turn 241). Not true. We favour bold and audacious work amongst the youth and in industry.

1) "Bold, open work amongst the workers and youth? Or emphasising Labour Party work, when there is no activity within the party? (For the Scottish Turn 256). It is ridiculous to assert that this is our position. We have never counter-posed Labour Party work to that amongst workers and youth.

m) "No-one has advanced a rosy abstract 'tidal wave' theory, with 'the Labour left welcoming us back'." (For the Scottish Turn 285). To quote the Scottish document, "we should be under no illusions. It will require not merely a shift back to the left, but a tidal wave... Moreover, when such a tidal wave takes place, it would become almost impossible for the forces of Marxism to be excluded from the party." (Scotland, Perspectives and Tasks 36 and 37).

6) That the majority have to resort to fabrications and distortions of this kind is a clear demonstration of the weakness of their case.

7) We have been accused of frightening comrades and sowing panic in the ranks of the tendency. Our starting point has been to lay bare the real meaning of the 'turn' and draw out clearly its consequences. We intend to tell the truth to the comrades. Surely that is the prime responsibility of any comrade who holds the interests of the organisation at heart? If we believe the presumed turn will load to disaster, is it not our duty to say so? To do anything different would be immoral from a Marxist point of view.

8) Originally we understood there was broad agreement on British Perspectives. Did we not all stand by the last perspectives document - "Perspectives 1991"(British Perspectives 1991) -passed unanimously at the EB, NEB and then the national event earlier this year? This dealt with in broad terms: international perspectives. Eastern Europe and the USSR, the under developed world and British Perspectives. It covered specifically the character of the period, the economic crisis, the Tories, industrial struggles, the Labour Party, Poll Tax, youth, women. Blacks and last but not least, Scottish nationalism.

9) What has fundamentally altered in the last eight months to force us to dramatically alter our perspectives for the Labour Party or Scottish nationalism? In the debates EB majority speakers have stressed that there has been a fundamental change in the world balance of forces arising mainly from the collapse of Stalinism in the USSR and Eastern Europe. If so, what are the consequences for world perspectives and perspectives for Britain?

In the short term, far from strengthening Marxist ideas, it will, according to the 'majority' document, "undoubtedly give the capitalists a temporary access of confidence". In the long term, they say, "it will clear away Stalinism and its political apologists "(For the Scottish Turn 16). It goes on, "these changes have inevitably had a big effect on the working class." (For the Scottish Turn 17). If this is the case, what conclusions do they draw?

10) We are accused of "pessimism" in relation to perspectives and party building. This apparently arises from (a) our phrase 'society has moved to the right' (b) our refusal to accept the 'turn' and supposedly 'more bold and open work' (c) our defence of entrism, which leads according to the 'majority' to capitulation to the bureaucracy.

Perspectives

11) The prime task of Marxism has been to assess in a sober and realistic fashion the likely economic and political perspectives in Britain and internationally as a starting point for our organisational work. We have attempted to avoid a one-sided approach by drawing out all the fundamental processes developing in the situation. We live in a very complex period, where our perspectives by necessity are conditional. We nevertheless must give the most likely development of events and not hide behind a multitude of options.

12) The comrades have seized on a sub-phrase in our document ('society has moved to the right') and attempted to manufacture a whole philosophy around it. Perhaps in a rather bald way, we attempted to explain that the move to the right in the Labour Party was not down to the whim of the Labour leaders, but had material foundations in society. We believed this formulation was clear given the context. We did not expand on this as we assumed that there was broad agreement on perspectives. Incidentally we are not the only ones guilty of a loose phrase that could be taken out of context and deliberately exaggerated. For example the 'majority' document talks of "the advanced capitalist countries experienced boom from 1981 until the present... Moreover the boom is beginning to exhaust itself." (For the Scottish Turn 12, our emphasis). In fact the boom began in 1982 and came to and end in 1990, when the US moved into recession. The bourgeois are now looking for signs of a revival from the recession, not a boom "exhausting itself". It could be said that the whole position of the majority is based on a false economic perspective. But that would be an exaggeration given the context of the statement. To attempt to take things out of context and exaggerate them is not the Marxist method.

13) The period we have entered is a very complex one. On a world scale it is characterised by profound instability and crisis. The boom from 1982-90, however, affected in particular the advanced capitalist countries and provided the material basis for the successes of Thatcher and Reagan. The boom, despite its weaker character, provided a temporary injection for western capitalism and the strengthening of bourgeois ideas within layers of society. This was the main material reason for the re-election of the Tories in Britain and the Republicans in the US.

14) We explained this phenomenon at the beginning of the year, as the British Perspectives 1991 states: "The Thatcher government has been sustained in the main by the world economic boom from 1982-90. An additional key factor has been the abject failure of the Labour leaders to offer a genuine alternative to the policies of the Tories. This boom has had an effect in particular on the tops of the Labour Party and trade unions. It is a law that under boom conditions, the preserves of capitalism are reflected within the ranks of the labour movement, through the capitulation of the leadership to prevailing bourgeois ideas. (British Perspectives 1991 63)

15) "Such phenomena are inevitable in class society, where bourgeois ideas are constantly pumped out by the media, education systems and the apologists of capitalism. The labour and trade union leaders-are thoroughly implicated with the morality and ideology of capitalism. Even the working class can be, for a time, infected with these alien class ideas" This was the case in the past period amongst important layers. "Big sections of the middle class and better-paid workers," explains the document, "saw a certain improvement in their living standards during the course of the boom. Even in the North, the West Midlands and Scotland, sections of employed workers and middle class have benefited to a degree, from the boom. This applies to most of the industrialised countries. It is the material explanation for the domination of the Tories, especially in the 'Soft South' for so many years." (British Perspectives 1991 69)

16) The extended boom of 1982-90 therefore provided the material conditions for the strengthening of the bourgeois ideas. The move to the right in the tops of the Labour Party and trade unions did not fall from the sky. It was based on the material conditions - the boom - and it reflected this shift within society. What other explanation can there possibly be?

17) For a more rounded out explanation of general perspectives then of course, given the complex period, other contradictory processes are at work. The polarisation of wealth, the increase in poverty, the social decay, the disintegration of the infrastructure have all led to increased bitterness amongst certain layers of the class. While the bosses have been able to buy relative 'social peace' in industry, reflected by the lowest number of strikes since the 1930s, the increased exploitation of the 1980s has meant growing resentment at the intolerable stress that bears down on the workforce, "The illusions in capitalism and the capitalist market will be burned out by the experience of workers themselves" (British Perspectives 1991 159).

18) The "majority" document itself recognises that the boom of the 1980s, the shift to the right in the tops of the movement, together with the collapse of Stalinism has had an affect on the class:

"Conditions determine consciousness, and these changes have inevitably had a big effect on the working class. The older layers of workers, with experience of activity within the Labour Party and trade unions retain a loyalty to those organisations, although many are bitterly disappointed and disgusted by the current leadership and have dropped out of activity." (For the Scottish Turn 17)

19) "At the same time, there is a new generation of younger workers, who have grown up during the Thatcher era and whose view of the labour movement is conditioned by Kinnock and the right wing trade union leaders". (For the Scottish Turn 18)

"There are different layers of the working class, with different levels of consciousness and varying political moods." (For the Scottish Turn 21)

Reaching the Working Class

20) Of course there are different layers and levels of consciousness in the working class. Because of our size we have always understood that the road to the unorganised, more politically backward sections of the class would be through the organised layers. For us, the organised layers were those involved in the labour movement, especially in the shop stewards committees, trade union branches, etc. It is true that an older layer has dropped by the wayside, but a younger layer is coming through which we must strive to win.

21) As the British Perspectives 1991 document said: "in industry itself, the shop stewards committees which are closest to the rank and file, have a mixed character-there is a layer who are prepared to fight..." (British Perspectives 1991, 157) it went on "a new generation of workers is growing up prepared to fight" (British Perspectives 1991, 160). We must find a road to these workers. Alongside our current methods of more open work on the streets and on the estates, we must strengthen our orientation towards the factories and workplaces, for example with the youth work. This is particularly the case now with the collapse of the Communist Party.

22) However, we must not make the fatal mistake of believing that these layers have all seen through Kinnock, the Labour Party and reformism. Some, for example, who reject Neil Kinnock, look to John Smith or one of the other right wingers as an alternative. With 12 years of Tory Government, as we get closer to the election, these layers will feel the need to get a Labour Government elected. However critical they are of Kinnock - and this is widespread - they nevertheless see the election in class terms. Those who are seen to damage this prospect will be cut off from these workers. They may be put off by the pro-capitalist policies of the Labour leaders, but at this stage they see no mass alternative.

On the other hand widespread illusions exist in what a Labour Government could do, particularly amongst the trade union activists. Despite the hedging of the leadership, there is a belief that Labour would improve education, health, transport, etc. Moreover the call for a minimum wage of £3.40 an hour could become an important issue for millions of low-paid workers.

23) The road to the most downtrodden workers, and youth, disillusioned with "politics" and alienated from the labour movement (because of the actions of the leaders), is through the organised layers of the class who are emerging in the stewards committees, workplaces etc.

A Turn or Open Work?

24) The proposed 'Turn' with the establishment of an open revolutionary organisation/party will not provide the bridge to these layers. On the contrary, we can damage ourselves in their eyes by embarking on this adventure. Our great advantage in the past was to be perceived by these workers as part of the Labour Party, but at the same time separate from it. We were seen as a socialist minority fighting the reformism of the labour leaders, not from outside of the labour movement, but as a component, but independent part of it. This was a colossal capital for us in the eyes of these workers, even if they did not agree with us totally at this stage.

25) It is clear from the debate, that many comrades are still unclear about what is meant by the new 'turn'. It has been promoted by the leadership as 'all things to all comrades'. The 'turn' has been promoted as "more open work" especially in England and Wales. This is then lumped in with the "even more open work" in Scotland.

26) To begin with, the question of "more open work" is a complete red-herring, and is being used as a smokescreen to launch an open revolutionary organisation/party, starting in Scotland, then in England and Wales as we are emptied out of the party, within a measurable period of time.

27) There is no disagreement over "more open work". In reality it is nothing new. What have we been doing in the poll tax battle if not "more open work"? What have we been doing with the YRC if not "more open work"? What have we been doing for the last five years if not "more open work"? We are in favour of continuing this policy of "more open work", providing it does not conflict with our perspectives, strategy, or our fundamental method of work.

29) The proposal, which will have colossal consequences for our work nationally and internationally, is for us to declare ourselves an open revolutionary organisation/party. The original Scottish document falsely declared that the problem we face is that the image of the tendency among some of the advanced layers could be that of "a loose pressure group inside the Labour Party". (Scotland, Perspectives and Tasks 107)

30) The document refers to the examples of open public organisations such as the SWP and the Scottish National Party. Only by setting ourselves up as an open revolutionary organisation/party "we can attract towards us the best fighting elements of the working class and youth in Scotland who are already looking for an alternative to Kinnock's Labour Party" (Scotland, Perspectives and Tasks 107, our emphasis). The turn is therefore clearly attempting to establish an open revolutionary party as an alternative to the Labour Party in Scotland.

31) The Scottish document explains this must be done "even if this means mass expulsions from the Labour Party". (Scotland, Perspectives and Tasks 108). There can be no doubt that all our forces will be expelled if they are associated with this "open revolutionary alternative to the Labour Party".

32) To believe, as the document says, "with our friendly approach facing towards the party it will make little difference to our position within the broad labour movement" (Scotland, Perspectives and Tasks 108), is to completely underestimate the damage such a step would mean. The proposal is to establish an organisation/party that will stand candidates in the general election, Scottish Assembly elections, regional and district elections against the Labour Party.

Especially now with a growing mood for unity in the labour movement in the run-up to a general election, such an action will cut ourselves off from labour workers in the unions, shop stewards committees, and workplaces.

33) Comrades will object that this revolutionary organisation is not a party. But whatever we say, if we establish an open organisation with all the trappings of a party, standing candidates against the Labour Party, then the workers will see it as a party.

34) To compare our organisation/party with that of the old Communist Party, especially in Scotland, lacks all sense of proportion. The Communist Party established itself over half a century in the factories, pits, shipyards, etc with the colossal authority behind it of the Russian Revolution and the Communist International. It created powerful points of support in the trade unions and shop stewards committees as well as the factories. Any damage they did in standing against Labour was made up by their powerful position they already had in the workplaces. Despite the support for some of our key comrades, we are far from establishing this position at the present time. Standing against Labour can erect barriers to our work in the trade unions and amongst those Labour workers still loyal (at this stage) to their traditional organisations.

35) The consequences of establishing an open revolutionary party in Scotland will have dramatic consequences for our work in England and Wales. With one Labour Party and one trade union movement, there is no "political Hadrian's Wall" separating Scotland from the rest of Britain. The line of the paper promoting the revolutionary party in Scotland, its activities and election campaigns, will make it unsuitable as an entrist paper in our work. The idea of using a Scottish supplement will fool no one as it will be regarded obviously as the same paper. In any case the paper nationally will have to support and justify the line in Scotland, just as we had to support it in Walton. We would be rapidly expelled - not for campaigning for our socialist programme but promoting an open revolutionary party standing in elections against Labour. It would also tend to undermine our work in the trade unions, especially those affiliated to the Labour Party.

36) This is not a secondary question but a crucial difference. If you are expelled for defending the working class then you retain the sympathy of workers who believe that you have been victimised by the leadership. To be expelled for promoting a separate revolutionary party and standing candidates against Labour will be seen by workers in an entirely different light, especially in the run-up to the General Election. We will be regarded as having provoked our own expulsion from the Labour Party.

37) The comrades object when we say that the organisation will be breaking from the Labour Party if we adopt the new 'turn'. We don't believe that it is the intention of comrades to 'rip up their cards' (although we have made the serious error of allowing hundreds of comrades to do so in the last few years by not renewing their membership), but their very actions in promoting the open revolutionary party in Scotland will be regarded by Labour workers as consciously breaking from Labour. This will be all the more so as we are recognised as having had a consistent approach to the labour party. Workers will sec us as moving away from the Labour Party, and we will lose all the sympathy that we had built up through our consistent patient approach over the years. It will weaken our trade union work and erode our base in industry.

A Full-Scale Purge?

38) If the 'turn' goes through, then within a relatively short period all our forces will be emptied out of the Labour Party nationally. Some leading comrades have argued that we will be expelled in any case so what's the problem. "A full scale purge is on the cards irrespective of whatever action we take" (Scotland, Perspectives and Tasks 110). To begin with, even if Labour wins, a complete purge of our comrades is not inevitable. The witch-hunt is a struggle of living forces. To say it is "on the cards irrespective' is to have a fatalistic approach.

39) Although the witch-hunt has accelerated over the last few years, the amazing feature has been the slow progress of expulsions. The right-wing first threatened to purge us all in the late 1970s. The fact that only about 220 have been expelled to date is a testimony to our tenacity and superior tactics, as well as the basic democratic traditions of the labour movement. Nevertheless, as in the 1950s with its struggle against the Bevanites, the bureaucracy has carried out suspensions of MPs, councillors, and Constituency Labour Parties, as well as the exclusion of potential members. We explained at the beginning of the year, in British Perspectives 1991: "As the leadership and its hangers-on move to the right, witch-hunts against class fighters are inevitable. It could not be ruled out that the expulsion of Marxists, in the event of a labour victory could be attempted on a far wider scale than up to now." (British Perspectives 1991, 168).

40) In contrast to the categorical fashion in which the issue is now posed by those who favour the 'turn', the witch-hunt was then, in January 1991, explained in much more conditional and balanced terms. Of course, the witch-hunt has proceeded and intensified, especially in Liverpool, but we must avoid taking a fatalistic view of the outcome. It is precisely the tactics of Walton, followed by the Turn that will make a mass purge far more likely.

41) Our work in the Labour Party would be wrecked, despite the incredible view of the NEB majority that Labour Party work would become an "auxiliary", and that "we should strive to maintain all points of support we have inside the Labour Party and strive to develop aspects of this activity more tightly". (For the Scottish Turn resolution, and para 12 in Scotland Perspectives and Tasks document). How could it be 'auxiliary' or 'maintained' when we are all out of the party? We cannot be blind to the real consequence of this new 'turn'.

42) Does it matter if we are all expelled? We have spent 40 years in the Labour Party conducting entrism not as Trotsky perceived it, but as long term work in the mass organisation. Incidentally, it is not simply a long-term orientation to the mass organisation, as this would mean we were an organisation outside of the Labour Party facing towards it. This has not been the case for four decades.

43) As we explained previously, the entrism of the 1930s and 1940s was based on Trotsky's classical conception. It presupposed a ferment inside social democracy and the crystallisation of a mass loft wing moving in the direction of Marxism, which the revolutionary party would enter and win over to the revolutionary standpoint. For Trotsky it was a short-term tactic. The perspective was for the rapid development of the revolutionary party at this time. What we have been conducting over the last 40 years was not classical entrism. The conditions for this tactic have never existed in Britain during that whole period. Our work was of a qualitatively different nature. We developed, extended and enriched Trotsky's ideas of the 1930s and adopted them to the period from 1950 onwards.

44) The references to the RCP and the debate around entrism in the 1940s misses the point completely. That discussion was based wholly on Trotsky's classical conception of entrism and the perspective of a rapid development of the revolutionary party. There was no question of long-term work in the Labour party as we have been doing. The consequences of openwork were therefore fundamentally different. We have to take into consideration the damage to decades of work we have already put in, and the jeopardy to our present and future work. On this will depend the key question of building of a mass organisation in the future.

45) The reason why we talk of the threat to forty and not sixty years work is not to be clever and avoid Trotsky's ideas in the 1930s, but to refer to our particular work in the mass organisations and the colossal capital that we have built up arising from this work. If comrades want to discuss 'entrism' in general, then why not take the experiences back 70 years to Lenin's attitude to the Labour Party or even further back to Marx and Engels - as Trotsky had done? That would be fruitful, but our main concern arising from these concrete proposals is the danger to our consistent approach to the mass organisations over the last four decades.

46) Incidentally the reference to our turn towards the Communist Party in 1956 to show our flexibility is breathtaking. The Communist Party was in absolute crisis after the Hungarian events with large layers of its membership in turmoil. At this stage the organisation was posed to attract those workers leaving the Communist Party. Our comrades had been in the Labour Party five years and were only about 40 in number. The danger of a brief turn to these layers was minimal. The bureaucracy hardly knew of our existence, never mind concern itself with our activities. In fact, PT in the introduction to 'Entrism' poked fun (p2) at the Healyites for suggesting in their document 'Pabloism in Britain' that our 'main pivot of revolutionary activity as being the open organisation' (p2).

47) Instead, PT described our turn to the Communist Party as "fields where a certain amount of attention must be devoted". This episode lasted a matter of months. We had nothing to lose from it and everything to gain. Today things are entirely different. If we now set up the open revolutionary party then we would have much to lose and little to gain. To quote further from PT's introduction:

"A great opportunity will be presented to us to develop as a mass tendency in the conditions which will develop in Britain in the next decade. But on one condition - that our comrade correctly absorb the lessons of our work within the Labour Party and theoretically arm ourselves for the coming period. We have carved out for ourselves a favourable position from which big advances can be made. We have remained firm on principles, on our programme, and flexible in the way we work in the mass organisation (our emphasis) We could have succumbed to the moods of opportunism and its twin adventurism, as did the sects. Comrades can satisfy themselves that we resisted both pressures...We can be justifiably proud of our achievements. But the real history of the tendency is only just beginning. We are only at the start of real entry work with the outline of those conditions laid down by Trotsky just beginning to take shape". (p5, our emphasis).

48) At that stage PT was clear that our work was not orientating towards the mass organisations but was actually in the mass organisations.

49) Although the development of events turned out to be more protracted than anticipated, the article correctly pointed to the opportunities that would begin to develop in the period of a Labour government. The article was written in 1973 on the eve of the Wilson-Callaghan government. As we predicted it was a government of counter-reform which pushed the trade unions to the left and produced a left wing in the Labour Party around Benn. The boom from 1982 largely cut across these developments in the Labour Party and provided the Tories with material conditions (as well as the outcome of the Falklands war) for electoral victories in 1983 and 1987. The Labour Party shifted to the right.

50) However, just before the 1987 general election, in a pamphlet on Liverpool, PT outlined the likely perspective if Labour came to power: "That government will be a right wing government in the manner of the Gonzalez government in Spain, the Papandreou government in Greece and the recently defeated Socialist government in France. It will come to power against the background of an economic crisis far worse than the one which faced the Labour Government of 1974-79.

"After an initial honeymoon period of perhaps 18 months to two years, an inevitable revolt will grow within the ranks of the trade unions and be reflected within the Labour Party. The ruling class and their shadows within the labour movement can see this. James Callaghan in an outburst at a meeting of Cardiff South Labour Party said that Labour was likely to win the next election, but would soon run into trouble within 18 months: 'Heaven help you if by then Marxists are still on the GMC." In other words the right wing understand that the Marxists can become a catalyst to the inevitable opposition of the rank and file to the retreat of the right wing."

51) We are facing a further general election in the next few months. The situation is very volatile. As explained above, we could be faced with a Kinnock government operating under far more difficult conditions that 1974-79. It will be a government of crisis possibly similar to the minority Labour governments of 1924,1929-31. It will be precisely in this period that the very conditions for classical entrism for which we have been preparing for 40 years may begin to mature, giving the revolutionary organisation tremendous possibilities for growth. And yet, it is at this very time that the comrades are proposing a tactic which will, in effect, dissolve the Labour Party work. Is it any wonder that we call the 'new turn' an ultra-left adventure?

52) Are we proposing to bury our heads in the Labour Party? Absolutely not. The preparation for a new Labour government must mean a consistent, well-orchestrated drive to the trade unions. Industrial work must assume, not in words but in deeds, a vital cutting edge to the work of the organisation in the next period. The reaction to the counter-reforms of a Labour government will come first in the trade unions and industry. This will then become reflected in the Labour Party itself. We are likely to see a re-run of the radicalisation of 1977-81, but on a much higher level. Unfortunately, the new turn will completely undermine our position and isolate us from these shifts to the left in the Labour Party.

53) The comrades argue that we will all get back into the Labour Party later. However, according to the majority document "No one has advanced a rosy, abstract 'tidal wave' theory, with 'the Labour left welcoming us back with open arms.' This is the Minority's own invention." (For the Scottish Turn 285). Yet it is the original Scottish document that we read the following: "Moreover, when such a tidal wave takes place, it would become almost impossible for the forces of Marxism to be excluded from the Party." (Scotland, Perspectives and Tasks 37, our emphasis). Clearly the 'tidal wave' theory is not an invention of the minority, but expressed bluntly the tremendous difficulties of us getting back into the Party, unless there was a pre-revolutionary crisis in society.

54) In fact the Scottish document draws analogies with pre- revolutionary Spain and France in 1934. This, however, is a mechanical view of the formation of a left in the mass organisations. It will not be built in one big bang which allows all the expelled to be drawn back in. The left in the Labour Party will emerge through all sorts of partial struggles of the class over a period of time.

55) The view of the EB majority is contradicted by the latest edition of the theoretical journal (TJ). This says: "a new left wing would develop in the Labour Party but this time it would be a working class left, based on the trade unions, with our supporters to the fore. Then the majority who have been expelled today would return."(p 7-8 our emphasis).

56) Here everything seems so easy and simple. There is no talk of a tidal wave or a pre-revolutionary situation, only the development of a left wing. However, the bureaucracy has had more than 50 years experience in fighting infiltrations from the Stalinists and 40 years fighting the Trotskyists. Lists of expelled would be excluded. It would take big events to get us back in - if it was possible to make a second turn after being so long outside of the Labour Party. Moreover, even new comrades won in the future would be linked to the paper which would be seen as having broken from the Labour Party.

57) The tragedy is that as the left begins to develop we will still be outside of the party. We will have renounced participation in the formation of the left from the beginning. We would have handed it over to the left-reformists on a plate. Without the turn it is likely that we could have played a decisive role in the early stages of the left's development in the party. Now that will be closed off.

58) As for perspectives in the eventuality of a Tory election victory, we stand by the explanation given in the British Perspectives 1991 document:

"after a certain period of despair, particularly at the tops of the movement, it would prepare the way for massive class battles in industry, reflecting themselves in the unions and the Labour Party. There would be struggles both in the public and private sectors. One layer after another would be forced into battle to defend their living standards. The timing of these events is not possible to determine exactly. It could unfold within six or twelve months depending on the recession. A Labour defeat would see the likely removal of Kinnock as Labour leader and a battle open up for the succession. Under these conditions it could not be ruled out that a struggle within the apparatus of the party could trigger off a movement from below. This could serve to draw a layer of workers into the party." (British Perspectives 1991, 140, Our emphasis)

59) Yet according to the EB majority in the theoretical journal, less than six months after the above statement was endorsed, we read the opposite view: "If the Tories win the election ... there will be ructions in the Labour Party and the trade unions but this would not compel workers to move into activity in the party."(p8, our emphasis). What made us change our minds so radically in five months?

60) The EB majority is attempting to revise perspectives to play down any possibility of a leftward development in the Labour Party for 4 or 5 years or even 8 years according to some leading majority speakers. This delay, they maintain, is due to the counter-revolution undertaken by Kinnock and the elimination of party democracy. But wasn't this understood at the time of the national event last January? At that time we all agreed that: "The illusions that the Party leadership have settled matters by tying up the Labour Party constitution in order to try and guarantee a permanent right wing majority will be shattered by events"? (British Perspectives 1991 189). And again, "The laws of the class struggle are much stronger than the conspiracies, schemes and calculations of right-wing officials in the Labour Party and trade unions."(British Perspectives 1991 156). To justify their turn the leadership exaggerate the power of the Labour Party bureaucracy to hold back the tide of events, as if their will alone will forever determine the character of the Labour Party. One leading comrade in Wales, even went as far as comparing Kinnock's grip on the Labour Party to the grip Stalin held on the CPSU!

61) To shore up their proposals, those in favour of the turn have raised the example of Greece to show how expelled comrades can be readmitted. All the Greek comrades were expelled in the mid 1970s from PASOK. They were recently readmitted into the party by a groundswell towards the left. However what is important from the Greek experience is the fact that they did not set up an open revolutionary organisation/party - despite the fact they were all expelled. They were always considered supporters of the Marxist paper and expelled members of PASOK.

62) Their "open" work, referred to in the 'majority' document, (For the Scottish Turn 279), did not constitute declaring an open revolutionary party on the lines of the Scottish Turn but was on the lines of our past work. They did not stand in any general election against PASOK but on the contrary campaigned energetically for PASOK candidates. We did stand as independents in local elections, twice. However, the traditions in Greece are entirely different to Britain. In the local elections there is a tradition of many independent candidates who stand against the PASOK slate. Often they win and are then invited to join PASOK. No one has been expelled in Greece for standing independently in local elections. In Sweden and Ireland the comrades stood independently in local elections where list and proportional representation electoral systems meant there was no danger of splitting the vote. In Britain, the proposed 'turn' would place us in a totally different position, and establish barriers between ourselves and the Labour workers.

As an aside, the attempt to justify the turn by publishing AW's comments on Spain is completely false from beginning to end. The material relates to the concrete conditions and circumstances in Spain, at a time when there had been a right wing Socialist Party government in power for almost a decade and where virtually all the comrades have been expelled from PSOE for ten years. How can this possibly compare with the situation in Britain with 220 expulsions, 11 years of Tory government and standing on the eve of a general election.

63) The comrades argue that we were fully justified in standing in Walton because of the special conditions in Liverpool and the attacks by the right wing council on the achievements of the 47.

'The key consideration for supporters at each stage was how best to defend the gains made by the 47 and preserve the morale and combatively of the most advanced Liverpool workers." (Theoretical Journal p6)

64) According to the EB majority document Kilfoyle personified the "counter-revolution". "To have given Kilfoyle a clear run would have been seen as an ignominious retreat." "the balance sheet of the campaign entirely justifies our decision..." (For the Scottish Turn 166).

65) There are many individuals - particularly in the PLP -who personify the "counter-revolution" in the Labour Party and the abandonment of the principles of socialism and the class struggle, but we have never suggested that the way we fight them is to stand against them in elections. What is going to happen in the general election - are we now going to stand again against Kilfoyle so that he does not get a "clear run"? After all does he not still represent the "counter-revolution" in Liverpool?

66) If it would have been "criminal" and a "dereliction of duty" not to stand in June, as the paper said at the time, then the same would apply in the general election. However the comrades are rather cool about this idea now after the experience of the bye-election. They realise that the result would be far worse in the general election. How does all this experience help defend the gains of the 47?

67) The comrades talk about the balance sheet being justified. Yet it is clear we completely misjudged the mood of the class, hoping the reformist trade union leaders locally would escalate the industrial action against the council. We also misjudged the way the working class themselves saw the bye-election. The comrades hoped it would be a repeat of the May elections, despite the warnings of the Opposition at the time. The vote itself showed the way the workers viewed both elections completely differently. In the May elections, the Broad Left candidates, as well as being closely linked with the fight against cuts and redundancies, were seen as the legitimate Labour candidates. The imposed official candidates were completely identified with the counter-reforms of the Council. That is why in the one ward in Walton where the Broad Left stood in May, in Anfield, the Broad Left candidate got 1,600 votes and Labour came third. And yet in the bye-election we managed to get just 1,000 more votes throughout the whole constituency, despite all the resources that were put in to win the seat.

68) The workers in Walton did not want to undermine Labour's chances at the approaching general election. We warned of this beforehand, but the comrades were blinded by their feelings towards Kilfoyle and did not take a rounded out view of the situation and the implications that flowed from it.

69) But the leadership suggested victory was possible to the rank and file comrades. We were told things were neck and neck. PT stated we would get 10-15-20,000 votes. FC believed we were heading for another by-election defeat for Labour similar to Govan. As a result of these high expectations, the target for growth was doubling or trebling the ranks in Liverpool. BI went as far as to put forward the doubling and trebling of the ranks nationally. Where did all this appear on the balance sheet'?

70) DC (Liverpool) in the paper stated that the struggle was between Labour and Real Labour, that the Liberals were a spent force. Yet on the day, there was a 13% swing to the Liberal Democrats who came second. In fact if we had picked up an extra 6,000 votes from Labour (which the comrades hoped for), it would have resulted in victory for the Liberal Democrats!

71) In June DC explained in the paper: "Now a genuine workers party is in the making (the Broad Left)...But the official party is withering on the vine. It will have no activists and declining support." He also agreed in the paper in April with Eric Heffer's statement that "without the left the Labour Party would 'become like the dodo -extinct'". This completely underestimates the colossal reserves of support the Labour Party has not only nationally but in Liverpool. Without the left, the Labour Party will probably gain over 10 million votes in the next election. It is far from extinct or declining in support. Whereas the "genuine workers party", the Broad Left, as the Opposition we predicted in June, has already split in Liverpool after a few months.

72) In the paper, the whole tone was of a great success in Walton. "2,600 Votes For Socialism" was the banner headline. There was no mention of a defeat. The stand of the Broad Left against Labour has even been compared in the paper to Keir Hardie's stand against the Liberal Party in the period before the formation of the Labour Party. This comparison was made in the paper without any qualification. The clear implication - which will seriously miseducate newer comrades - is that the Broad Left is the 'new' Labour Party replacing the old 'Liberal' Labour Party. How can the present Labour Party be seriously compared with the major capitalist party of the last century? Again there is an attempt to blur the class character of the Labour Party to justify the "fundamental" change in its character. Ever since the election there has been an attempt to re-write the history of Walton and play down what was promised and what was really achieved.

73) To say that if the Broad Left didn't stand, that our position was to give full support to Kilfoyle is a complete distortion. What have we done in every general election or bye-election in the past. For us it is a class question of supporting the Labour Party against the bourgeois parties, irrespective of their candidates. But this is not unconditional. We should have campaigned (independently) for a Labour vote, an immediate general election and Labour to power on a socialist programme. We would have firmly criticised Kilfoyle's programme and record, and put forward our own. This is exactly what we would do in a general election. What else are the comrades suggesting - abstention, or what? They remain embarrassingly silent over this issue as they don't like to admit that Kilfoyle will be given "a clear run" and we will have to give him critical support.

75) Walton provided the political climate to move against our public representatives. You won't find it on the charge sheet, but it was made clear at the time that this constituted the key opportunity to move against us. As the "Independent" (26 September, 1991) explained, "the (Labour) leadership is adamant it was the challenge by a Broad Left candidate against the official Labour candidate in the Walton by- election that galvanised Labour into rooting out remaining militants out of the party."

76) We are accused of failing "to answer the case made out in Scotland: Perspectives and Tasks 1991." (For the Scottish Turn 197). The whole of our original document was an answer to the proposed 'turn'. But in addition we are accused of not dealing sufficiently with the problem of Scottish nationalism.

77) To begin with, we stand by the position put in the British Perspectives 1991 document which dealt in outline with Scottish nationalism and the likely perspectives that flowed from it.

78) The crisis of capitalism has led to a revival of the national question in Scotland and Wales. The incapacity of reformism to solve the problems of the working class and middle class provides fertile ground for the nationalists. The de-industrialisation of Wales and Scotland, with the destruction of much of the basic industries, has resulted in an exodus to the South-East in search of work. This in turn has reinforced the genuine aspirations of the Scottish and Welsh people for greater control over their lives. This has been reflected in opinion polls and the support for elected assemblies.

In the coming general election, Labour will win the overwhelming majority of the working class vote. However, added to this is Labour's promise to establish a Scottish Assembly.

80) Despite the actions of the reformist leaders, there still remains an overwhelming loyalty of the Scottish working class to its traditional organisations. This was reflected when Dick Douglas, who resigned as a Labour MP and stood in the regional elections as Independent Labour against a right wing pro-poll tax Labour candidate and was defeated. This was despite his reputation as an MP, and his support for mass non-payment, etc.

81) The shift of layers of youth towards the nationalists is of course a potential danger. The fact that they have not turned towards the YRC and its revolutionary banner, despite the efforts of the comrades, means that they do not at this stage see it as a real alternative. The same would be also be true of a small revolutionary organisation/party.

82) In the event of a Tory victory, with the disillusionment and despair, there could be a move in the direction of nationalism. This however is not automatic. Much will depend upon the national and international situation and the events in the industrial field. As the original Scottish document stated, "In this complex period, perspectives are of necessity conditional. For instance, nationalism could be held in check if a huge wave of industrial conflict were to engulf Britain. In the miners' strike of 1984-85 nationalist sentiment was completely eclipsed by class loyalty and the Scottish National Party was driven into the political wilder-ness."(Scotland, Perspectives and Tasks 93). Despite the Scottish National Party's left face. the future movement of the working class in Scotland and nationally will certainly serve to cut the ground from under their feet. In this context, the article in the paper in September covering perspectives for Scottish nationalism, was inadequate as it did not deal with the possibility of trade union struggle checking a movement towards nationalism.

83) If Labour wins, after 12 years of Toryism, there will be enormous credit given, temporarily, to the Kinnock government, especially if it promises to create a Scottish Assembly. This very act would serve to temporarily cut across nationalism. There will be a honeymoon period.

When they move on to counter-reforms, a reaction and disillusionment will develop. Under these conditions there could be a renewed move towards nationalism in Scotland and Wales.

84) As we explained in the British Perspectives 1991, "The development of industrial struggles in England, Wales and Scotland would tend to unify the workers and lead to a decline of nationalism and nationalist parties. Similarly, the development of a mass, left opposition within the Labour Party and trade unions, with the forces of Marxism playing a prominent role, would provide a powerful counter-attraction to those sections of the working class and youth currently looking towards the Scottish National Party." (British Perspectives 1991 203). Unfortunately, the turn will serve to undermine this position as all our forces will be outside of the Party.

85) We never attempted to over exaggerate the dangers of nationalism. This is being done now to panic the comrades into accepting the new 'turn'. Suddenly Scottish nationalism becomes the major threat. According to a leading Scottish comrade, "I predict that the campaign around a Scottish Assembly will assume even greater political proportions than the campaign against the poll tax - in other words, mass civil disobedience to force a Tory government to grant an assembly or a Labour government to allow it to work."(our emphasis). We believe this is a complete exaggeration of the situation. Although we do not discount a movement over this issue, to equate with the mass movement against the poll tax is to completely mislead the comrades. If nationalism was such a danger why the extremely scant coverage in the paper over the last 12 months? This year there has only been one article on Scottish nationalism, and that was the centre page article last month.

86) The question of Scottish nationalism has been exaggerated and drawn in to back up arguments for the turn. If it was so vital, why did the lead-off and summing-up by FT [Full time worker for the Militant] at the April NEB discussion on the turn hardly mention a single word about Scottish nationalism? Because in April it was not the issue at all. The argument was that the poll tax is coming to an end, there is a periphery around us in Scotland and we need an open banner to recruit them. The only fleeting reference to Scottish nationalism was PT arguing to put up candidates to the Scottish Assembly (when it comes about) so as not to give the Scottish National Party a free run. That was all that was said about nationalism.

87) Nevertheless, our main argument remains. If there was a movement of youth towards the Scottish National Party, to imagine a small organisation like ours could head this off is deluding ourselves. They would not be attracted to a small open revolutionary organisation / party.

88) 'But didn't we lead 2 million in Scotland over the poll tax?' we are asked. But that was entirely different. Millions were being faced with staggering bills they were unable to pay. There was no leadership from the labour movement. A huge ground swell built up against the poll tax. We were able to step in and articulate this mood, and give it an organised expression. Workers looked to us when we said "Don't panic. Don't pay. We will defend you. Stick together as they can't deal with us all." etc. Whole layers looked to us for advice and a lead. This was a classic instance where a tiny force can become a leadership of millions.

89) The Poll Tax campaign has been a tremendous achievement for our organisation. We can be truly proud of our successes. However, we also need to have a sense of proportion That is not to be, as the EB majority say' the role of sceptics, raising doubts and difficulties (For the Scottish Turn 199) We have to be honest with ourselves and not bury our heads in the sand.

90) To quote the comrades "Even if we accept this figure (of 300 active comrades in Scotland), has not our organisation been able to act as a lever on millions of workers? Do we not have an enormous periphery with tremendous authority amongst wide layers of workers?" (For the Scottish Turn 217)

91) On the poll tax, by and large, we were swimming with the stream. We articulated the mood of workers. They supported us over that particular issue. We built up respect for our work and achievements. To believe that we can translate our success on the poll tax into fighting nationalism is to completely misread the situation.

92) Let us be clear, our entrist tactic has not impeded any of our independent work over the last period. To blame our lack of recruitment from the poll tax on our entrist image' is to make a fundamental error. "While the image of the tendency among some of the most advanced layers could be that of only a loose pressure group inside the Labour Party we are forced to fight with one hand tied behind our back. Only with an open, public organisation can we attract towards us the best fighting elements.." (Scotland, Perspectives and Tasks 107) The new 'turn' is clearly borne out of this frustration. It is an attempted organisational solution to a political problem.

93) The whole 'turn' is posed as a gamble. According to the comrades if the gamble doesn't succeed then we would have lost nothing in trying. PT at the April NEB asked: "what is to be lost for us testing out the water in Scotland on this initiative... we may end up without any results or we may get 2,000. It won't make a fundamental difference to the tendency if we take this initiative." Again later on: "There are no guarantees, it may or may not work out." (Transcript of tape recording of NEB meeting, 10 April 1991)

94) So confident were the EB majority that they were not sure if we would get bold results from this gamble - one that threatens 40 years work, and the emptying of all our forces out of the Labour Party.

The April NEB

95) A myth has been fostered about the NEB meeting in April. The comrades state in the Majority document that when the proposals for new tactics were put forward in April, not one leading comrade opposed them. (For the Scottish Turn 9) This is being somewhat economical with the truth.

96) After a 20 minute emergency EB meeting on the last morning of the NEB, the proposal of the Scottish Turn was taken to a surprised NEB. Nobody knew of this proposal beforehand which was squeezed into the session on standing independent candidates in Liverpool.

97) Incidentally, there was no mention at the EB about Scottish nationalism. In fact the proposal to establish some open organisation was still quite vague. The complete minutes of the EB meeting 10 April read as follows:

"1. Present: 10 comrades

2. NEB agenda PT reported that in the discussion with the Scottish comrades, it had been agreed that there would be a big advantage in us establishing some open organisation which could appeal to the thousands who had been pulled around us during the campaign against the poll tax. After some discussion, it was agreed that this be put to the NEB meeting in view of the urgency and the changes taking place in the poll tax campaign at the moment. The name and launching details would have to be worked out with them, but generally, we should first get the approval of the NEB. End"

98) At the full NEB, PT explained the position. "Very tentatively and very hesitantly we have arrived at these conclusions. It is not true to say that we have arrived at them in the last week. We have been pondering this for quite a while. But it came to a point in a commission meeting and I think it is correct to bring it before the NEB. Even if it is aired in order to get clarity if possible on the issue. ' (transcript)

99) It is amazing that the most serious turn in our history was being pondered 'for quite a while", when the elected leadership knew nothing about it until the day it was announced

100) At the NEB many comrades were taken aback Clearly many supported the proposal, but others were against or had serious doubts.

101) PT was forced to acknowledge this opposition when he replied. "If we had produced a document and come back to the next NEB, I do not exclude that we would have more agreement perhaps than what appears at this particular time, but we would have missed a golden opportunity' (our emphasis.)

102) The attempt to re-write history by the EB majority goes a little further. Their document now claims that "Plans were made for a thorough discussion throughout the tendency before any firm decision would be taken. There was no lack of democracy" (For the Scottish Turn 9.)

103) The fact of the matter is there was no plan, beyond the normal NEB report backs, for a discussion in the ranks or for a special conference. The Scottish Turn was to be immediately implemented from that April NEB and reviewed at the following NEB in June. This was only changed when opposition to the turn emerged in the ranks after the NEB report backs. This was particularly the case in Scotland, where more time was now needed to convince the comrades of this drastic change. It was an aggregate in Manchester/Lancs which passed a motion, moved by a comrade who now supports the Opposition, overwhelmingly demanding a National Council to discuss the issue that finally changed the EB's mind.

104) But even after the April NEB there was confusion of what was being proposed and decided. For example, within a week DC (W Mids) wrote to the EB (15 April, 1991) saying the proposals were: "tentative steps indicated in Scotland (our emphasis) ... the obvious danger in some NEB members minds is ultra-leftism, a looking away from the mass organisations - this may not be too great a problem with existing comrades but will be a greater problem with new, and future comrades joining under a more open policy" (emphasis in original.)

105) PT had stressed at the NEB the need to immediately implement the proposal: "We must begin now to take the initiative. It's not an attempt to bounce the meeting. Let's give it a go in relation to Scotland, then at a future CC we can re-appraise the position."

106) The whole weight of the leadership was used to push the proposal through. In the words of PT, "I don't know whether we can arrive at definite conclusions today, but I think it will be a grave mistake for the meeting not to agree...

"In Scotland we are proposing to establish an organisation called M[ilitant] Labour Federation, aiming at a big conference of 1,000 to join the organisation. It is not a parallel organisation, it is our organisation, where we could bring in 100s and 1,000s of workers who will start maybe at £1 a week subs - of course it will be different for the cadres."

"It is not the green light for us to proclaim a national independent party. It is an important point of departure in Scotland ... I must say at face value there is a case for it in Wales as well, of testing the water.

"But we are not proposing it. Don't comrades, because some areas believe it applies to them,... say let's postpone it until we can discuss the national implications ...

"If we agree on this particular initiative, then the worse thing we can do is to prevaricate, hesitate, 'will we, won't we', 'what are the dangers, difficulties'. When we arrive at something we take it to the rank and file, the best workers, we jump in the water and take (the) initiative as far as we can. There are no guarantees; it may or may not work out, but it would be criminal for us not to take what the comrades say - there is that periphery. If we get an audience of 1,000, let's get them..."

107) In relation to the proposal being solely for Scotland, everything was qualified. At this stage it was for Scotland. PT went on "In the West of Scotland we have the strength to take this initiative. There are all kinds of implications for the rest of the country. To put it forward in Hampshire would be ludicrous, to put it forward in other areas would be a nonsense at this particular stage. The organisational nationally has not arrived at that position. We may be there in 6 or 12 months time."(our emphasis).

108) The consequences of adopting the new 'turn' were never really brought out. In fact the idea was stressed that it wouldn't make any fundamental difference. The question of Scottish nationalism was only referred to by PT in one sentence. At that time it was not the issue at all. Subsequently it has become a central issue! The key issue in April was the large periphery that was around us in Scotland and the best means to win them.

109) The new 'Turn' was born out of this frustration at the lack of growth from the poll tax battle. In fact, in terms of comrades, locals, districts, etc we are weaker now in Scotland than we were two years ago. This is not to denigrate the sterling efforts of the Scottish comrades and the undoubted standing and respect which many comrades have on the housing schemes, etc, but merely to face up to the real situation, and to understand the reasons for it.

110) Although we have a periphery around us from our work on the poll tax, it has been very difficult to recruit them. They have great respect for our work in the campaign, but joining a revolutionary organisation is a different matter entirely. To think we can overcome this political problem (which we face nationally) by an organisational measure is to fool ourselves. It is not our "image" that repels them, no matter how high our banner, but the seemingly difficult prospects of building a revolutionary organisation in the coming period.

The real reason for our lack of growth is not the potential for building, but the lack of cadres that could politically convince the periphery of the need to join us. Unlike in the early 1980s or the miners' strike, it is more difficult at the present time to recruit. Because of the complexity of the situation far more patient discussion is needed to convince and consolidate contacts. The whole argument of the turn is false from beginning to end. If alt that is needed is an open revolutionary banner, why have not big layers of the youth in Scotland turned to the YRC?

Party Building

111) It has been posed frequently in debates: "What kind of organisation do you want for the 1990s? What is your alternative to the 'Turn'?"

112) We want a strong, outward-looking organisation -with a healthy internal regime - built on firm foundations and sound roots in the Labour Movement and the youth.

113) If we are going to develop a more effective organisation in the coming period then we need an honest balance-sheet of our past strengths and weaknesses. What are the pluses and minuses? What are the lessons of the past period? How are we equipped to tackle or face the tasks ahead?

114) The building of the organisation is a very complex task. However, the first prerequisite must be a self-acting and critical minded rank and file who must be fully involved in the decision making of the organisation. Comrades must feel free to question and criticise any decisions or proposals that they are not convinced about, without any fear of being labelled a 'conservative', 'pessimist' or worse, 'disloyal. Comrades must feel free to express opposition views - or even to join established factions, which is their democratic right - without the fear of the full weight of the FT apparatus being used to discredit and isolate them. We must welcome a mil, free and democratic discussion on all issues, as it is only through the clarity of ideas that the organisation can go forward. Internal democracy is the vital oxygen of the revolutionary organisation, at every level. Only on this basis can we develop a strong and healthy organisation.

115) For too long, there has been a tendency to take decisions at the top and relay them to the ranks without any meaningful dialogue. There has been a fear of real 'controversy' in the ranks as this might divert attention away from the everyday tasks of FF, papers, etc. This has resulted in a certain frustration in the ranks which must be overcome by an honest discussion over the way things have been run in the past, and how to improve them in the future.

116) We have correctly characterised the present period as a very complex one. The lengthy 'boom' of the 1980s and the collapse of Stalinism in particular have had an effect on the working class. In Britain we are faced with an industrial lull and the mass of workers are now looking to the electoral plane and the prospect of a Labour government. But even within this picture there are certain cross currents, especially amongst the youth.

117) We have previously recognised that if a Labour Government comes to power the organisation will face a difficult period initially. Only with the development of cadres can we hope to build and develop the organisation. We therefore need to take stock of the situation, and prepare the organisation to deal with these real problems and equip ourselves politically and organisationally for the tasks that lie ahead.

118) The organisation has made tremendous progress over the past decade. We have succeeded in establishing ourselves as a component section of the labour movement. We have recorded great successes in the class struggle, especially in Liverpool and the epic poll tax battle. We have become the largest organisation on the left, completely eclipsing the Stalinists. Many other gains, including on the parliamentary front, could provide us with big possibilities for future growth.

119) These past gains have been achieved by our correct programme, perspectives, and flexible methods. It is also based upon the self sacrifice of our comrades in their pioneering work in the labour movement. Resting on this colossal capital built up over decades, we can be confident - provided we avoid the pitfalls of ultra-leftism and opportunism - of our future growth and development.

120) In drawing up a balance sheet, it is necessary to have an honest appraisal, not only of our strengths and successes, but also of our weaknesses and mistakes. Only by correcting these deficiencies in sufficient time can we successfully lay the solid foundations for our transformation into a decisive political force over the coming years.

121) The complex political situation has not only had its effects upon the working class and its organisations, but also upon our own organisation itself. Despite our consistent intervention in struggles and the labour movement, we have faced a period of retrenchment in terms of comrades, locals, DCs [District Committees], paper sales, etc. In these terms we are far weaker than we were 5 years ago. Unfortunately the weakness of our cadre and our one-sided approach to party building have served to compound these problems.

122) In the past, the organisation has correctly pursued a bold recruitment policy. The need to draw workers and youth rapidly into our ranks was crucial if we were to capitalise on the potential that existed. This approach largely resulted in a sizable increase in the tendency up until 1987.

123) We recognised that such bold recruitment would mean a certain turnover in the ranks. This was regarded as acceptable as long as it remained at a relatively low level. However, turnover in the last 5 years has reached alarming proportions. The figures given at the last national event in January indicted a 50 per cent turnover on those given for the previous event. We have the development of a 'revolving door' syndrome. Even now, the majority of the ranks is composed of paper members -something in the past we were highly critical of the Communist Party for being. This has resulted not from more rapid recruitment, but grave deficiencies in consolidation and training and the complex objective situation. This high turnover has even affected the Full Time staff. We ought to have taken urgent action earlier to reverse this trend, and strengthen the cadre basis of the organisation. If this is not done, then the burden of work will tend to fall on fewer and tower shoulders. It will become like an inverted pyramid.

124) Consolidation is not an optional question that we can take or leave. The development of a cadre is a political task. The training of them is a prime responsibility of the organisation. How many times did we condemn the SLL/WRP for its method of pure activism, which destroyed countless workers and youth?

125) To tackle this serious problem is not to turn the tendency into a discussion circle. Activity and intervention in the class struggle is a vital ingredient in the training of cadres. To counter-pose one to the other is false from beginning to end. However, without the necessary balance and political training then we will be in danger of building on sand. That has been the salutary lesson of the past five years.

126) Of course, over the last two years in England and Wales (and in Scotland three), we have been heavily involved in the poll tax work. There appeared little time to consolidate the new recruits. But in that case it is even more important to be more conscious about education and training and to take special measures to redress the balance. This is vital given the very complex nature of the period.

127) The analogy with 1917 and the growth of the Bolshevik party from 8,000 to 240,000 with very limited cadres is false. The Bolshevik party was able to become a mass party due to the correct policy and tactics of Lenin, and the tumultuous events of that year. The revolutionary tasks were posed within a space of nine months. We are still at the very early stages of the revolutionary movement of the British working class. The development of the British revolution will be of a far more protracted character. The development of cadres if paramount in the building of the organisation in the next period. Without the necessary training of cadres, especially in this period, how is it possible to grow in the future to 10,000,20,000, and so on?

128) Although this weakness has been recognised formally in ample resolutions to numerous conferences, etc, little has been done in practise nationally to correct the situation. We must ensure that past decisions are translated into reality.

129) We therefore propose the immediate establishment of a department responsible for the systematic education and training of the organisation. That a special session be given at a NEB to consider the work and plans of such a department so that it can be integrated into all aspects of the work.

130) This far more balanced approach to party building and the training of our comrades, including the FT staff, will assist in regenerating the structures of the tendency, especially the locals. This is vital as healthy locals will moan a more healthy organisation overall.

131) In previous resolutions we have stressed the need for the locals to work out a strategy to penetrate the labour movement locally. It must be responsible for the organisational tasks in each field, and work out how they can be applied to local conditions. However, we must also re-establish the local as the key political unit of the organisation.

132) Unfortunately a whole layer of comrades, particularly industrial comrades, have tended to turn their back on the locals as they get very little from them, politically or organisationally. As one NEB member wrote to the EB there: "has been a drop in the political level and the loss of a layer of trained comrades. This has load to weaknesses in the branches." We have to rectify this by making them more relevant and attractive.

133) We must raise the level of the branches by assisting the education of newer comrades by the systematic organisation of special training schools, meetings, as well as other initiatives.

134) In relation to party building the organisation must reappraise the way targets are arrived at and implemented. There exists a widespread feeling that targets are decided upon from on high and simply handed down to the ranks without any consultation or full appreciation of the subjective weaknesses of the organisation. We must ensure a dialogue is carried out before all targets are agreed in future. For example, the target we set in January was 5,000 new comrades by the end of this year. We have no hope of achieving it, but instead of amending it, it was simply retained. Why didn't we face reality and do so? Over Walton, as explained, the target was for doubling and trebling the ranks - how many comrades actually believed or knew about the target? Such pie-in-the-sky targets, which were never even challenged by the NEB comrades, just serve to undermine the confidence of comrades in the targets proposed nationally. There is a feeling that the leadership is out of touch. We must have an attentive ear to those who raise doubts or opposition to proposed targets. It is far too easy to write off these genuine doubts as 'conservative', instead of patiently discussing with and hopefully convincing the comrades of their correctness, or they the leadership with their unrealistic proposals.

135) What this feeling reflects is a lack of genuine involvement of the ranks in the decision making of the organisation. From this flows the need to ensure the widest internal democracy and fullest participation in the collective work of the tendency. It requires greater control and accountability over the leading bodies. Unfortunately, over the past few years it appears the opposite process has occurred.

136) The change from a lay leadership to a FT NEB in 1980-81 was taken to professionalise the leadership of the tendency. It was to allow greater flexibility, to meet rapidly, to deal with abrupt changes in the situation. However in recent years we have ended up with fewer meetings of the elected bodies, resulting in an undermining of accountability by the ranks. Although we face the pressure of events, we must remember that the Bolsheviks held their congresses every year, including the international, even despite the difficulties of the civil war period.

137) On the other side, the dangers of a FT NEB becoming 'out of touch' were recognised at the time. As a result, guarantees of greater control over the NEB were undertaken. There were to be regular full annual national events, a regular National Industrial Bureau to maintain the links with the industrial workers, two National Councils each year, as well as regular NEBs to ensure greater accountability over the FT leadership.

138) Unfortunately those guarantees have fallen largely by the wayside. We therefore call for them to be reinstated forthwith. These will then provide the necessary forums for the ranks to collectively develop our perspectives, strategy and tactics at each stage.

139) It is alarming that discussions over the tactic of standing independent candidates in Liverpool last May had taken place in for some time in Liverpool but nowhere else. This constituted a fundamental change in tactics yet even the NEB did not discuss it until the decision had been taken and it was too late to change. Even the EB only discussed it once to approve the recommendation from Liverpool. As another NEB comrade wrote criticising the EB, "I think it is ridiculous that comrades get to hear about what is going on first in the pages of the bourgeois press."

140) The vital issue of standing more independent candidates in the general election should be thoroughly discussed out, weighing up all the implications, including the possibility of splitting the Labour vote and allowing a Tory or Liberal in, instead of being pre-empted with announcements in the capitalist press. Such actions can only demonstrate a contempt for the ranks who should be fully involved in deciding these issues.

141) This greater involvement of the membership in the decision making of the organisation will serve to raise the political level as well as the collective consciousness concerning the tasks that face us. It will allow us to conduct a real dialogue with the comrades on all aspects of the work and serve to transform the outlook of the organisation as a whole.

142) These measures will also serve to cut across the tendency towards 'commandism' that have arisen from the organisational pressures of the Centre.

143) Likewise they will assist in overcoming the sickness of substitutionism, especially by the FT staff. The continual pressure from the Centre to 'deliver the goods', which bears down on the FTs especially, force them to take shortcuts. Instead of being able to train up organisers in the various fields, they appear to be on a treadmill dealing with one organisational crisis after another. The FTs are forced to step in more and more to fill the gaps in the apparatus. It has been reported recently that the decline in the number of finance organisers has resulted in FTs taking responsibility for this even at branch level.

144) A recent letter from an NEB explains: "At present the FTs spend a lot of their effort in covering the organisational gaps in the work. This can lead to the position where the FTs come under pressure to substitute themselves for the organisation and not do their main job which is giving political leadership.

"This pressure is particularly sharp on the question of finance especially the regular income. We have achieved miracles on the regular income. However is there not a trend which could become a problem that the FTs become like Labour Party Agents spending their time raising the money to pay their keep?"

145) We must undertake a thorough review of the organisation at all levels, and take urgent measures to increase the active base of the organisation. Unless we do this then we will not have the necessary forces to face up to the increased tasks of the future. This will not be accomplished by brow-beating, but by real inspiration and a patient approach. Above all it will mean an improved life of the local, with political training as a key component. This will give rise to more effective work, enabling us to penetrate the local labour movement and establish a sound basis for the ideas of Marxism.

146) This is a timely period to undertake such a review and reorganisation of our work. We have gone through the mighty battle of the poll tax - although this is still not at a complete end - and it is essential to take stock of the situation. This, of course, is not a recipe for "passivity". After all, wasn't it Trotsky who stated that the nerves of comrades must not be strained indefinitely. After hard efforts one needs to catch one's breath, get one's bearings and restore one's energies. This is essential to prepare the organisation for the next stage in its development.

Trade Union work

147) Apart from these 'internal' measures, with the General Election on the horizon, our main responsibility must be to step up our work in the trade unions and amongst the youth. These remain the two twin pillars of the organisation. They must become our key priority in this period.

a) The trade union and industrial field generally is of paramount importance for the Marxist movement. Our key responsibility is to penetrate and establish a bastion for our ideas in the industrial working class. The success or failure of the organisation will be judged by our success in this work. It is therefore essential we make a serious and sustained turn to this vital field of activity.

b) Despite our shortcomings and weaknesses our organisation has earned great respect in the past period. Now more than ever with the decline of the Stalinists, a vacuum is opening up in industry that we can fill. Although the mood can vary from factory to factory, there are openings for our comrades to establish themselves in preparation for the future battles, whatever the outcome of the general election.

c) Unfortunately, far too often in the past we have made periodic or spasmodic 'turns' to industrial work. What is needed is a consistent drive of the organisation towards this work. The strategy of the youth should be dovetailed into this thrust. After all, a stable youth organisation will need to be built primarily on young workers.

d) At a time when there is limited scope for Labour Party work, then comrades should undertake more consistent trade union work. There are a multitude of grievances in the workplaces which could be taken up by our comrades. The need to play an active role, of becoming a shop steward or representative at work will provide us with the necessary platforms from which to build up our support. In a consistent and patient manner we can establish a firm basis in the workplaces and union branches. With the prospect of a Labour government on the horizon, then the trade unions will be the key to our Labour Party work in the future. It is essential we prepare for this now.

e) In this period every local and FT must pay particular attention to our industrial comrades, discussing their problems at work and planning out a strategy. We have discussed many excellent initiatives which have been taken from time to time by various locals, such as the production of local bulletins to supplement the paper. This kind of approach, giving support to the trade union comrades in the patient work that is vital in this area, needs to become the norm for the locals and the work of the FTs. In the past, every industrial comrade was treated like gold dust, whose work was regularly discussed. We must reintroduce this approach. We must raise these comrades' political level and integrate them fully into the life of the organisation. The development of trade union caucuses must be an important adjunct to the local's strategy of attempting to penetrate the main factories and workplaces in their area.

f) Our most important initiative in this field to date was the launching of the national Broad Left organisation. At its founding conference in early 1984, there was widespread enthusiasm for this initiative. At the time the Stalinist Liaison Committee, which had played a key role in the late 1960s and 1970s, had gone into terminal decline. The ground was clear for a new left organisation.

g) Unfortunately this brilliant initiative was allowed to "wither on the vine". Of course there have been difficulties on the industrial front since the defeat of the miners' strike, but this cannot totally explain its demise.

h) The importance of the national Broad Left organisation was its potential for the future of becoming the hub of left opposition in the trade unions. Although not the same as the National Minority Movement of the 1920s, its potential could not be underestimated. Rather than being seen as just an adjunct of the organisation, its role was to develop and co-ordinate the emerging Broad Lefts in the unions and uniting the different campaigns.

i) Unfortunately its role was very much coloured by our view of it as a 'front organisation', without a real life of its own. Rather than allow it a certain 'independence', dealing with key industrial issues as they arose, it was subordinated to the particular needs of the organisation at each stage.

j) For instance, the very period when it should have played a major role during the biggest industrial battle since 1926, the miners' strike, it was not in evidence for the first six months of the dispute. Instead of being a focal point or forum for rank and file solidarity, establishing links in the power stations, with the lorry drivers, and the Dockers, it was effectively sidelined. It did not start taking initiatives over blacking until 9 months into the strike.

k) By and large, the whole organisation turned towards the miners' strike. We won a whole layer of miners to our ranks. However our main weakness was a clear industrial strategy, above all seeing the role of the Broad Left organisation that could have established itself out of the struggle as the only serious left organisation for the trade union rank and file.

1) This organisation, failing to develop a life of its own, proved unable to meet up to the potential. It was allowed to pass into the background, to be revived very occasionally for a particular rally. The hopes of the founding conference were disappointed. We must learn these lessons if we are to relaunch a genuine left body in the future. After all, the industrial 'lull' at the moment will not last indefinitely. Movements on the industrial field will affect the trade unions and lay the basis for a swing to the left. Even now, the elections in a number of unions, such as the TGWU, UCATT, USDAW. indicate the beginnings of a move to the left, which will have a colossal effect on the Labour Party in the future.

m) In order to ensure we maximise the potential for the future we need the maximum involvement of industrial comrades in the working out of the industrial strategy and ensuring its implementation. The NIB should meet regularly without fail. It must not be a rubber- stamping body, but a genuine forum for the industrial work. This should go a long way in ensuring the turn towards industrial work is not spasmodic, but carried out consistently. On this basis we can effectively prepare the organisation for the mighty struggles that lie ahead.

147) Alongside our trade union work is the vital area of youth. The restrictions imposed on Labour's official youth organisation, and the severe difficulties with the Labour students' organisation, created major difficulties for us. With flexible tactics we were able to develop other organisations to allow us to circumvent the bureaucracy and find a road to the youth. These organisations must be further developed and linked into our other fields of work. In addition, in a pre-election period, on a local level we should not neglect using the official party youth organisation where this is possible, as it can still provide a way into the trade unions and workplaces.

148) A key task in the next period is to strengthen the YRC on a local level. Many excellent initiatives have been taken. In the next period every local should have the target of building on this work and establishing a regular functioning YRC. The general election will provide a golden opportunity for this, particularly through campaigns that can be taken by comrades into their workplaces. The demand for a minimum wage offers great potential.

149) As was explained at the last national event in January, sizeable advances can also be made among women and Black and Asian workers with a patient and consistent approach. The regular production of the Black and Asian paper is a big step forward in this field of work, and offers a key to the breakthrough amongst these oppressed layers of the class.

150) Over the coming years, provided we draw all the political and organisational lessons of the past, history will provide us with a wealth of opportunities for growth. The organisation must seize them with both hands. However, our recruitment policy must have an all- rounded approach. Yes to bold recruitment! Open the doors to the best workers and youth. But equally we must get down seriously to the organisation's political development and consolidation, so that all comrades can play a full role in building and shaping our fate in the turbulent years that lie ahead.

151) What initiatives should we undertake in the next period⁷ What is our alternative to the new 'turn'? The 'turn' is not some kind of new campaign. It is a fundamental departure from the tactics, strategy and policies of Marxism.

152) The comrades challenge us to produce a strategy to win the advanced layers and the youth. But what do they offer as a strategy? "Bold, open work amongst workers and youth" (For The Scottish Turn 256) "It is vital that we develop methods of recruiting among this layer of youth, and this requires clear policies, effective tactics and bold action." (For The Scottish Turn 261) "We have to have an approach that will allow us to take up all the issues which concern young people" (For the Scottish Turn 262)

153) What have we been doing over the last number of years if not conducting "bold, open work amongst workers and youth" using the YTURC, FELS, YRC, etc. Bold, open work is nothing new.

154) In their document they do not propose any strategy or campaign to win the youth in the next period. All they have to offer arc vague suggestions for bold action etc. The same also applies to the trade union work They limit themselves to generalisations about a bold approach etc.

155) Before this 'strategy' of the new 'turn' was proposed in April what did the organisation do? Were we buried in the Labour Party waiting for events? Were we paralysed waiting for d now strategy to build? Of course not.

156) Our main campaign up until then had been the poll tax which culminated in the big demonstrations in March. The youth organisation also intervened in the anti-Gult war demonstrations. These campaigns drew youth and workers around our periphery. With the end of the war and the drawing to a close on the poll tax, new issues facing the working class and youth would need to be taken up. There are no shortage of issues.

157) However, from the standpoint of the working class the most important generalised issue facing the class in the next period will be the general election and the opportunity to kick out the Tones after 12 years. We must attempt to capitalise on this development and extend our influence in the factories and amongst the youth.

158) A special extended NIB should be convened to discuss ideas for industrial work and the general election. The national youth bureau should also be convened to discuss proposals for youth and the general election. We should examine the possibility of reactivating trade union broad left organisation which could be used to initiate a conference to drive out the Tones and place immediate demands on a new Labour government.

159) Alongside our general programme the question of the minimum wage could be taken up - demanding its immediate introduction when Labour comes to power. Such a campaign would involve YRC, especially given the amount of low paid young workers. It could be a focal point for our work amongst women, and Black and Asian workers. It would be a golden opportunity to get into the factories, workplaces and offices. We could get sponsorship from the trade unions, stewards committees, etc as well as from MPs etc. This could be a major initiative and help to pull together all fields of work in the immediate period.

160) The way to prepare our forces for a new Labour government is to immediately step up our trade union and industrial work. Over the years we have paid a lot of lip-service to the TU work. This initiative around the election could give us the opportunity to put it on a well organised footing. Of course all this work must be undertaken with elan and audacity.

161) As we have explained previously, the period of the run-up to an election, and the election itself could provide us with great potential for growth.

162) As a precondition, however, the turn must be dropped if we are to make the necessary gains out of this initiative. If we run candidates in Scotland and declare ourselves an open revolutionary party, then that will do us colossal damage. We will play into Kinnock s hands and we will be portrayed as 'splitters' to Labour workers.

163) For forty years we conducted patient and consistent work in the Labour Party and trade unions, despite the domination of the right wing for most of this period. This never stopped us from intervening in the struggles of the working class. On the contrary, we effectively used our position as Party members to assist our intervention in strikes, etc.

164) We recognised that the real fruits of Labour Party work would develop in the future The vast bulk of our recruits were made outside. We understood very well that it would be through the experiences of reformism in power that would radicalise the advanced workers who would come in and fill out the trade unions and then the Labour Party. With the real possibility of a Labour government in the immediate future and the crisis that will inevitably face it tremendous possibilities for Marxism would emerge in the trade unions and Labour Party. However at this very time we are recklessly throwing away our past work, sacrificing our public representatives, and proposing to launch an open revolutionary party in Scotland that will result in the emptying out of all our forces from the Labour Party, Why sabotage our entire base in the Party at this very moment when we could be reaping great gains in the relatively near future? Is this not an irresponsible adventure after all the work we invested in the past?

165) And for what? We had meagre gains from the Walton experience. Now we are risking everything nationally for possible short term gains in Scotland that could well prove illusory.

166) We understand and appreciate the frustrations of the comrades with our lack of recruitment, but to launch this gamble is senseless especially at this stage.

167) What is the point of perspectives if not as a guide to action? In the event of a Labour government the perspectives for the Labour Party in the next 2,3 and 4 years will be extremely fruitful for us, so why risk it all now?

168) It is naive to suggest that we can all get back easily into the Party in the future. Even the Scottish document admits this when talking about a 'tidal wave'. Even if we could get back in at some stage, which we doubt, we would have lost out largely in the shift to the left in the Labour Party and lost valuable time in establishing ourselves as a component part of the left.

169) The 'Turn' would have done us colossal damage. The capital we built up in the past, as part of the Party but separate from it, will be undermined. Our break from the Party - and that is how it will be seen by the working class - will create enormous barriers for our work in the trade unions and labour movement generally.

170) All this damage for what? According to the majority document there are two clear advantages for an open revolutionary organisation/party:

1) "It would sharply pose the aims and tasks of the tendency before our own members."

2) "It would provide a bold, clearly defined alternative to the advanced workers and youth." (For the Scottish Turn 224)

Firstly, can we not pose the aims and tasks before our own comrades without launching an open party. If our comrades are not clear about what they should be doing then this is a political problem, which we can only overcome by patient explanation. Secondly, to infer that the tendency cannot present, or did not present in the past, a "bold clearly defined alternative" is to belittle the actions of the organisation. To believe that the launching of an open party is the means to this new bold image is to put forward an organisational panacea as a solution to the political problems of party building.

171) We must open up an honest discussion on party building, so that we can resolve our deficiencies and difficulties. On that basis were can develop a more dynamic and healthy organisation that will enable us to prepare ourselves politically and organisationally for the historic tasks that lie ahead.

10 October 1991.

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